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     As a study exclusively on the political elites, the dissertation studies the Chinese regional 
leaders and their political career mobility controlled by the central government from 1949 to 
2010. The Chinese Communist Party controls its regional leaders by controlling their career 
movement (political mobility). This study explains why some regional leaders were promoted 
while some others were demoted or dismissed while most of them shared similar personal 
background and career experience. By providing empirical evidence with quantitative analysis, 
this study shows that in post-Deng Chinese politics (1997-2010) there are certain patterns and 
manipulated by the CCP center in demoting and dismissing its regional leaders in order to 
improve the party’s overall ruling legitimacy. Many China watchers have ignored the fact that 
socioeconomic development among different Chinese regions is highly uneven yet has the 
government found any efficient solution. The conflicts of interests between a regional 
government and the central government of China may have caused different economic outcomes. 
Meanwhile, the political importance of a region in China can be evaluated through the center’s 
fiscal indicators. Last but not least, sustainable economic growth and regional governments’ 
financial conditions are among the decisive factors that determine regional leaders’ political 




          “His fellow villagers asked: ‘It was planned by the meat-eaters, what it is for you to 
remonstrate with?’ 
          Cao Gui replied: ‘Meat-eaters are little learning; they are not far-sighted.’  
          Thus, he was shown in (to the Duke).”  
---- “The Duke of Zhuang, Year 10,”  
The Chronicles of Zuo (circa 4
th
 Century BC) 
 
          It can be rather complicated to analyze the phenomena of Chinese politics in which most 
outcomes are exclusively determined by its leaders rather than by the people. No matter if they 
are Standing Committee members of the Politburo or the Communist Party officials in a mid-
sized city of a quarter million people, they are names that are being mentioned, and faces that are 
being publicized everyday on the media. On the other hand, they are personalities that are very 
much unknown to the people. One might frequently be wondering: who are they? What are they 
like? And the most important of all, how have they become who they are?  
          From every aspect, voting or the holding of elections is not likely to become a regular part 
of most Chinese’s political life in the near future. However, in a bureaucracy as large as the 
Chinese government that governs more than 1.3 billion people and a set of institutions, there are 
certain techniques, channels, principles, mechanisms, or even hints or signs that outside 
observers can use to make somewhat close predications about political mobility, personnel 
arrangements, successions and appointments. And the political career movements in the future 
among regional Chinese governmental officials are greatly affected by these leaders’ leadership 
experiences and performances.  
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A. Why Regional Leaders in China Are Important? 
          Unlike in the United States, where a state and its administration are much more 
independent of the federal government, regional leaders in China serve as agents of the 
ultimately powerful central government, and enjoy their power as regional leaders in a much 
more different way. In most open political systems, successions or appointments of officials or 
politicians can be polled or surveyed through more public and transparent means; such issues, as 
they affect many people’s everyday life, can be (and mostly will be) debated or discussed more 
openly with the press and the public. However, in Chinese politics, and to most Chinese, the 
mobility of political elites has not yet become an open topic, nor does it seem likely to become 
on in the near future. Rather, it is most discreet for open discussion. Discreet, it is; but it is also 
quite common and popular in private conversations. My father often recalls that his friends and 
he frequently enjoyed studying the appearance orders of senior Party officials (most were CCP 
politburo members) on the People’s Daily’s front-page coverage of major political events back 
to his teenage years in the Cultural Revolution. That was how they “discovered” numerous 
political facts simply by thoroughly reading the contexts hidden under the front pages.  
          Compared to decades ago, everything today in China is no longer that secretive. Now if 
one turns on one’s TV every evening, one may easily find that Chinese regional political leaders 
(both provincial and municipal) are being massively exposed to public scrutiny by allowing 
government-operated media coverage of their social and political activities days and nights. It 
has already become the norm that the headlines on one’s daily evening news hour start with the 
headlines of what the political elites are engaged in during the working hours of the day. 
However, what fascinates me, as well as many others, is not what the elites are doing now, but 
how much of what they are doing now can affect their next move. In other words, hardly does 
3 
 
any higher ranking party or governmental official stay in one position for more than a few years; 
either they are moved up or they are carried down, or they restart with something similar but 
definitely not the same.  
           Overall, Chinese regional leaders are among a small groups of decision makers whose 
decisions have been changing peoples’ lives and reshaping politics among local governments and 
the center. Individually, a regional leader, for instance, a party boss of a province or a deputy 
leader of a provincial people’s congress, cannot be compared to any of the central leaders; a 
central leader is far more influential and powerful and controls a great deal of resources. But 
collectively, as there are hundreds of them, Chinese regional leaders are executors of the center’s 
policies and regulations. Without sufficient and positive support from local governments, it is 
hardly true that any of the center’s policy or important decision can be practiced or executed 
effectively.  
B. Why Study the Political Mobility of Regional Leaders? 
          A monarch is usually born to be one, a U.S. President is usually elected to be one, but a 
regional leader in China is usually orchestrated to replace his or her predecessor. The 
professional trajectories of Chinese regional leaders can be very interesting yet mysterious in 
many ways. Their promotions and demotions can be “predictable” in terms of their age, gender, 
nationality, education, factions, and previous engagements in the political system. Yet, speaking 
of their capability, performance, opportunities and arrangements, their future can also be 
“unexpected”. Such arrangements are always originated from the organization (zuzhi) which 
represents the Chinese Communist Party; but what factors the organization considers in order 
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making its final decisions on nominating and appointing a regional leader are the key elements 
that the study here tries to identify.  
              Among all the challenges and opportunities encountered in contemporary China, the 
core question is still about its politics. Has it changed through the years? How much it has 
changed toward more transparency and openness? And where is it going in the 21
st
 century? 
Surely not all of these questions can be thoroughly studied and resolved in this dissertation. 
However, I intend to make my contributions to answering these questions by studying the 
patterns of political career mobility of China’s regional leaders. This is the very subject that 
needs to be studied and analyzed to explain a series of socioeconomic phenomena ongoing in 
contemporary Chinese society. By unveiling the pattern of regional leaders’ political mobility in 
post-Deng Xiaoping era, it is likely that most new socioeconomic changes taking places in China 
are helping the country to move forward. It is also obvious to all Chinese and China watchers, 
however, that it still has a very long way to go.           
              Today’s regional leaders of China will very likely become the central leaders of China 
in the future. The author assumes that by making an empirical analysis of Chinese regional 
leaders’ political mobility, we could establish a descriptive political mobility model that reveals 
leadership trajectories in Chinese politics.  
C. Variables and Hypotheses 
 
            The relationship between the Center and the localities has undergone significant reforms 
ever since Deng Xiaoping became the leader of China. Since the abolition of the six 
administrative regions in the mid-1950s, the most important administrative levels have been the 
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provincial and the municipal. Unlike some other communist states (e.g. the former Soviet Union), 
the People’s Republic of China has always been a unitary multinational state.  
            Below the provinces and the administrative equivalents, there is a three-level 
administrative network of (a) prefectures, (b) counties and cities, and (c) townships and districts. 
The prefecture does not constitute a level of political power, and therefore does not operate local 
People’s Congresses and People’s Governments. Instead, prefectures have agencies, 
administrative commissioners and their deputies, who are not elected but are appointed by the 
higher levels.  
             In the dissertation, I intend to answer the following core questions: 
a. What are the patterns of regional elite political mobility in post-Deng Xiaoping’s China? 
b. What are the factors that affect elite mobility and its consequences?  
c. How have political mobility issues affected leaders’ decision-making? How can the 
outcomes be used to explain political phenomena in contemporary China? 
       Taking these questions into consideration, then, the dissertation will assess these 
following factors: 
Independent variables: 
i. Geographic characteristics: (a) regions, provinces and cities in which leaders work, (b) 
demographic characteristics: size of a region scaled by its population, (c) economic 
importance of this region. 
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ii. Biological factors of the sampled Chinese regional leaders: (a) distribution of sex, age, 
and nationality; and (b) correlation between the province and city in which they were 
born and the province and city in which they later serve as regional leaders. 
iii. Educational background: (a) educational level, (b) major field and other professional 
training experiences, (c) alumni and other social connections.  
iv. Career and recruitment patterns: (a) major career pattern; (b) work experiences in 
different organizations (e.g., party, government administration, military, the Youth 
League); (c) work experiences in different fields (e.g., industry, agriculture, military, 
propaganda); (d) work experiences at different levels (grass-roots, bureau/county/district, 
municipal); (e) initial year of party membership; (f) year of assuming office as mayor; 
and (g) the most recent previous position. In the following section, we will first present 
our findings in these three broad areas and compare characteristics of mayoral elites with 
those of elites at different levels. Then we will explore the correlation among variables by 
the application of regressions and coefficients. The final section is a discussion on the 
implications of these findings.  
The hypotheses are:  
a. Advantages in professional experiences and personal connections, in terms of helping 
leaders get promoted, can be greater than advantages of educational and professional 
trainings. 
b. The center has its regional preferences when determining a regional leader’s political 
mobility. Regional leaders who work in the more developed regions of China more 
frequently receive promotions than do leaders who work in less developed regions with 
weaker economic scale.  
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c. In the post-Deng Xiaoping era, leaders who are demoted or dismissed (downward 
political mobility) for actual causes (corruptions and violations) instead of purely 
political accusations. We expect to find some patterns in studying the downward political 
mobility among Chinese regional leaders in from 1990s to 2000s.  
d. The empirical research of the political mobility of Chinese regional leaders will also have 
its theoretical contribution in studying post-communist authoritarian regimes and their 
elite. Regional leaders of China in the post-Deng era tend to be more technocratic. They 
behave more like regular bureaucrats and less like revolutionaries; thus, central 
government’s selections are becoming more and more general, rational, and technical. 
Better understanding of the regime and the elite in China will constructively improve our 
understanding of Chinese government and political economy.  
D. Regional Leaders’ Political Mobility as the Outcome 
            The Chinese Communist Party is no longer the party it was when it came to power. A 
new generation  of  leaders  whose  socialization, educational background, and political  
experience  differ  significantly  from those of the old elite  has  risen  to  high  positions. China 
has opened up since Deng Xiaoping’s “going out” reform of the late 1970s. Limited by the topic 
of my discussion, this study will not preview every aspect of contemporary social and political 
changes in China. To those who are interested, to begin with the analysis of Chinese leaders is a 
much more practical approach that a series of indicators can be used to unveil some of the most 
important political phenomena taking place in China. After more than 30 years of effort of 
installing private entrepreneurships and a market economy, the economic life of Chinese has 
been deeply and widely capitalized, globalized and internationalized. In 2010 alone, China was 
active in the G20 summit, surpassed Japan to be the largest economy in Asia, and was criticized 
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by the U.S. Congress and Obama administration for adjusting the renminbi exchange rates to 
overcome the global recession. Without the economic reform of the past few decades, most of 
these events listed above likely would not have taken place in China. Still, it is a fact that some 
fundamental changes in political life are more crucial for China to maintain a sustainable 
economic growth and to regain the balance between economic achievements and lagging 
environmental and social developments. To have most of these issued eased and problems solved, 
the authorities and political leaders in China must play more efficient roles to make the right 
choices for the people. Therefore, a great number of intrinsic changes, if not from the outside, 
need to be put on the government’s agenda. As the great transformation was initiated by China’s 
leaders, it is what the people say in China, the one who tied the bell shall be the one who unties it.  
              Here, the study attempts to combine the analysis of Chinese regional leaders both 
individually and collectively based on their characteristics as suitable candidates for certain 
leadership posts and the opportunities they have been given based on their training, experiences 
and previous working locations. However, new conditions also pose new obstacles and new 
issues. The problems that confront the country now are not the ones that confronted it years ago. 
The dilemmas faced by China's new leaders are (1) how to decentralize economic initiative to 
microeconomic units while  retaining  some  form  of  macroeconomic control, (2) how to 
increase functional efficiency while  maintaining political control;  and (3) how to continue their 
elitist  orientation while legitimizing their governance. This study attempts to explore these 
issues by analyzing Chinese elites, especially those Chinese regional leaders who came to power 
in the post-Deng Xiaoping era. Studies of the social background and career patterns of elites 
must always be viewed with caution. It is hard to know what these characteristics explain about 
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concrete political behavior.  Situational variables, be they international, bureaucratic, or resource 
constraints, may effectively strip elites of choice.  
               Despite of the decentralizing authority with resilient legitimacy of the CCP center since 
the late 1970s and especially the post-Deng Xiaoping era, there are enduring peculiarities in 
China’s mobility regime related to its political and economic institutions
1
. There should be no 
doubt that the center controls the mobility of its regional leaders in order to consolidate its 
authority in contemporary Chinese political economy but not to have itself weakened by the 
socioeconomic changes through the years. As for the regional leaders, besides one’s educational 
background, political credentials are important factors for leaders to build up to more powerful 
posts in the system. Social background and career patterns in the aggregate also do not tell us 
much about creative acts of the political leadership that aim to reshape patterns of political 
preferences within  a polity, or about the individual  psychological dimensions of key leaders that 
may significantly influence policy making. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to ignore the 
linkage between the characteristics of regional political elites in China today and the broader 
patterns of societal change. There is no doubt that the political elite has changed dramatically.  
Broader  social  trends  are  emerging  that  are  closely  related to  the  leadership transformation. 
We have focused on the implications of elite transformation for the issues of economic locality 
and political mobility as they signal emerging trends. Therefore, the possible correlations that 
will be discovered in this study can also help us find out not only the career patterns for Chinese 
regional leaders, but also the intrinsic political changes adapted by the Communist party and the 
possible directions China’s political system is heading in the near future.  
                                                          
1
 Pierre F. Landry. Decentralized Authoritarianism in China: The Communist Party’s Control of Local Elites in the 
Post-Mao Era (New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp.3-9. Also, Andrew J. Nathan. 
“Authoritarian Resilience,” Journal of Democracy, 14(1)(January 2003), pp.15-16.  
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E. Data and Method 
               Because very little has been released by the Chinese government from its massive 
confidential archives, the study relies mostly on unclassified and published materials from 
Chinese state-owned media and news press. Another noticeable trend over the past 20 to 30 years 
in China, in terms of political transparency, is that information about Chinese politicians and 
political leaders has become more and more accessible to the public. Details about Deputy 
Chairman Lin Biao’s failed coup against Chairman Mao Zedong were not released to the media 
after nearly a year after Lin Biao’s plane crash in Mongolia in September 1971
2
. Now with 
telecommunication and the Internet, news about Chinese leaders travels at a much more vibrant 
speed; it has been awfully difficult for the governmental officials to cover up sensitive 
information once it has been known.  
               This study focuses on important personnel arrangements and changes which happened 
in 2000s, and to compares them both with those of Mao’s era (1950s and 1960s) and Deng’s era 
(1980s and 1990s). The state-run press, such as Xinhua news agency and the People’s Daily, has 
relevant information on such subject, but scrambled by different dates and issues. Both Xinhua 
and the People’s Daily’s releases of the leaders’ biographical information is considered the 
official version. The Communist Party of China has its own website that publishes official news 
of personnel changes in multiple languages (http://cpc.people.com.cn/). Other popular and 
reliable Chinese search engines and webhosts, such as sina.com, sohu.com, and china.com also 
publish relevant information periodically. Regional leaders’ personal information and profiles 
have been collected and categorized through these resources. Economic data are accessible by 
                                                          
2
 Federick C. Teiwes. “Mao Zedong in Power (1949-1976),” in William A. Joseph ed. Politics in China (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), pp.89-91. Also, in Ezra F. Vogel. Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China 
(Cambridge, M.A.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), p.60.  
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accessing the websites of China’s National Bureau of Statistics (http://www.stats.gov.cn/) and 
the Ministry of Finance (http://www.mof.gov.cn/), and other relevant official resources listed in 
the footnotes. In addition, each and every county, municipal and provincial government and CCP 
party organization has its own website that posts biographical information about particular 
leaders’ profiles and its regional economic reports. Above all, this study relies on officially 




CHAPTER ONE  
CHINESE REGIONAL LEADERS AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS 
 
             People are always interested in their leaders. It does not matter if a leader was born to 
lead one’s people whose loyalty to their leader comes genuinely, or if a self-made leader who has 
worked his way from the very bottom to the very top of the bureaucracy whose power comes 
from one’s position and current ranking inside the bureaucracy, outsiders often attempt to make 
certain judgments about their leadership and are curious to find out more about their political life. 
And as time goes by, such curiosity somehow only grows stronger and stronger.3 
             Regional leaders usually are not yet the world leaders whose names and faces are known 
to many others in the world. Moreover, the majority of regional leaders will never become the 
top leaders of their nations and countries. This does not lower, however, the political importance 
of regional leaders compared to their national or central leaders; it only makes regional leaders 
more important to people who live under their regional leadership, as regional leaders are those 
who get involved in specific local affairs and make particular decisions that actually affect 
people’s life in a much more direct way than any of the world leaders. Still, we the people expect 
no less from our regional leaders compared to the national leaders. We expect our leaders to be 
capable, wise, decisive, as well as moral.4 
             In terms of their responsibilities and engagements of regional people’s livelihood, 
Chinese regional leaders have always been a crucial part in Chinese politics. They are the most 
responsible for carrying out central government’s policies, applying its laws to the locals, and 
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keeping all the institutions functioning. Meanwhile, they have also served as the primary and the 
main channel for the feedbacks on each of the center’s decisions. Chinese regional leaders 
should to some extent, if they have not been doing so, also represent the interests of the regions 
they govern. In other words, regional leaders bear great expectations from both the center and the 
people. It seems to be a difficult task to handle, yet who handles it well gets mobilized upward in 
the bureaucracy and enjoys more power.  
             Before we start to explore the subject of the political mobility of Chinese political elites, 
we must keep in mind that regional leaders’ power come from the center rather than the people. 
In Chinese history, China has been a highly centralized state. Historically, the State was divided 
into different administrative regions, later labeled as provinces and municipalities, done not so 
much to serve its people better but rather to serve its ruler more efficiently. It is acknowledged to 
scholars that the earliest formation of administrative regions in China, later were addressed as 
provinces and counties, was initiated by the emperor to appoint his men to govern these regions 
under his commands rather than having the land distributed to high ranking aristocracies who 
might build their own military forces and demand much more power from the emperor.5 Thus, 
for centuries, absolute loyalty to the emperor was the primary requirement for a bureaucrat who 
was appointed as a regional leader in China. Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of 
China in 1949, such loyalty to emperor had been replace by the loyalty to the Chinese 
Communist Party. The CCP has had a considerable capacity to monitor individuals and control 
access to prestigious governmental posts around the country. Governors and provincial party 
chiefs since then have been appointed by the CCP’s central leadership without campaigns and 
elections. Thus, the means adapted by the center to select its regional leaders is of great 
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importance for scholars to unveil the facts about regional leaders and their careers; also, which 
factor(s) would play the decisive role in determining a regional leader’s career is what the author 
intend to discover in the study.  
             Hence, the first chapter of the study tries to answer these questions by examining the 
previous literature on the subject. What have we known about Chinese regional leaders and 
career mobility? What have been bypassed or forgotten in the studies on these regional leaders? 
What is it that we need find out by studying the regional leaders in China in the post-Deng 
Xiaoping era compared to that of Mao’s era and Deng’s era? Consequently, the chapter is 
divided into three different parts: first, a literature review of previous scholarly research; second, 
an introduction to regional governance in China as related to the issues raised and analyzed by 
the study; third, a general description of contemporary Chinese regional leaders, their leaderships, 
their roles in Chinese politics, and the meaningfulness of the case selection. 
A. Studies on Chinese Regional Leaders and Their Careers 
1. The Importance of Regional Leaderships in China 
 
             Generally speaking, one of the significant characteristics of Chinese politics, as in any 
authoritarian regime, is that the Communist party is closely tied to all governmental 
organizations. Therefore, the Party and all the organizations together make the entire Chinese 
bureaucracy. China's government is a one-party system with minimal popular participation; 
success therefore depends on the energy and ideas of its leaders. Historically, there was no 
middle-class in China. The ancient regime that the emperor ruled the country by appointing 
bureaucrats to run the massive bureaucracy was popularly supported by China’s nationwide 
landed elites and contracted farmhands known as peasants. The vast proportion of land elites 
15 
 
came from retired bureaucrats who previously served in the government. Therefore, regional 
political elites had relied on the central government’s support and authority in keeping their 
status quo in socioeconomic and political affairs.6 While, on the other hand, the central leader(s) 
would be satisfied with the situation that regional elites can make some autonomous decisions 
over local issues, their power would be as limited by the center to prevent local leaders from 
overpowering the center with local affairs.7 Thus, the possible dilemma which China’s central 
leaders often have to face is not having their power decentralized, but also having it be too 
centralized, going beyond their capacity. 8   
              Hence, administrative regions in China had served a very important political function in 
terms of maintaining a stable politic order nationwide; the regions are the main resources of 
taxations for the center’s revenues. Thus, some scholars argue that regional and provincial 
governments, especially as regional development has made significant gains in the economic 
reform initiated in the late 1970s under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, have been 
decentralizing the central government’s control over economic sectors, constantly lobbying the 
top leaders of China to extract preferable policies for their regions and to gain more economic 
interests or policy benefits by lobbying the central leaders. 9 As important policy decision-
making processes rarely involve regional leaders but as discussed and decided by the central 
leaders, provincial leaders have tried to influence the final policy outcomes by stressing the 
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importance of their provinces to the national economy. On the contrary, the central leadership 
has autonomy from parochial interests in many fields; central leaders should always consider the 
national interests ahead of the interests of a small region where a limited number of people 
would be beneficiaries of a certain policy. Whereas variations in policy implementation are 
needed to adapt to specific local conditions, policy choices are made ultimately toward 
maximizing China’s national interests.10  
             Furthermore, scholars also find that such balance of power between the center and its 
regional leaders has existed since Mao Zedong’s era. One of the significant outcomes of the 
leadership battles over provincial posts was the disastrous change took place in mid-1960s, when 
most provincial leaders had stabilized their posts and power and Mao himself felt unsecure about 
his personal leadership over the regional leaders. In 1967, nearly 81percent of incumbent 
provincial leaders were removed.11 As provincial party chiefs and governors were purged and 
removed from their leadership positions during the Cultural Revolution, regional governance fell 
into chaotic situations where mass rebel groups took over regional governments by claiming they 
had mastered the truth of Maoist Thoughts and that regional leaders had become the bourgeoisie 
opposed to people’s government and Mao himself. Such violent and drastic changes in regional 
leaderships destroyed the provincial governmental and party institutions and crushed regional 
leaders’ political careers, sometimes even their personal livelihoods. Though the beginning years 
of the Cultural Revolution (which is commonly reckoned to have lasted from 1966-1976) were 
brutal to provincial leaders’ career mobility, the provincial leadership of the main Cultural 
Revolution period was more stable as nearly all of them kept their positions in the government 
and the party. It is commonly understood that the Cultural Revolution caused political purges of 
                                                          
10
 Su and Yang. Ibid, 218. 
11
 Zhiyue Bo. Chinese Provincial Leaders (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E.Sharpe, 2002), p.72.  
17 
 
Chinese leaders from the center to municipalities, but scholars argue that in fact it was the most 
stable period for provincial leaders’ career because the victims of the Cultural Revolution had 
already been removed in 1967 and those who survived the purges had entered into provincial 
leadership positions after 1967 and were able to keep their jobs until the Cultural Revolution was 
over. 12 Thus, after the disastrous change of regional leaderships, the rest of the leaders continued 
their political careers due to their loyalty to Mao and his Cultural Revolution. 
             Besides playing important roles in making economic strategies and maintaining the 
balance of power in the conflict between China’s central leadership and regional leadership, 
scholars have also argued that regions in China are becoming more and more important in the 
country’s great transformation from a developing country to modernization and industrialization. 
Historically, provinces have been under the center’s direct leadership as it was they who have 
defined the importance of China’s administrative regions. Urbanization is one of the most 
prominent indicators of a country’s degree of modernization; while industrialization also caused 
massive immigration spurred by investments and working opportunities. Therefore, ever since 
the economic reform started three decades ago, coastal areas in China, especially cities and 
townships where factories and manufacturing plants are located, have become more and more 
important as the nation’s economic engine and samples of urbanization. Hence, governing the 
newly urbanized cities and industrial areas have become crucial not only to provincial leaders but 
to the CCP center as well. The success of the market economy, private ownerships and 
entrepreneurs have all become challenging issues to the CCP leadership as political recruitment 
is no longer the shortcut to higher social classes. As pointed out by Li and Bachman, becoming a 
mayor of a municipality has often been a “stepping stone” to other higher political posts in China, 
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while under China’s reform cities have taken on a much greater importance than under Mao’s 
regime. 13 Yet rapid urbanization in China has raised many new challenges to Chinese authorities 
in the past few decades: environmental sustainability, exhaustion of natural resources and 
community development, welfare and livelihood of the laid-off state-owned enterprises’ workers, 
wages and medical cares for tens of millions of migrant workers, education for lower income 
families, and the politically urgent task of dealing with the resistance and protests of citizens 
against governmental policies and regulations.  
    Most of these issues, as they are changing rapidly from time to time, have been studied by 
scholars and China watchers alike. In order to realize their interests and defend their rights, 
ordinary people may need to pay higher costs, and sometimes even face state repression. Some 
scholars point out that since the economic reform, individuals in China have found more social 
mobility channels other than joining the government-conducted units, such transition has been 
mainly positive by bringing changes to social systems and subordinate institutions charged with 
social welfare provision. But to midwife a mature civil society, the transition from traditional 
urban communities and their dwellers to more self-governance involves a “functional transition” 
from state to community institutions, since the party-state must loosen its control over private 
sectors and the private lives of the Chinese people. 14  Ascribed status is the social standing an 
individual is assigned at birth or assumes by tradition or by law. The lower strata of such a status 
hierarchy are often inseparable from the negative stereotypes that are associated with them. All 
societies display such practices of assigning statuses based on sex, gender, race, family origins, 
and ethnic differences. The Chinese household registration system (known as hukou) imposes a 
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unique type of status based on one’s parents’ place of residence, a structural rarity across cultures. 
Over time, hukou has become a deeply ingrained socio-cultural identity used by people in 
constructing stereotypes. 15  
              In consequence, most of the issues would eventually have themselves pointing to the 
regional government and its leaders. In other words, as in a highly politicized society where 
governmental control has been overpowering the society and its individuals, political solutions 
issued or directed by the government seems to be the most direct way of easing the tensions. As 
a result, although municipal leaders are not senior enough to make all the decisions, they are also 
the changing forces in Chinese politics.  
             By far the majority of studies on Chinese regional leaders focus on provincial party 
chiefs and governors alike, but the importance of newly industrialized cities and the political 
roles they are about to play somehow have been mostly unmentioned in scholarly works. Based 
on the consensus report published in 2011, there are 42 cities in China having a population larger 
than one million.16 Presumably, the difficulties to municipal governance brought by larger 
populations can certainly be compared to that of governing a smaller province in less developed 
regions in China. Therefore, in future studies on related fields and subjects, more extensive 
studies on the regional differences in China, especially by comparing industrialized cities to 
agricultural townships in Chinese economy and politics, deserve their scholarly attention.  
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2. Regional Leaders as Elites 
 
             Studies on elites show that certain social context and institutional causes can generate a 
new group of political elites who tend to have more unified interests due to such elite 
integration.17 In Chinese politics, such a social context was the Communist Revolution in which 
CCP revolutionaries defeated the Nationalists and became the new group of political elites in 
China. The earlier mechanism used by the CCP to assign political positions to its revolutionaries 
was such that the party systematically allocated career opportunities according to the political 
loyalty of its members. Due to high degree of organizational penetration and influential control 
of educational and work institutions, the ruling communist party considers loyalty and party 
membership as two of the significant requirements of a leadership post.18 Consequently, the party 
is in favor of recruiting officials with loyal party membership and higher capability in leading 
and governing, while the rewards for these members would be career advancement and a series 
of privileges, such as higher wages, better housing options and medical care packages. 
Meanwhile, educational credentials are found by scholars to be associated with increased 
organizational authority, even if such authority is secondary to a leader’s loyalty to the party. In 
order to achieve more privilege and higher positions, leaders are encouraged by the party to 
achieve more educational credentials first. Thus, Chinese regional administrative officials whose 
loyalty is high and who have outstanding educational backgrounds tend to be the elites who 
enjoy more from their careers. In other words, “[i]t does not appear that intellectuals have been 
on the road to class power; instead, party bureaucrats have been on the road to college.”19 
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             Some China watchers have argued that the Chinese government today finds it harder 
than ever to attract, develop, and retain talent as some of the current cohort of regional leaders 
now will be the top leaders in China in the future. Graduates from the country's top universities, 
who once would have filled government posts, are instead now choosing to take jobs in the 
private sector. By slowing down the political transition to open democracy and by recruiting 
more talent, CCP leadership over the country is possibly declining. 20 Moreover, the structure of 
the country's bureaucracy stifles initiative and promotes mediocrity. Furthermore, many officials, 
from the village to the central government, are corrupt, thereby eroding the government's 
effectiveness and feeding popular discontent with the system. Another argument from China 
watchers contradicts the view that the entire leadership of China is facing great challenges 
brought by the CCP leadership itself. Instead, they argue that contemporary regional leaders in 
China collectively have become a strong political force, though individually they tend to be more 
obedient to the center. However, when dealing with issues affecting regional leaders’ political 
careers or their regional interests, Chinese regional leaders as a group can make the center’s 
policies rather difficult to be carried out. Issues such as international environmental agreements 
and an accurate renminbi exchange rate against the U.S. dollar have been pushed by the central 
government as urgent policies, but have been deliberately delayed or passively pursued by 
regional leaders. Thus, according to these scholars, the center’s ability to unilaterally impose its 
will across China is “highly limited” due to regional political elites’ overpowering influence. 21 
In addition, analysts and political reporters have also noticed that even the Chinese military 
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leaders, who had been absolutely loyal to CCP’s center leadership since Mao’s era, have become 
much more independent; for example, President Hu Jintao was bypassed (or delayed) in being 
told the results of an important air force test flight. 22  
             Of all China’s challenges, the most critical one could be that of nurturing a new 
generation of leaders who are capable, skilled, honest, committed to public service, and 
accountable to the Chinese people as a whole. Unless China manages to produce such leaders, 
the CCP and Chinese government would fail to meet the country’s challenges and its public 
promises of a more prosperous and democratic future will remain unfulfilled. The difficulty that 
returnees face is only one aspect of the structural problems of China's bureaucracy. Another is 
that Chinese leaders must learn to deal with rapidly changing situations over many issues 
throughout the country. Such adaptability can cost a leaders’ career if handled badly, but it also 
provides an excellent opportunity for further promotion. Another trend in the study of Chinese 
political elite mobility has been the tendency to concentrate on the mobility of much more highly 
ranked Chinese leaders, especially officials ranked at the politburo level (Dickson 2003, Manion 
2004, Holbig 2009, and Shin, Shan and Liu 2010). They point out that economic reform and the 
installation of market economy have provided financial benefits for Chinese leaders. Bruce J. 
Dickson argues against the notion that economic development is leading to political change in 
China or that China’s private entrepreneurs are helping to promote democratization. Instead, they 
have become partners with the ruling Chinese Communist Party to promote economic growth 
while maintaining the political status quo. Thus, the Communist Party’s strategy for 
incorporating China’s capitalists into the political system and the common interests, personal ties, 
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and common views of the party and the private sector are creating a new form of co-existence. 
Rather than being potential agents of change, China’s entrepreneurs may prove to be a key 
source of support for the party’s agenda and its leaders. 23 
              One of the most enduring scholarly debates in the field of Chinese politics centers on 
the elite political equilibrium in the Chinese Communist Party. On the one hand, some scholars 
argue that Mao and other CCP leaders consistently sought to gain complete dominance over the 
party. On the other hand, it has been argued that factional politics at the top produces too much 
transaction cost such that no single faction can dominate. Clear historical examples can be 
brought to bear to support both sides. This type of study offers a novel perspective on the debate 
by taking advantage of a quantitative data set recording the biographies of all CCP Central 
Committee members from the first to the 16
th
 CCP National Congress. The data set they used has 
an indicator of how influential the official heads of the CCP were within the CCP elite, as 
represented by the Central Committee. Compounding the difficulty, studies also find that many 
high-level officials are moved from post to post too quickly; state power is also interrelated with 
economic factors and business personnel profiles.  
             Chinese regional leaders in the above examples were native to the county, but served in 
townships other than the ones in which they were born, which is also part of a top-down 
administrative strategy of the center. Some scholars argue that the rotation of CCP cadres among 
different geographical areas often serves to reinforce their identification with higher levels of the 
apparatus rather than with the local community. 
24
 It is considered a strategy used by the center 
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to strengthen its ties to the local leadership groups. Many authors assert that the capacity of the 
central state is weakened by decentralization and that there is an erosion of the nomenklatura 
system; and some argue that the political structure in contemporary China has been transformed 
from a highly effective central direction of the local cadres to the situation that the center must 
try harder to coordinate its own local agents’ behavior. 
25
 Therefore, regional leaders’ mobility 
can also function as a means to enhance the center’s influence and control over regional issues, 
as well as to host a talent show for the promising cadres. For instance, the CEO of a state-owned 
bank may suddenly find himself assigned to a provincial leadership position. For example, 
starting as an accountant of a rural coal mine in Yunnan province, Dai Xianglong (born in 1944) 
was promoted in 1985 to be vice president of the Agricultural Bank of China. Dai then in 1995 
became the president of the People’s Bank of China, the top financial job in China. In 2002, Dai 
was appointed as the mayor of Tianjin (the largest port of Northern China with one of the 
nation’s largest Industrial and Economic Developmental Districts attached) and stayed in the 
post for another 5 years until in 2008 he was appointed as the president and the party chief of the 
National Council for Social Security Fund, PRC. All these ministerial posts consolidated Dai’s 
experiences and reputation as one of China’s most powerful financial figures who currently 
manages China’s Social Security Fund with an asset value of about ¥ 780 billion. 
26
 To some 
degree, such promotion represents the government's hunger for talent and its willingness to put 
leaders wherever they are needed. Such job-hopping, however, limits the effectiveness of leaders, 
since they might have little time to learn about their positions or see their initiatives through, and 
they face resistance from subordinates who know that they will soon be gone.  
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             Other scholars have noticed that cadre training and professional development for 
regional leaders have become part of the party’s priority agenda. In order to train party officials 
for their job qualifications, midcareer training is now common among regional leaders. To 
improve cadre competence, CCP party schools and leadership schools have been functioning as 
training institutes since Mao’s era. But in recent decades, these party schools and leadership 
schools did not vanish. The training programs have been altered to fit into the new requirements 
from the center; some party leadership schools even started granting advanced degrees for cadres’ 
midcareer training. 27 One of the major differences held by scholars asserts the Chinese and other 
former Communist parties’ effective ability of adapting changes and learning from the past. For 
instance, “[o]ne thing that does seem certain―both from the China case but also from the former 
Soviet Union―is that stasis, nonadaptability, and inattention to change by the ruling party are a 
recipe for accelerated atrophy and likely regime collapse.” 28 However, the efficiency of 
vocational training offered by party schools nationwide has been doubted by other scholars. 
Scholars find that in less developed regions, cadre and bureaucrat training usually is much less 
useful and meaningful when compared to that in developed regions of China. As a result, poorer 
vocational training has less help in cadres’ career development; though the training itself was 
rather a mandatory task assigned by the party. 29 
              As the dominant ruling party, the CCP and its top leaders may have realized that strong, 
effective and durable leadership can help the CCP overcome many of its crises. Speaking of 
party leadership transitions, the transition from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao as the CCP General 
Secretaries and Presidents of China had been made smoothly and highly predictable despite 
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some significant personnel losses and gains (such as the replacement of Chen Liangyu, the 
former Shanghai party chief, conducted by Hu in 2006, which was viewed by others as Hu’s 
successful attempt to reduce former President Jiang’s influence in the party). Lower-level 
officials have the opposite problem, as pointed out by other scholars (Thorton 2006 & Edin 
2003). Most must work patiently inside a single area of government until they reach a relatively 
senior level before they even have a chance to experience working in another ministry or bureau. 
Even at the national level, it is common for directors general to have spent their entire careers 
rising through the ranks of the bureaus they now lead. This further discourages risk taking and 
innovation and thus creates yet another obstacle to good governance. Furthermore, the political 
system, manipulated as it is by the party, encourages careerism at all levels: one Chinese study 
published in 2000 found that government officials were more worried about pleasing their 
superiors than serving the people. By most accounts, the central control over the provinces has 
caused more resources go to those provinces that boast greater representation in the center. As a 
result, the center treats central cities and other provinces differently; and central provincial 
interactions are contingent on the macro-political environment.30 The Chinese party-state has the 
capacity to be selectively effective, but it depends on how it defines its priorities and degrees of 
importance when dealing with central and local governance issues. The center is severely 
constrained in its implementation of other policies, to the detriment of famers in less developed 
areas. To reduce rural poverty and farmers’ burden, thus, “the center needs to modify its 
development strategy and move the issue of poverty and burden reduction to the top of its 
agenda.” 31 
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            Overall, the contributions that previous scholarly works have made must be 
acknowledged in terms of making the study of Chinese leaders and their political careers an 
advanced, comprehensive, meaningful, fascinating, and both methodologically and evidentially 
rich subject. Yet, the shortcomings of and deficiency existed in previous studies also must be 
pointed out in order to spur further progress and advancement to the subject. First, despite 
biological research and analysis on regional leaders’ personal backgrounds, the socioeconomic 
and political differences existing among regional leaders in China has not been studied. Leaders 
differ in various ways. In terms of governing regional governments in China, the limit of one’s 
capacity may not only exist for one’s biological differences; due to regional differences and other 
unmeasured constraints, regional leaders’ decision-makings and professional performances 
actually affect their career mobility as well. Second, as China has a large population and the 
population is not at all evenly distributed through the country, a large number of leaders of 
municipalities and coastal cities are governing a population equivalent to some provinces in the 
west of China. Thus, presumably, the difficulties of governing these municipalities can also be 
compared to that of governing provinces. Yet, hardly can any studies with strong analyses on 
municipal leaders in China be found at this stage.  Most Chinese top leaders (Mao Zedong, Zhou 
Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin etc.) have been thoroughly studied, and numerous provincial 
leaders have likewise been studied, but regional leaders of newly developed cities and 
municipalities have not noticed considerably by scholars. Though it is not easily accessible for 
one to keep track of frequent personnel arrangements and reshufflings across China month by 
month and year by year, today’s mayors and municipal leaders might well become governors and 
later national leaders; it is of vital importance, therefore, that we devote more attention to them in 
order to discover more of the political system in China. Third, due to a lack of relevant empirical 
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evidence and theoretical construction, the CCP center has not been studied properly as a crucial 
part of scholarly analyses of regional leadership. As regional leaders have been changing from 
time to time due to new tasks raised by China’s progressive economic growth and social 
modernization, the center has in fact also been changing as fast, if not faster, as all the regional 
leaders. By taking all domestic issues into its consideration, the CCP center faces new challenges 
from regional leaders, and it also adjusts its mechanism by manipulating the standards of 
promoting, demoting or swapping regional leaders in order to achieve its desirable adaptabilities 
and to keep its dominant position at the center of Chinese politics. In consequence, when 
studying regional leaders and their political mobility, one must think of the center’s reactions 
accordingly as so far it is still primarily up to the CCP center to decide a regional leader’s career 
choices. As the dominant political party in China, the CCP center and its regional chiefs are not 
moving in opposite directions, rather they are actually well connected to keep the system 
working.  
B. Typologies of Chinese Regional Leaders 
            Regional political elites are often considered the future leaders of China. Among 25 
committee members and alternate members of the 17
th
 CCP Politburo, 15 of them have had 
previous regional leadership experiences, including President Hu Jintao and Vice President Xi 
Jinping (by all accounts the next president of China). In fact, “elite integration is also enhanced 
by sociometric ties, that is, networks of personal communication, friendship, and influence.”  32 
As in all communist regimes, the CCP has its system to manage the selection of leaders of 
governmental positions. The system, no matter how a cadre is promoted to be a regional leader, 
makes sure that the CCP holds a monopoly of power in town. Developed under the planned 
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economy and central-planning over all other kinds of social life, the system adopted by the CCP 
from the Soviet Union helps the party maintain its political dominance and authority in personnel 
arrangements across the nation.  
1. Regional Governance in China 
 
            In general, a region’s political importance is defined by its political or economic capacity 
and importance to the central government of China. And smaller regions are usually governed by 
a bigger regional government. It is most understandable to readers who are not familiar with 
administrative regions and rankings in China. However, unlike the system used in the United 
States, a big city in China usually also governs its surrounding counties; while a relatively small 
city can be equivalent to a county. Also, the biggest cities in China (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin 
and Chongqing) are equivalents to a province are divided into districts such that each district is 
an equivalent of a regular city; but other cities with large population are not considered 
provincial units (Figure 1.1).  
             Thus, municipalities under the central government (namely) Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin 
and Chongqing and 28 provincial regions (with Taiwan excluded as its governor and regional 
leaders are not appointed by the CCP) govern cities under their regions. And most of these cities 
govern themselves and their surrounding counties. Each county governs a certain number of 
towns or townships, and then each town likewise governs villages or administrative units like 
villages.  Therefore, according to the unit a leader is in charge of, all Chinese civil servants from 
the premier of the State Council to a town’s chief, each of them can find their position in the 


















































Table 1.1 Bureaucratic Rankings in Chinese Politics 
Rankings (from high to 
low) 
Title in Civil Service 
System 
Equivalent in Regional 
Governmental System 
Equivalent in CCP 
System 
1 Premier of State 
Council 
N/A Standing Committee 
Member of Politburo 
2 Vice Premier N/A Regular Member or 
Standing Committee 
Member of Politburo 




Provincial Party Chief, 
Member of CCP Central 
Committee 
4 Vice Minister Vice or Deputy 
Governor 
Vice or Deputy 




Head, Mayor of a 
Capital City 
Party Secretary of a 
Department 
6 Vice Departmental 
Head 
Mayor of a Mid-size 
City 
Party Secretary of a 
Department or City 
7 Divisional Head Mayor of a Smaller City 
or a County 
Party Secretary of a 
Smaller City or County 
8 Sub-divisional Head Deputy Mayor of a 
Small City or County 
Party Secretary of a 
Small City or County 
*Source: Author’s Database 
 
 
              Based on the ranking inside the civil service system (as shown in Table 1.1), governors 
are regional leaders under the premier and the center of CCP, and their equivalents in the center 
are ministers. Thus, a minister can likewise be moved to a governor’s post outside Beijing, as a 
governor can be called back to the center. Another confusing point to some readers would be: 
who has more power inside the same regional political system, the governmental chief or the 
party chief? They do enjoy the same ranking position on the chart, but in fact, the party chief has 
more power and his or her authority tops that of the governmental chief’s. Needless to say, 
32 
 
within one political unit, the chief is always in principle higher than his or her deputies or all the 
vice chiefs. Exceptions are rare. 33   
Table 1.2 Economic and Administrative Regions of People’s Republic of China 
Region (Total Number = 4) Provincial Units (Total = 31) 
Northeast Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jilin 
East Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Hainan 
Central Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan  
West Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, 
Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, 
Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang 
(Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan are excluded) 
Source: http://www.stats.gov.cn/zgjjpc/cgfb/t20060307_402309439.htm accessed July 1, 2011 
             Based on China’ geographic features and cultural characteristics nationwide, the country 
can also be divided into different grand regions: the East, the Northeast, the Central, and the 
West. Such divisions are not official but rather are valid for statistical or cultural reasons. 
However, regional economic performances are important indicators to the entire Chinese 
economy. Before the economic reform which was orchestrated by Deng Xiaoping in the late 
1970s, regional economic differences within China were much less noticeable than they are at 
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present. The West has been much less developed compared to all other regions in China, while 
the Northeast used to be the industrial center of China from 1950s to 1980s as most heavy 
industries and high energy consuming plants were built there during the First Five-year Plan 
initiated in 1953. However, the success of Chinese economy in the past three decades made its 
way through labor intensive and export-leading manufacturing sectors, instead of exporting or 
selling heavy industrial products. Thus, the economy of the Northeast declined in 1990s and the 
coastal areas of China shone their light over the country. Therefore, becoming a regional leader 
in the coastal province, especially a mayor of a newly industrialized coastal city, can generate 
some rather aggressive and intensive competition among potential cadres. On the other hand, 
being moved to the West or the Northeast without a significant promotion on the ranking chart 
would be considered a sign of one’s career stagnation. The data shown in Table 1.2 point out that 
the dominant region in Chinese economy is the East as the percentages of the West and the 






Table 1.3 Regional Economies and Assets in China 
Regions GDP (100 million yuan) Percentage (%) 
Northeast 14,545 8.68 
East 92,819 55.38 
Central 31,617 18.86 
West 28,620 17.08 
Total 167,601 100 
Source: Chinese National Bureau of Statistics 













GDP Per Capita 
Ranking 
Region 
1 Guangdong 37775.49 39978 6 East 
2 Shandong 33621.32 35893 7 East 
3 Jiangsu 33478.76 43907 5 East 
4 Zhejiang 22716.98 44895 4 East 
5 Henan 19724.73 21073 14 Central 
6 Hebei 17067.99 24583 12 Central 
7 Liaoning 14696.23 34193 9 Northeast 
8 Shanghai 14344.73 77205 1 East 
9 Sichuan 14050.78 17289 24 West 
10 Hunan 12939.85 19355 20 Central 
11 Hubei 12866.05 22050 18 Central 
12 Fujian 11855.08 33106 10 East 
13 Beijing 11469.28 70234 2 East 
14 Anhui 10191.48 16656 25 Central 
15 Inner 
Mongolia 
8967.52 37287 8 West 
16 Heilongjiang 8257.24 21593 13 Northeast 
17 Guangxi 7903.47 16576 26 West 
18 Shaanxi 7752.2 20497 16 West 
19 Jilin 7072.25 25906 11 Northeast 
20 Tianjin 7068.56 63395 3 East 
21 Shanxi 7050.38 20779 15 Central 
22 Jiangxi 6954.12 15921 27 Central 
23 Yunnan 6178.25 13687 29 West 
24 Chongqing 5693.58 20219 17 West 
25 Xinjiang 4005.41 19119 21 West 
26 Guizhou 3662.43 9214 31 West 
27 Gansu 3373.78 12882 30 West 
28 Hainan 1585.19 18760 22 East 
29 Ningxia 1198.15 19642 19 West 
30 Qinghai 1012.69 18346 23 West 
31 Tibet 434.34 15294 28 West 




              However, even among Eastern Chinese regions, differences among cities and provinces 
can be undeniable for not all of them are in the period of socioeconomic development (shown in 
Table 1.4). Centrally directed municipalities, such as Beijing and Shanghai, occupy tremendous 
resources and their GDP per capita indices can be compared to any of the OECD country’s 
performance.  Therefore, it is highly possible that regional leaders in Beijing, Shanghai or 
Tianjin attract more political attention from the center as they play with better cards with all eyes 
on them. Accordingly, it can also be true that becoming leaders in these cities tends to be more 
difficult for competitors. How difficult if compared to that of becoming an equivalent in the 
Central or the West of China? The answer awaits to be revealed in the later chapters of the study.  
2. Trends of Regional Leaders in Mao Zedong’s Era, Deng Xiaoping’s Era, Compared to 
Post-Deng Xiaoping Era 
 
             The first generation of CCP local leaders and political elites were drawn from various 
types of backgrounds, “whose legitimacy was based on charisma, their roles in the revolution, 
and their positions as representatives of the former exploited class.”34 Without revolutionary 
practice, ideological influences (as well as ideological propaganda campaigns) from the center 
have become the crucial connection between the center and its regional elites. Despite the greater 
availability of information about the current leaders of the PRC's key political institutions, 
scholars remain divided in the conclusions to be drawn. While agreeing, for example, that the 
new elitist party cadres are generally younger and better educated than the first generation of 
revolutionaries, scholars and analysts disagree about “the nature of their training and career 
paths,” 35 and the question of the possible existence of communist regime in the future. Thus, 
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“[t]he implications of a more influential subnational elite for the future evolution of the Chinese 
political system are not yet entire clearly.” 36 By examining the historical process of building the 
communist state under Mao’s central leadership, scholars also argue that in the 1950s and 1960s, 
local leaders and party cadres were tightly controlled by communist ideology, Leninist party 
discipline, and regional economic constraints controlled by the central planning system. Regional 
leaders, especially those lower ranking cadres, were scrutinized not only by their vertical leaders 
from the above, but also closely monitored by politically mobilized mass and relevant 
institutions at lower levels. 37 Though the short-lived, decentralized economic recovery initiated 
by Liu Shaoqi (then Deputy CCP Chairman and viewed as Mao’s successor) before the Cultural 
Revolution called for more monitored economic freedom to the people and loosened control over 
regional authorities in order to stimulate the national economy, the ideological education and 
organizational discipline served as leverage on the local governments and their cadres to obey 
the center unconditionally. Therefore, “[b]oth the citizens and the cadres of the new [communist] 
regime were simultaneously subject to sanctions from a wide variety of sources, including 
central state authorities, members of work teams, representatives of mass organizations, and 
higher-ranking authorities of local political organizations, all of which employed a variety of 
means, from ‘criticism’ and ‘re-education’ to the death penalty, in their attempts to ensure 
compliance and mete out ‘revolutionary justice.’”38 With such constrains and pressures put on 
regional leaders, the center may have reduced the degree and frequency of corruption and power 
abuses among officials and regional leaders. However, despite the violation of personal freedom 
and a large number of political injustices across the country, the center gained nothing more from 
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its cadres than absolute loyalty; the improvement of governmental efficiency and most important 
of all, the urgent need of developing national economy, did not arise.    
             Starting from the Deng Xiaoping era, it has been more common to witness cadres 
promoted as regional party leaders and heads of governments with industrial, administrative, and 
distinctive professional background and career experiences. This type of elite mobility 
transformation contributes to political mobilization and liberalization by de-emphasizing 
ideological concerns and accentuating social tolerance in Chinese society. Deng’s reform started 
with experiments that no one had done before. Thus, governors who fully cooperated with Deng 
in hosting the experiments in their provinces actually received great opportunities of promotion.39 
Relevant research on the topic also suggest that as veterans of the communist revolutions were 
still very much alive in Deng’s era, their political mobility tend to be lower compared to that 
experienced in the Cultural Revolution as Deng promoted them to regional leadership posts 
when he was back to power and they did not retire until Jiang Zemin became the General Sectary 
of CCP in 1989 and the 14
th
 CCP National Congress in 1992 (Li & Bachman 1989, Walder 
1995a, Bo 2002). The Tiananmen Incident in 1989 was a crucial event to some top leaders of 
China but it was not an earthquake to all regional leadership group in China. The transition from 
Deng to Jiang was more or less smoothly handled as Deng expected. Thus, many senior regional 
leaders remained in office until 1992.  
              After Deng Xiaoping’s withdrawal from public in 1992 and his subsequent death in 
1997, Jiang Zemin was known as the leader who “normalized” Chinese politics by repeatedly 
signaling that Hu Jintao would be his successor once Jiang had served his terms as General 
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Sectary and the President. During these years (1997-2000s), a significant phenomenon was the 
rising importance of regional leaders’ seats in the CCP Central Committee (shown in Table 1.5). 
Noticeably, regional leadership experiences had by this time become a crucial factor for one’s 
career future to get into the center. One possible explanation the author thinks is this: as political 
movements have declined from Chinese politics, the center has replaced its judgment on cadres’ 
loyalty to the party. Previously, by judging how much enthusiastic a cadre would like to 
participate in the movements could help one’s upward career mobility. But now economic 
growth and regional governance have become more important factors if one wants to please the 
center and demonstrate one’s leadership skills and capabilities.  











 13 2 9 
1969 9
th
 17 4 8 
1973 10
th
 21 5 24 
1977 11
th
 23 6 26 
1982 12
th
 25 9 36 
1987 13
th
 17 9 53 
1992 14
th
 20 10 50 
1997 15
th
 22 13 59 
2002 16
th
 24 16 67 
2007 17
th
 25 19 76 
Source: Author’s Database 
 
               Furthermore, the educational and professional training of regional leaders is also being 
emphasized by the center in an effort to improve leaders’ performance. Some recent personnel 
arrangements have shown the open door for more talent into the system. For example, the current 
Minister of Science and Technology, Dr. Wan Gang, who is also the Chairman of the Zhigong 
39 
 
Party (one of the eight minority political parties in China), studied and worked in Germany for 
16 years and occupied a senior technical and management position of the Audi Auto Group of 
Germany before he accepted a senior administrative post at Tongji University in Shanghai and 
moved back to China.40 For decades, it was extremely rare for professional technicians from a 
minority political party to be chosen for a ministerial post; more typical was a rather honorary 
position in the National People’s Congress or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference.  
C. Conclusion 
               In brief, a new generation of leaders whose socialization, educational background, and 
regional experiences differ significantly from those of the old elite, has risen to high positions in 
contemporary Chinese politics. However, new conditions also pose new obstacles and new issues. 
The problems that confront the country now are not the ones that confronted it years ago. The 
dilemmas faced by China's new leaders are  (1) how to decentralize economic initiative to 
microeconomic units while retaining some form of macroeconomic control, (2) how to increase 
functional efficiency while maintaining political control, and (3) how to continue their elitist 
orientation while legitimizing their governance. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to ignore the 
linkage between the characteristics of elites in China today and the broader patterns of societal 
change. There is no doubt that the political elites have changed dramatically. Broader social 
trends are emerging that are closely related to this leadership transformation. Studies have 
focused on the implications of elite transformation for the issues of economic localism, elitism, 
and political mobility and mobilization as they signal emerging trends. Many Chinese and 
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foreign observers are clearly aware and worried by some of them―particularly localism―and 





THE RECRUITMENT AND POLITICAL MOBILITY OF CHINESE REGIONAL LEADERS 
 
          The current map of Chinese politics shows a hierarchical system where the CCP occupies 
the dominant position and has great influence over every political issue flowing within the 
system.  Unlike the former Soviet Union, where the Communist Party was the only game in town, 
the Chinese Communist Party does have followers
41
 showing that this is not a “one-party state,” 
but these are only followers, not competitors. Therefore, membership in the CCP usually is the 
first step for someone who is interested in a career in politics.
42
 But the CCP contemporarily has 
more than 80 million members nationwide. While not all of them can enjoy a share of the CCP’s 
power, who are those who have the potentials as well as motivation to become an official? By 
examining current regional leaders’ career mobility trajectories, we may find that the party does 
not select its officials randomly. Instead, it is a series of combined factors of potential party 
members’ background, experiences, capability and opportunities.  
           No denying that since its establishment 90 years ago, the CCP has been through a great 
deal of external challenges and internal turmoil. Yet, it survives and maintains a hold on central 
political power in China; its leadership has evolved and played the crucial part. Although not 
selected as leaders through elections, Chinese regional leaders are selected through a series of 
procedures and are given opportunities to accomplish tasks from their bosses; their performance 
will be taken into consideration for further promotion opportunities. Regional leadership is 
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important to the CCP as it assures the CCP’s political dominance locally; furthermore, 
outstanding regional leaders with talents and accomplishments are likely to be chosen for higher 
posts in the future.  Thus, the selection procedure itself makes sure that the central leadership of 
China will be handed to the most capable bureaucrats in the country. “Promoting inner-party 
democracy” has been mentioned frequently in recent years through CCP propaganda. It means to 
grant more opportunities from the center to lower ranking officials and to party members holding 
different views of the center’s policies or campaigns. It is said that the current general secretary, 
President Hu Jintao, has been supportive to a number of decentralized initiatives.
43
 The center 
tries to be more democratic to its members within the system and tolerates a very small number 
of competitors, albeit with certain regulations over them. Though far from any open competition 
and with no opposition party allowed, it is obvious that the CCP is adopting changes gradually as 
it knows some changes are unavoidable in terms of modernization and globalization. In 
consequence, changes of the selection of regional leaders may show some new signs of the 
CCP’s gradual and highly cautious transformation.  
           In the first chapter, we have already examined some of the newer phenomena found in 
regional leaders’ curriculums over time: both ideological and organizational controls over CCP 
officials were tighter in Mao’s era, compared to that of Deng’s and post-Deng’s China. In the 
second chapter of the study, we intend to find out: (1) what are the patterns of political mobility 
of Chinese regional leaders and why has the mobility had the decisive influence on their political 
careers? (2) When the political mobility is under discussion, what are the indicators in Chinese 
politics which construct the map of political hierarchy in China? (3) What are some rules of 
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thumb that influence political mobility of regional elites? And (4) what would a timely, cross-
regional, comparative examination of Chinese regional leaders reveal?   
A. Defining Political Mobility 
            In this study, the political mobility of Chinese regional leaders focuses on promotions or 
demotions of their career specifically means the movement of a leader from one position to 
another during his political career as a regional leader in China. As is broadly used in 
sociological studies, the term social mobility means “[t]he ability or potential of individuals 
within a society to move between different social levels or between different occupations;” 
44
 the 
political mobility in this study does not concern inter-occupational mobility as long as officials 
still work within the political system.  
            Political mobility is a crucial part of a Chinese regional leader’s political career. The 
movement of a leader can be either vertical or horizontal within the hierarchical political system; 
moreover, such mobility exists in most communist and post-communist regimes as the dominant 
communist party controls the decisive power to determine a leader’s political career. For 
example, “[t]he movement of Soviet political elites from one part of socioadministrative 
structure to another connotes a change in the individual’s political status, defined in terms of 
political power. These changes over time reveal much about the dynamics of the political system 
itself.” 
45
 Specifically in the case of Chinese provincial leaders, five different possibilities can be 
said to exist for a provincial leader’s career: (1) stay where one is (no movement vertically or 
horizontally), (2) get promoted at the same locale (vertical movement), (3) receive no promotion 
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but get transferred to a different region (politically no change but change of location), (4) get 
demoted at the same locale (vertical movement), and (5) retire (end of all movements).
46
 It is true 
that continuing the same job or retiring due to one’s age can be considered as part of a leader’s 
career movement. But as no change or retreat from leadership (or death) has little significance on 
the mobility analysis, the study emphasizes regional leaders’ promotion, demotion, and location 
changes.  
1. Organizational Control of Leaders’ Political Mobility 
 
            Within the state conducted political system, there are different sub-systems in Chinese 
politics. For instance, there are the CCP party system, the central and local governmental system, 
the military system, the state-owned corporation system, and the Communist Youth League 
system. Theoretically, officials who work in different sub-systems are actually interchangeable. 
However, as different sub-systems are in charge of dealing with different affairs in Chinese 
politics, some of the positions are practically more important to the whole system than that of 
other sub-systems. Thus, being transferred from other posts to a certain post actually means a 
promotional opportunity for the official. On the contrary, being transferred away from this 
certain post to other posts, as a matter of fact, means a demotion to the official. In general, it is 
the CCP politburo or important central committee members who decide posts for governorships, 
and the CCP chief of a province or a city makes decisions to transfer or reshuffle officials within 
his region. Practically, the CCP department of organization (an essential part of most CCP 
regional branches) handles the details once the decision is made, and they also catalog all the 
leaders and officials periodically and report to the organizational heads and party chiefs.  
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            Therefore, the party makes all the personnel decisions and arrangements that no matter 
which sub-system needs its leadership to be filled or changed, the decision-making authority 
remains in the party’s hands. And the department of organization is in charge of carrying out the 
decisions. For instance, if a leadership reshuffle in a regional educational system is needed, the 
party chiefs will discuss about it, make their choice, and send the organizational head to have the 
job done. A department of organization exists in most CCP branches nationwide and it archives 
most personnel information including every party member’s profile, curriculum vita, and career 
records. Generally speaking, organization departments specialize in surveying and classifying 
party members and officials personal information; the classifications routinize the political 
mobility processes among regional leaders, make sure candidates meet the basic requirements, 
and influence (and sometimes monitor) the decision-makers final decisions.  
             However, as they handle confidential materials unknown to most people, some 
organization departments abuse their power to make profit. A recent case shows that a Youth 
League chief of a sub-provincial city not only changed her name years ago (in order to be seen as 
being related to an influential person of her hometown), but also changed her year of birth 
multiple times within a short period of time, from 1969 to 1973, then from 1973 to 1978, in order 
to meet age qualifications for her career promotions. She was caught again using a fake name 
and documents to defraud of a multimillion dollar legacy.
47
 Before this League official was 
finally sentenced in April 2011 for 14 years of jail, she had climbed all the way up from a young 
farmer without formal education to a sub-provincial political leader and once was considered a 
political star as she was a very “young” official among her peers. Even with nationwide 
organizational control over CCP cadres, there are unexpected factors in studying Chinese 
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regional leaders’ political mobility that can be difficult to detect or measure. Though the efficacy 
of the CCP’s control over its local branches is not a subject of our study, the author would like to 
point out that some of the outcomes of the CCP’s governance can be different from the center’s 
expectancy. Such unexpected cases are not caused by systemic factors, as the party itself would 
not be willing to promote an official with fake credentials whatsoever, but the results have 
caused controversies among Chinese people question the party-state regime’s efficacy and 
legitimacy.  
2. Vertical Political Mobility: From Low to High 
 
             The vertical political movements of leaders are fairly obvious to explain. Apparently, 
one of the most important indicators to show a regional leader has received a promotion is that 
the leader has been moved from a lower level in the system to the next higher level. As shown in 
Table 1.1 of chapter one, a mayor of a small city becoming the mayor of a bigger city is a 
promotion, and a mayor from a mid-size city becoming a deputy mayor of a provincial direct city 
(usually the capital city of the province) is also a promotion to the leader. For higher ranking 
officials when a deputy governor or deputy party chief of a province moves up to the governor or 
the chief position, that official is getting a promotion. A governor or provincial party chief 
getting the job as mayor or party chief of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin or Chongqing also a 
promotion since the four central direct municipalities, though they are smaller than any province 
in China, means a great deal because most mayors or party chiefs of these four municipalities 
will sooner or later become members of the Politburo. If a provincial leader is removed to the 
center and accepts a chief ministerial post, usually it means a promotion. This is the case unless 
the leader is removed from an important region to a much less important central ministry. Being 
called up to the center entails having more opportunities and connections; perhaps becoming a 
47 
 
politburo member is soon enough to come true. Such movements in regional leaders’ careers are 
vertical movements, as this type of promotions moves the leader upward and demotions move 
them downward in the category. Therefore, if a governor is being moved to a non-direct 
municipal city chief post, it is considered a demotion. And if a big city mayor is moved to a 
small city mayor post, or given a deputy major post at a similar type of city, in terms of 
population, economy and political importance, it is likewise considered as a demotion. In a word, 
going upward or downward depends on where the leader is going.  
             Meanwhile, measurements for deputies (e.g. deputy ministers, deputy party secretaries) 
have been a weakness in studying political elite mobility in China. It is hardly the scholars to 
blame since there are many more deputy posts than chief posts in both governmental and party 
sub-systems. Even inside the Center, deputies and vice-chiefs have been granted to senior central 
leaders as promotions, political compensations, balance of power, and temporary personnel 
arrangement negotiations.
48
 Within a province, there is one governor and one party chief, but 
usually about 6 to 8 deputy governors and the same number of CCP deputy secretaries. The 
Chinese bureaucracy has always been expanding and never seems to be happy with its current 
size. Sometimes, for an important city inside a province, its party chief is also a deputy or vice 
governor and occupies one of the 8 seats. Despite the 15 sub-provincial municipalities (listed in 
Table 2.1 from Harbin to Shenzhen) whether a big city boss can be an equivalent to a deputy 
provincial chief or not, it has to be examined by looking at a specific case. It is only conventional 
that capital cities in provinces tend to be more important, but no official arrangement shows that 
a capital city boss must take a seat among the vice governors who sit next to the governor. 
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Therefore, when a city boss becomes a vice governor or party chief while having his or her city 
chief seat saved, it is considered a promotion. And for other vice governors, if they can hold 
titles more than the governorship, it is also an upward mobility. If they are striped to only one 
title from multiple titles and the one left is still a deputy one, meaning he is not in charge of a 
region, then we can call it a demotion.  
             In all, the vertical movements of Chinese regional leaders look quite mixed for outsiders. 
But they are not random at all. The leaders seem to be aware of the institutions set by the center, 






3. Horizontal Political Mobility: From Region to Region 
 
             Many have noticed the political difference among regions in China, but few have 
explained it well. Yet the social mobility trend shows that more educated, skilled labors flow 
from the less developed regions to more developed regions in China. The political mobility of 
regional leaders also shows that once in a while, underdeveloped regional leaders with better 
performance get moved to developed regions in China and become leaders there.
49
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Table 2.1 Important Municipalities in China 




GDP** Province Region 




1377.8 N/a East 




1687.2 N/a East 




910.8 N/a East 




789.4 N/a West 
Harbin 10.6 Sub-
Provincial 
Vice Governor 366.6 Heilongjiang Northeast 
Changchun 7.52 Sub-
Provincial 
Vice Governor 258.8 Jilin Northeast 
Shenyang 7.86 Sub-
Provincial 
Vice Governor 435.9 Liaoning Northeast 
Jinan 6.03 Sub-
Provincial 
Vice Governor 335.1 Shandong East 
Nanjing 8 Sub-
Provincial 
Vice Governor 501 Jiangsu East 
Hangzhou 7.97 Sub-
Provincial 
Vice Governor 509.9 Zhejiang East 
Guangzhou 12.7 Sub-
Provincial 
Vice Governor 1060 Guangdong East 
Wuhan 9.79 Sub-
Provincial 
Vice Governor 556.6 Hubei Central 
Chengdu 14 Sub-
Provincial 
Vice Governor 555.1 Sichuan West 
Xian 8.31 Sub-
Provincial 
Vice Governor 271.9 Shaanxi West 
Dalian 6.69 Sub-
Provincial 
Vice Governor 515.8 Liaoning Northeast 
Qingdao 7.64 Sub-
Provincial 
Vice Governor 566.6 Shandong East 
Ningbo 7.6 Sub-
Provincial 
Vice Governor 512.6 Zhejiang East 
Xiamen 3.53 Sub-
Provincial 
Vice Governor 205.4 Fujian East 
Shenzhen 10.36 Sub-
Provincial 
Vice Governor 951.1 Guangdong East 
Total 212.9     12367.6     
*Millions, as of 2010 **Billion Yuan, as of 2010                                               




             But why? Scholars of comparative politics state that developed regions are relatively 
easier to govern than underdeveloped regions. In developed regions, the rule of law is better 
established, citizens tend to be more educated, the infrastructure is markedly better than that of 
the underdeveloped regions, there exists greater social and political integrity, less social 
cleavages, more civic engagement, more social capital, and more advanced market economy. In 
general, the civil society is stronger and more autonomous in developed regions.
50
 If so, a 
Chinese regional leader who has been doing well in governing a less developed region, as he or 
she has made progressive achievements, the center should have sent that leader to an even less 
developed region as the leader can do things that others cannot. In other words, have your best 
employees deal with the most troublesome customers. As a matter of fact, Chinese leaders who 
had worked well in underdeveloped regions more often find themselves transferred to more 
developed cities and provinces. Little has previous research noticed the logic of the CCP center 
behind its arrangement: that the primary concern when transferring leaders is not to put them 
where they are the most needed, but to put them in more important leadership posts and to use 
them in the future. It is known to all the people of China that more developed regions (especially 
the four central direct municipalities) occupy much more political importance in Chinese politics 
than do the less developed regions of China. Therefore, the reward for diligent leaders is to 
become more well-known and powerful to the nation. Arguably, the mayor of Shanghai may 
have less disturbing governance issues than the governor of Gansu Province. But certainly a 
politburo member as well as the mayor of Shanghai enjoys much more political and 
socioeconomic resources than the governor of Gansu who is usually not known to most Chinese 
and barely has the chance to participate in any of the center’s decision-making processes.   
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             As shown in Table 2.1, the most important 19 central direct municipalities and sub-
provincial cities make up almost 15.6 percent of the Chinese population and 14.4 percent of 
Chinese national economy. Furthermore, half of the cities listed here can even compare their 
economies to some of the provinces in Western China (i.e., Gansu, Tibet, Xinjiang, etc.) where 
the land is vast but people are poor. Thus, the political importance of these regions is weighed by 
their share in the national economy and their degree of social capital, such as skilled labor, 
prominent higher educational institutions, better infrastructure, hospitals and health care units, 
foreign investments and cultural affairs, the professional expertise of the labor force, the region’s 
adaptability to business and foreign investments, locals’ respect to the rule of law, etc. Therefore, 
if a provincial leader becomes the mayor of a central direct municipality, it is a promotion. Sub-
provincial leaders (mayors and party chiefs) are next in line to become provincial leaders or 
ministerial posts in the center. Central-direct municipal party chiefs are already politburo 
members; their next upward movements are likely to be the leaders of China. However, when a 
central-direct municipal mayor is removed to be the party chief of some other provinces, it is still 
considered a promotion because party chiefs are more important than governors. Basically, 
governor posts are not attractive enough for mayors of central-direct municipalities; they want at 
least provincial party chiefs in the developed regions of China or seats in the politburo. Even if 
there are only about 25 politburo members are selected once in every 5 years.  
4. Cross-Dimensional Transfers between the Executive and the Non-Executive Posts 
 
           Besides vertical mobility within one sub-system of Chinese government and horizontal 
mobility between regions in China, political mobility can also be found in movements of leaders 
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In charge of broad 
administrative affairs, issues 
related with the government, 
assists the provincial leaders.  
Departments of Finance, 
Industry, Human Resource, 
Agriculture, Education, 
Culture, Justice, Business, 
Public Health, Public Safety 
(Police), Environment, etc. 
Taxation, Tourism, Banking, 
Broadcasting, Forestry, Press 
and Publishing, Quality 
Control, Labor Welfare, etc.  
Headed by the governor and 
usually 6-8 vice or deputy 
governors, each is charge of 




            Previous studies of Chinese leaders’ political mobility show that highly ranked regional 
leaders tend to have less potential upward political mobility opportunities as the promotional 
room left can be limited. However, before regional leaders reach a certain ranking, cross sub-
system movements can be rather frequent.
51
 Scholars argue that such frequent movements among 
leaders leave them little time and experience to prepare, but leaders’ previous experiences hardly 
help them to adjust to a new working environment.
52
 Scholars try to explain this phenomenon by 
claiming that the CCP is trying to train its cadres to adapt new challenges brought by 
internationalization and globalization of the 21
st
 century. In fact, cross-dimensional political 
mobility existed even in the early years of the CCP’s establishment. Deng Xiaoping was a classic 
case of the kind. Studied in France during his teenage years of 1920s, Deng joined the 
Communist Party of China before he was sent to more intense communist training in Moscow in 
1924. After working briefly as a political advisor for a Nationalist (KMT) warlord (Gen. Feng 
Yuxiang) in 1927, he was sent to southwest rural China to organize local peasants’ resistance 
against the KMTs. Then he was transferred back to Northern China where he officially became a 
military leader when the Anti-Japanese War broke out. He was put in charge of establishing the 
“Liberated Territories” as forts and settlements for the communists and their supporters during 
the War. Before his vice premiership in the early 1950s, he worked both as a regional party chief 
and a military commander of the People’s Liberation Army. As a result, multiple job titles and 
frequent career moves did not overwhelm Deng but only made him more well-known as a 
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strong-willed CCP leader. As Deng said himself by reviewing his personal stories, “I became a 
central leader at the age of 23, it was quite prominent!” 
53
  
            Deng Xiaoping’s case can be historically exceptional as he lived long enough to succeed 
as the top leader of China after Mao Zedong. But cross-dimensional personnel arrangements 
(making arrangements amongst the party, the state and government system) among leaders were 
common when the CCP became the dominant political force of China in 1949, and eventually the 
arrangements became systemic to provide regional leaders with different tasks before they get 
promoted or demoted. Meanwhile, cross-dimensional reshufflings among highly ranked regional 
leaders can always cause great attention nationwide. For example, in April 2010, Zhang 
Chunxian, the CCP Chief of Hunan Province, replaced Wang Lequan as the new CCP Chief of 
Xinjiang Autonomous Region of Uighurs, while Wang was moved to the center and became a 
deputy secretary of the Central Committee of Politics and Laws. Each man was a regional leader 
with the Politburo membership but no official explanation detailed the reason for the reshuffling. 
Wang Lequan had acquired his governorship of Xinjiang in 1991 and was known as a supporter 
of President Hu Jintao. However, the Uighurs Revolt in July 2008 shortly before the Beijing 
Olympics, with more than 200 deaths of innocent Han Chinese civilians killed by the revolted 
Uighur violence cause great controversies over Wang’s governance in Xinjiang during the past 
two decades.
54
 Unofficial sources claim that Wang might have abused his power to have 
chartered some governmental land to his family members instead of employing open bidding 
among potential buyers. Revolts or political instabilities seem to be unacceptable to the CCP 
center. On the other hand, ever known as a very capable Minister of Transportation, Zhang 
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Chunxian became a provincial leader in 2005. Not only is Mr. Zhang 9 years younger than Mr. 
Wang, but he is also known to the press as a “vivid” and “open” regional leader. This reshuffle 
showed the center’s hesitation over Wang’s regional leadership even if his performance had been 
approved for the past 19 years as the leader of Xinjiang. The center was seemingly eager to have 
a new face such as Zhang, who is not only press-friendly but also capable of easing multinational 
tension among the minorities.
55
 The political career movements of Wang Lequan and Zhang 
Chunxian show that the CCP center has a strong interest in sustained unitary governance all over 
China; it will not tolerate its tenured regional leader decentralizing its authority. Noticeably, 
Wang was moved to the center with a senior post on the Central Committee but with less 
practical power compared to a senior provincial chief. According to the rankings, it was a slight 
promotion (since regional leaders all want to be in the center someday), but the deputy post itself 
means no further promotion would be likely and Mr. Wang is obviously too old to stay on the 
next CCP Politburo.  
             Generally speaking, governors and provincial party chiefs are interchangeable to each 
other. A governor or a deputy in the East can be transferred to the Central or West to be a party 
chief. It would be a promotion as the party chief controls more power in a province. And if a 
deputy party chief is transferred from the Central or the West to the East to be a governor, it is 
also a promotion, as this official is no longer one of the deputies, and the East is considered to be 
more important both politically and economically. For sub-provincial city mayors or party chiefs, 
governorships everywhere would be a promotion. Although western provinces can be poorer 
than a coastal city, becoming a governor means a provincial party chief is the next step upward; 
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eventually, if one makes no big mistake, entering the center is also possible after tenured terms 
as a provincial leader. Within each governmental setting, the secretariat, the departments of 
finance, business, human resources, and public safety (police) are relatively more important than 
other departments as they control more political resources than the departments of agriculture, 
social security or cultural affairs. Thus, becoming officials of the more important departments 
means promotion opportunities, though they are actually more difficult to get in as well. For 
officials being transferred, for instance, from a post in a department of business to one in a 
department of environment can be viewed as a hold-back.
56
  
             By all means, the CCP is a political party with strong discipline and considerable 
organizational strength. In fact, all communist parties were established based on the Leninist 
ideology and organizational institutions. Thus, ideology and organization are crucial to a 
communist party’s rule (and survival). Inside a regional CCP committee, the department of 
organization and the department of propaganda are usually occupied by officials with greater 
ambitions and stronger connections with the regional party chief. Therefore, cadres from these 
departments as well as from the committee of laws and politics are taking the VIP seats in the 
conference room. If cadres or governmental officials are removed from these departments to the 
department of the United Frontier or the bureau of senior party cadres (taking physical care of 
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retired cadres and providing them with a series of welfare), it would be a demotion as they are 
considered “weaker” departments. On the contrary, it would be a promotion if one gets into the 
propaganda or organization department from other departments. A regional party school is much 
more independent compared to the departments. It has its faculty and facilities not attached to the 
party committee directly. Only its principal is usually a deputy party chief of the region. Thus, 
only party school principals’ mobility will be taken into consideration in this study. However, 
party schools are where younger officials and cadres meet each other and get trained for further 
promotions. Therefore, party school training background can contribute to a regional leader’s 
political mobility in his future career.  
5. Where Do the Leaders Go? Movement after Leadership 
 
             When a leader is no longer a leader, such consequences would take place to the leader’s 
personal life and political career: retirement, change of occupation, resignation, dismissal, and 
death. Though caused by different situations, if any of these possibilities happens to a leader it 
leads to only one consequence of the leader’s political mobility: no movement thereafter.  
             In Mao Zedong’s and Deng Xiaoping’s eras, the political career of a high-ranked leader 
could be a life-time commitment as senior leaders rarely retired and worked until they were 
physically incapable of doing so (shortly before death). However, from the 1990s under Jiang 
Zemin’s central leadership, it has become formalized that all regional leaders and central leaders 
must retire when reached a certain age line. The age limit for provincial leaders is sixty-five 
(with a few exceptions) and for lower-ranked leaders, it is sixty. When retirement became 
institutionalized, new opportunities for promotion and political mobility go to the younger cadres.  
59 
 
             Unlike politicians in the developed world, Chinese political leaders generally do not 
change their occupation as politicians. It is more or less a Mandarin tradition that being a leader 
is a privilege rather than a job title. Once you are, you always are. When mayors or governors 
retire, they still enjoy the housing and medical care benefits as they used to; thus, changing 
career seems to be not only unwise but also unnecessary.
57
 However, one loses one’s leader’s 
privileges if the leader is dismissed or forced to resign for mistakes made. Such mistakes include 
serious violations of laws or party disciplines, corruption and bribery, inappropriate behavior, 
governance mistakes, or being sued or reported for other violations by the masses. Whatever 
happens, once the cadre’s party membership is dismissed and stripped down from the leadership 
post, a leader’s political mobility is also terminated.   
B. Measuring Chinese Regional Leaders’ Political Mobility 
1. The Changing Trends of Regional Leaders in China 
 
             A political leader’s importance is usually evaluated by his or her decision-making power. 
Instead of fashioning a ranking figure of all Chinese central and regional leaders by weighing 
their political powers compared to each other, we must keep in mind that such ranking can be 
subjective and dynamic. Under Mao Zedong’s leadership, Mao himself was the highest decision 
maker in China. But such ranking came from Mao’s decades of revolutionary leadership, 
reputation across the communist world, other leaders’ absolute loyalty to Mao as those who 
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doubted Mao’s leadership were gradually purged, and, indeed, his charisma. Therefore, the order 
of appearances of other leaders on the public media was of vital importance because whoever 
showed up next to Mao or stood closer to Mao in the Great Hall of People during state 
ceremonies was tabbed as a rising political leader and was deemed to have more importance in 
the center’s decision-making process.  
             Deng Xiaoping was also a senior leader of the Chinese Revolution, but not as dominant 
as Mao. Since the late 1970s, the importance of central and regional leaders and their career 
paths were greatly influenced by Deng’s personal decisions; but were not manipulated single-
handedly by Deng himself, however. 
58
 Sometimes a certain personnel arrangement was issued 
as a balance of power among senior Politburo members, rather than a decision-making outcome 
toward a policy solution. For example, in order to recruit younger talents as CCP leaders and 
take over the party to continue the reform, Deng created the Central Advisory Committee to 
contain most senior leaders and save provincial leaders’ seats for the new comers. The 
Committee was formed in 1982 during the CCP’s 12
th
 National Congress, and it was composed 
of 172 members and chaired by Deng himself. But the formalization of the semi-retirement of 
senior leaders began in 1975, and after numerous meetings and personal pushes between Deng 
and his senior colleagues, the Committee was finally established.
59
 The Central Advisory 
Committee was abolished after two terms in 1992 as most senior leaders had passed away and 
the third generation of CCP central leadership had been formed. Therefore, even though Deng 
was the leader of China with decisive power over most issues, the authority of his leadership and 
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his influence sometimes lacked the proper strength to push his regime to proceed the way he had 
planned. Indeed, the CCP leadership system is a highly Leninist yet hierarchical one, which 
means that centralized decision plus loyalty and discipline together characterize the nationwide 
system.  
             In contemporary China, especially after Deng Xiaoping’s death in 1997, it has been 
shown that no single central leader is able to control all regional leaders’ political mobility and 
their career movements. Both the third generation, headed by Jiang Zemin, and the fourth 
generation, headed by Hu Jintao, of the CCP center lacked charismatic personalities and wartime 
revolutionary backgrounds. Decision-makings inside the Politburo’s compound may have been 
relying on leaders’ actual powers rather than their honorary titles and impressive résumés, 
compared to their predecessors. In terms of regional leaders’ mobility, simply by counting the 
leaders’ order of appearances will not be enough for us to rank their importance in Chinese 
politics. Furthermore, with the same age range, similar educational background and trainings, 
and more likeness of their career experiences, these factors are now less significant for us in 
analyzing the differences of their positions ranked in the system. In other words, facing the 
growing talent pool but with similar types of talents, to make closer observation of how the 
center selects its regional leaders concerns a great deal of the accountability of this study. 
Nationwide, there were about 25,000 provincial-level cadres in China in mid-1980s; but the 
number grew rapidly to about 35,000 as of late 1990s.
60
 And the CCP’s Central Committee 
membership has indeed increased from time to time (Figure 2.3). An expanded bureaucracy can 
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be filled with more party cadres, but the task of disciplining all of the highly ranked officials can 
also be more difficult than before.  
 
Figure 2.3: Increased Membership of the CCP Central Committee of National Congress by Year 
Source: Author’s Database 
 
2. Toward Some Rules of Thumb with Measurements of Political Mobility 
 
             There are some rules of thumb that we should keep in mind when talk about political 
mobility of Chinese regional leaders.  
             (1) The Party system generally has more political resources than the regional 
governmental system, and it is more dynamic in terms of mobilizing its officials. Furthermore, 
having party membership can contribute significantly to one’s career mobility compared to 
governmental employees without CCP party membership. Age, gender, nationality, educational 


















regional leader’s political career. However, being a Communist party member is still the most 
important credential a leader shall have.  
             (2) Leaders or cadres in executive positions can get more promotions than those who 
work at non-executive positions. It is difficult to define how executive a post must be to let its 
leader move upward within a certain period of time. However, we may assume that such 
mobility scores can be drawn from comparisons to those non-executive posts. Needless to say, in 
any bureaucratic organization, its fiscal and personnel decisions can easily become its top 
priority over other areas of authority. The governmental system deals with more administrative 
affairs, yet some Party departments still have more executive powers over personnel 
arrangements. Therefore, inside a regional government or party committee, leaders in charge of 
financial and personnel arrangements are considered more prominent than other leaders or 
deputies with the same ranking.  
             (3) Cadres with professional backgrounds (i.e., managers, engineers and businessmen 
from China’s gigantic state-owned firms) can become Chinese regional leaders, and such career 
moves are considered promotions or upward political mobility. Executives of big state-owned 
corporations are sometimes promoted into the governmental system to become officials or 
regional leaders. But generally speaking, state-owned corporation's executives are rarely 
promoted into the Party system to become Party officials, neither regionally nor nationally. The 
initial career movement after one’s executive post of a state-owned firm would very likely be a 
post in the government (or a central ministry) rather than a secretary or deputy secretary of the 
CCP committee. However, if a regional leader, either governmental or party secretaries, is 
moved to become an executive of a state-owned firm, it is hardly a promotion as it is a step away 
from the political system to the business world. That is, unless the leader is also appointed as a 
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chair or executive member of a state-owned firm. But his or her primary profession is that of a 
politician, not a businessman or businesswoman. Such cases will be coded differently and 
separately, but they are not common among regional leaders.  
             (4) For most regional leaders, one must become a member of the CCP’s Central 
Committee (CC) in order to become a Politburo member as the next step. The Politburo is the 
head of the CC, and only very rarely has a regional leader become a Politburo member when first 
elected a CC member. Usually it takes another five years or longer; one has to wait until the next 
CCP National Congress to move from a CC member to be on the Politburo. As a result, 
becoming a CC member is a promotion but losing one’s CC membership is a demotion. Also, 
once a CC member reaches his or her age of retiring, his or her CC membership will be 
terminated and a new member will be chosen by the CC. In other words, when one’s political 
career stops, it also stops one’s social responsibility, political entitlements and publicity.  
             (5) In contemporary China, military leaders have been promoted regularly and 
expectedly into the CCP's Central Committee, but they are rarely promoted to governmental 
positions or regional leader posts. The mobility model for Chinese military leaders is more of a 
straight up forward movement: they keep going straight up in the military hierarchy and among 
Party rankings until they retire someday or get removed for “disciplinary reasons.” 
             (6) Leadership posts of the regional National People’s Congress (NPC) and Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) have less upward political mobility 
compared to posts of regional party committee and government. Thus, being transferred or 
appointed as regional NPC or CPPCC leaders without senior membership on the regional CCP 
committee is not considered as a promotion. In recent years, it is also common that regional party 
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chiefs occupy the posts as presidents of regional NPC, but it does not indicate that any NPC 
president is simultaneously the party chief. Instead, it is of vital importance to become the party 
chief first; then having other job titles or not would not actually affect the party chief’s political 
mobility in the future. Against the odds, to control more personnel and fiscal resources are two 
very important indicators of a leaders’ promotional opportunities. NPC and CPPCC branches 
throughout China are run by the state and are considered inseparable political institutions of the 
party-state. Leaders of NPC and CPPCC are also considered regional leaders. However, as 
neither post controls executive powers in making policies and important decisions, without party 
leadership, NPC or CPPCC positions alone are not as important as the regional CCP committee 
or the government. Therefore, its leaders’ political mobility scores would be relatively lower.  
             Above all, compared to that in the developed democracies where general elections serve 
to filter politicians and legislators once every few years, the posts held by Chinese regional 
leaders are usually stable such that most junior leaders get tenure and promotion once in a while. 
Again, Chinese politicians do not consider their political careers only as professions or job titles; 
they actually treat their careers as lifetime commitments to change their social status and 
personal life qualities. Thus, Chinese regional leaders’ promotions do not only mean more power 
and more significant positions in the political system, the mobility can also determine the leaders’ 
political future and other personal choices. As is shown in Table 2.2, since the CCP’s 12
th
 
National Congress in 1982, the number of regional leaders with full Central Committee 
memberships seems to be formalized and fixed at about 60 (which means almost every 
provincial unit can have its party chief and governor sit on the CC as there are 31 provincial units, 
excluding Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau). The rationalization of regional leader selections also 
provides more accountability to the CCP’s regional rule. Also, during the years with the most 
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frequent political movements, the percentage of regional leaders on the CC also changed 
dramatically (shown in Table 2.2 from 1956 to 1977).  
Table 2.2: Regional Leaders’ CC Membership of CCP National Congresses and Eastern 












Leaders w/ Full CC 
Perce
ntage 
1956 8th 97 73 170 33 12 36.4 
1969 9th 170 109 279 91 37 40.7 
1973 10th 195 124 319 104 29 27.9 
1977 11th 201 132 333 98 29 29.6 
1982 12th 210 138 348 69 27 39.1 
1987 13th 175 110 285 66 20 30.3 
1992 14th 188 129 317 62 20 32.3 
1997 15th 193 151 344 61 19 31.1 
2002 16th 198 158 356 63 21 33.3 
2007 17th 204 167 371 64 23 35.9 
Source: Author’s Database.  
 
C. Conclusion: Regional Leaders under the Mobility Whip  
             The power structure of the CCP is extremely hierarchical and centralized. Similar inputs 
can generate different outcomes through the political system. Examining only the outcomes 
would not be enough to determine the mechanism of the CCP politics. Interactions among actors 
in the system are difficult to gauge. Therefore, we must study the political outcomes through 
comparative analysis by comparing different actors and their political career trajectories from 
party cadres to regional leaders in China. Moreover, the nature of the single-dimensional 




             In this chapter, the study defines the political mobility of regional leaders to be their 
respective promotion, demotion, and movements throughout their careers. Based on the 
observations, a regional leader’s political mobility can be upward or downward with transfers 
among different regions in China. In other words, vertical mobility determines the leader’s 
promotion or demotion while the location of the leader’s governance and practice of the 
leadership can also be decisive to the leader’s future career moves. Among governmental posts 
and party positions, the study also points out that some posts are actually more important than 
others not because they are given more attention but because they control more resources and 
affect decision-makings more profoundly. As a result, cadres who occupy these more executive 
posts can get promoted more and sooner than those who work on non-executive posts. No 
Chinese leaders or laws ever point out which department of a government is more important than 
other or which is the least important. But it does make a difference when it comes to promoting 
leaders to evaluate their previous experiences as governmental employees or CCP cadres.  
             On the other hand, regional differences in China have served as the center’s preference 
when deciding to move its leaders from one region to another. During the CCP’s 60 years of rule, 
the developmental gap across the nation’s different regions has become undeniably obvious. 
Regional gap in China can be explained by different levels of social resilience and different 
historical heritages that led these regions onto different paths toward modernization. However, it 
can also be a political issue with possible political solutions in terms of the center’s governance 
and policy preferences. Some regions in China, especially coastal provinces and cities, not only 
draw better policies and more investments, but their political importance also sends their regional 
leaders up to the top tier of the Chinese hierarchy. Other less developed regions in China, 
comparatively speaking, have faced more developmental problems, and their regional leaders 
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may have drawn less attention from the center compared to the developed regions. Therefore, 
when measuring the political mobility of regional leaders in China, we must also take regional 
differences into our evaluation in order to make any relevant research more accountable and 
comprehensive.  
             Finally, the chapter has also pointed out some rules of thumb as potential standards to 
measure regional leader’s political mobility. In order to find the pattern of leaders’ mobility, an 
analysis of more than one dimension is surely needed. Recent trends in the careers of Chinese 
regional leaders’ show that leadership selection has become more rationalized and formalized 
compare to decades ago under Mao Zedong’s personal rule. The transformation of the CCP as a 
revolutionary organization to the dominant political party may contribute to the explanation. 
Also, the transformation from the central planning system to the market economy after 1978 may 
be useful for rethinking the gradual changes of Chinese government. Whatever approach or 
perspective is taken for studying the issue, we must remember that the hierarchical party-politics 
structure of the CCP determines the recruitment, selection and movement of its regional leaders. 
These phenomena still depend on the party’s decisions instead of open discussions and 





BACKGROUND AND OPPORTUNITIES: THE MAKE OF CHINESE REGIONAL 
LEADERS 
 
             The personal background of a person can provide vital information for others to know 
this person. With respect to political figures, it is even truer for the people to try to know their 
leaders by deconstructing their personal history before he or she had yet become one of the 
political elites. In contemporary Chinese politics, personal information of prominent politicians 
and governmental officials is indeed scarce and well-edited before it is released to the public. 
After reviewing the officially published profiles and brief biographies of hundreds of Chinese 
regional leaders’, the author notices that Chinese officials’ curriculum vitae use the same format 
(which is plain and bureaucratic in tone) with well-trimmed personal information, highly concise 
professional background and occupational experiences. Yet, tremendously interesting 
information has been found during the author’s research by placing the plain texts back into their 
historical contexts and comparing different generations of Chinese regional leaders to each other. 
Ambiguities do exist in the profiles of Chinese regional leaders. While the study here has no 
intention to deny the ambiguities, the interpretations made by the study help readers clarify their 
potential suspicions about the make-up of Chinese regional leaders.  
             Classical elite studies often emphasize the importance of the personal background of 
political elites. Scholars point out that a person’s early years of life, family influences, 
educational levels and social connections do matter a great deal in helping the elite choose 
politics as a career choice. Their characteristics accordingly affect the elite’s political attitudes, 
partisanship, ideological beliefs, and future career moves.
61
 Consistent with this approach to elite 
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study, the study here also begins with its basic assumption that the background of a Chinese 
regional leader matters to the leader’s political mobility in the future. Moreover, the study 
provides detailed research on both provincial and municipal leaders’ background information 
and provides a cross-regional comparison among leaders to find out how age, gender, nationality, 
nativity, education, party affiliation and membership altogether have become important 
indicators for others to explain the regional leader’s political mobility and related career 
movements.   
              Again, this study makes it clear that the hierarchical structure of Chinese politics 
determines that the center as well as China watchers pay special attention to Chinese regional 
leaders’ background information in order to select potential talents to serve in the bureaucracy in 
the future. Therefore, in this chapter the study first examines crucial background information as 
indicators of Chinese regional leaders by giving out relevant analyses on regional leaders’ 
profiles. Second, a comprehensive conclusion based on the findings of the chapter is presented in 
order to establish our further research on regional leaders’ political mobility by taking the leaders’ 
personal contexts into our consideration. In this chapter, based on Chinese regional leaders’ 
profiles and background information collected by this study, we expect to find these 
characteristics and features among Chinese regional leaders:  
(1) Provincial leaders are generally older in age than city and municipal leaders in China, due 
to their experiences and curriculums. Contemporary regional leaders are older than 
provincial leaders in the Mao Zedong era. But leaders were the oldest of all at the 
beginning of the Deng Xiaoping era (late 1970s and early 1980s). 
(2) Women and ethnic minority (non-Han nationals) regional leaders are much fewer than 
male and ethnic majority regional leaders. But we expect to see some increases of numbers 
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in post-Deng Xiaoping era such that there would be currently more women and minority 
regional leaders than before.  
(3) The CCP has maintained a policy that regional leaders must serve during their careers 
outside their hometown provinces or regions in order to minimize growing personal ties 
with localities. City leaders are less important than provincial leaders, thus, we expect to 
see more even distribution between native officials and non-native officials, which means 
local-born leaders get even opportunities if they compete for deputy or vice posts at the 
municipal level. Also, more chief posts (governors, CCP chiefs, and mayors) go to leaders 
who are non-native to the regions.  
 
 
(4) As younger generations of regional leaders were not interrupted during their school years 
by political movements and China’s national college examination was restored in 1977 by 
Deng Xiaoping, leaders and cadres have had more opportunities to finish their education. 
Hence, we expect that in post-Deng era, more regional leaders will have received higher 
education compared to regional leaders in Mao’s and Deng’s era.  
 
 
(5)  In post-Deng era, more regional leaders will have attended to the CCP party schools. And 
more regional leaders will have been associated with the Communist Youth League of 
China. Both hypotheses are to be compared to the situations in Mao’s and Deng’s era.  









            Chinese politics has its unique merit system such that the CCP rewards its cadres once in 
a while with political promotions and related social benefits according to each and every cadre’s 
loyalty and commitment to the party. This merit system was not created by the CCP but has been 
commonly found among East Asian nations where the seniority of an official is sometimes 
considered the equivalent of the authority of the individual inside a political system where it is 
usually hierarchical and carefully arranged. In other words, the relationship between one’s age 
and one’s position can be understood as: the longer a cadre has served for the CCP, usually the 






              The first generation of CCP leadership acquired dominant political power through the 
Great Chinese Revolution, and the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949. The 
previous regime was completely changed by adapting the Marxist-Leninist party-state regime 
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and most initial leaders were also revolutionaries and veterans. There was no official rule that a 
leader must retire at a certain age or pass one’s power to the successor by making the leader’s 
post vacant. And there was no official restriction that set an age beyond which an official would 
not receive any further promotion. Instead, whether a leader was going to retire or keep working 
as an official was determined by the center on an ad hoc basis, based on some rules of thumb 
plus common senses. As a result, both central leaders and regional leaders received their tenures 





                In 1956, the 8
th
 National Congress of the CCP was held in Beijing and a few newer 
members were added to the Politburo, the decision-making center of the CCP. As is shown in 
Figure 3.1, among 17 Politburo members, the average age was about 55 and the majority of them 
(N=11) were in their fifties and sixties meaning they were the early revolutionaries who joined 
the party in their twenties and thirties and had been through numerous events in the CCP history 
and became well-trained and well-experienced leaders. Although there was no retirement age 
requirement, since most leaders became CCP members at a fairly young age, many of them were 
still young despite their status as national leaders. Only a few (N=4) were getting into their 
seventies; compared to another 2 leaders were in their forties. The gap between the youngest and 





Figure 3.1: Member Age Distribution of the 8
th
 CCP Politburo in 1956 
Source: Author’s Database (X=Age, Y=Number of Members). 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Member Age Distribution of 17
th
 CCP Politburo in 2007 























              However, about 50 years later, the demographics of the Chinese central leadership have 
changed significantly. At the 17
th
 National Congress of the CCP in 2007, the newest generation 
of top Chinese leaders is generally older than the Politburo members of 1956. Among 25 
members, the average age is 61.7, which is about 6 to 7 years older than the 8
th
 Politburo. But the 
distribution of ages of Politburo members is actually much less diverged compared to that of the 
8
th
 Politburo. The majority of them (20 of 25) were in their sixties, and only 2 member were 
younger than 55 but still in their fifties by the end of 2007. The gap between the youngest and 
the oldest was only 15 years. These changes through the decades in the CCP central leadership 
show us that the CCP has become more mature in terms of its leaders’ age ranges and the 
biological and chronological differences among central leader may have been reduced as they 
were born about the same period of time and experienced similar types of socioeconomic 
changes. Keeping in mind that 23 of the 25 Politburo members in 2007 served as regional leaders 
in China or worked in regional government, they have spent a number of years working in 
different parts of China before they got promoted to the center. 
              There are no constitutional regulations on age limits for Chinese national leader that 
mandate that when a leader reaches a certain age, he or she must retire by leaving the post open 
to the successor. However, according to a series of governmental documents and published 
articles,
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 most Chinese ministers, governors, CCP chiefs and their equivalent retire at the age of 
65, for they should not receive any further promotion beyond that age. Deputies minister, vice 
governors, deputy provincial CCP chiefs and equivalents should not receive promotions once 
                                                          
62
 See Guojia gongwuyuan shixing tiaoli (Interim Regulations for State Civil Servants), Order of the State Council, 
No.125 (August 14, 1993). Gongwuyuan shengzhi jiangzhi renmian tiaoli shixing (Civil Servants Interim 
Regulations for Promotions, Demotions, Appointments and Discharges), The Department of Organization, The 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, No.7 (2008). And also, Gongwuyuan diao ren guiding 
(Regulations for Transferring and Appointments of Civil Servants), The Department of Organization and The 
Ministry of Human Resource, No.6 (2008).  
76 
 
they reached sixty years old. Departmental or divisional chiefs, mayors, city and municipal CCP 
chiefs should retire at the age of sixty year old and receive no promotion when that age is 
reached. Deputy departmental chiefs, vice mayors, deputy city municipal CCP chiefs and 
equivalents should also retire at the age of sixty and receive no further promotions once the age 
is reached. However, for any of the leaders mentioned above, when the retiring age is reached 
before one’s current term is finished, one may finish one’s current leadership term but receive no 
further promotion or continuous tenure thereafter. There have been, of course, exceptions. After 
the Cultural Revolution, most purged provincial and central leaders made their political encores 
by winning back the posts they held prior to the Cultural Revolution. They usually served until 
Deng Xiaoping’s call for senior leaders’ collective retirement at the 12
th
 National Congress of 
the CCP in 1982. Even Deng himself was considered to remain in charge of the “overall situation” 
to decide on vital matter until 1989, and by then he was already eighty-five years old.  
              These regulations were eventually institutionalized by the end of Jiang Zemin’s 
leadership as the General Secretary of the CCP in the early 2000s. Retirements of senior central 
and regional leaders in China had become formalized and widely accepted by leaders and the 
people. No member of the Central Committee (CC) or its Politburo elected at the 16
th
 National 
Congress in 2002 of the CCP was older than 70 years old. Though Jiang himself remained the 
President of China, and kept his chairmanship of the Central Military Committee at the age of 76, 
he was no longer a CC member. As is shown in Figure 3.3, among 62 current regional leaders of 
China who are also CC members, their age range sits from 47 to 68 years old with the average of 
59.4 years old (by the end of 2010). Upon their entry into the CC in 2007, the youngest among 
them was 44 years old (Hu Chunhua, then the First Secretary of the Youth League Central 
Committee who became the governor of Hebei Province in April, 2008, then the youngest 
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governor in China), while the eldest was 65 years old (Liu Qi, CCP chief of Beijing). Mr. Liu 
was actually serving his second term as a Politburo member meaning it would be unlikely for Mr. 
Liu to receive further promotions. Becoming a Politburo member in 2002, Secretary Liu started 
off early but made no subsequent career. Despite the fact that 44 can be too young for a governor 
and 65 might be overage for a city chief, the majority of Chinese regional leaders with CC 







Figure 3.3 Age Distribution of Current Regional Leaders on the CC 
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Table 3.1 Chinese Regional Leaders’ Age Analysis (Years) 
Post Count Max Min Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Provincial 243 71 33 54.2 7.0 
City 233 73 32 49.5 7.0 
Total 476 73 32 51.9  
Source: Author’s Database. 
Table 3.2 Provincial Leaders’ Age Analysis (Years) 
1950s  1960s  1970s  1980s  1990s  2000s  














Min 37 Min 33 Min 40 Min 41 Min 38 Min 46 
Max 67 Max 64 Max 71 Max 67 Max 64 Max 61 
Count 53 Count 37 Count 47 Count 53 Count 50 Count 53 
Source: Author’s Database. 
Table 3.3 City Leaders’ Age Analysis (Years) 
1950s  1960s  1970s  1980s  1990s  2000s  














Min 33 Min 44 Min 42 Min 42 Min 37 Min 32 
Max 62 Max 56 Max 71 Max 73 Max 59 Max 58 
Count 49 Count 24 Count 24 Count 31 Count 43 Count 62 






              While the relationship of leaders’ ages and their further appointments tends to be 
formalized by recent CCP national congresses, Chinese regional leaders’ ages are closed tied to 
their political mobility through the years. By examining 473 regional leaders in China since 1949, 
this study finds that as it is a hierarchical power structure of Chinese politics, it seems that older 
officials have also occupied more senior posts in regional the political system. As is shown in 
Table 3.1, in general, Chinese governors and provincial party chiefs have been older than mayors 
and city party chiefs. Considering a term for a provincial leader is 5 years and he can serve two 
terms continuously, but a term for county or sub-city districts leaders is only 3 years; it is 
reasonable that the age gap between provincial leaders are in general older than city leaders for 
about 5 years (average for provincial leaders: 54.2 and average for city leaders: 49.5) from 1950s 
to 2000s (Table 3.1).  
            Contemporary Chinese provincial leaders and city leaders (since 1990s) were relatively 
older than regional leaders in the 1950s, or the first half of Mao Zedong’s era (results shown in 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3). However, they have been relatively younger than regional leaders in the late 
1970s and 1980s, which were the years shortly after the Cultural Revolution and at the beginning 
of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform. That is because during the Cultural Revolution, most of 
the tenured regional leaders were removed, dismissed, or purged from their leadership posts in a 
short time (1966-1968) and their posts were taken by the radical young workers from state-
owned factories; these young radicals were known as zaofanpai (revolutionary rebels) and were 
extreme believers in Maoism among high school and college students known as the Red Guards. 
When the Cultural Revolution was finally over in 1977, many previous regional leaders 
recovered from the purges and regained their personal reputation and political authority (known 
as pingfan). Many of them were out of work for nearly ten years, which accounts for the 
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significant increase of average ages among regional leaders: provincial leaders gained about 8 
years compared to that of the 1960s (Table 3.1, 59.7 of 1970s and 51.6 of 1960s). The maximum 
of age among the samplers in late 1970s was 71, while the maximum of the 1960s was only 64. 
The situation was very similar compared to that of the city leaders. The maximum age among 
city leaders in 1980s was 73 compared to 56 in the 1960s and the average age increased from 
49.4 in the 1960s to 55.5 in the 1980s (see Table 3.3).  
               After the 12
th
 CCP Congress in 1982, and especially after the 13
th
 CCP Congress in 
1987, the pattern of replacing older leaders with younger generations of cadres in regional 
governments was obvious. When the CCP Advisory Committees were established both in the 
center and among the provinces of China, senior leaders who had reached the retirement ages 
were retained in the Advisory Committee but no longer took up posts in the governments. This 
was known as CCP leaders’ “semi-retirement.” The Advisory Committee system was finally 
abolished in 1992 at the 14
th
 CCP Congress and the full retirement of all the leaders who had 
reached their age limits was called by the CCP center. In other words, to refresh the party politics 
by removing senior regional leaders to retirement and introducing a considerable number of 
younger leaders to the system, the center finally had formalized its principles for age limits as 
lawful regulations. As is shown in Table 3.4, by examining specific provinces and cities, we can 
also find that the biological ages of regional leaders have become younger and younger, and that 





 Congress. Provincial leaders of Guangdong retired or retreated to the Advisory 
Committee after the 13
th
 Congress and the entry of younger leaders lowered the mean age of 
leaders. Some provincial leaders of Guizhou stayed until 1982, which caused an increase of 
mean age among leaders, but once they retired after the 13
th
 Congress, the mean also decreased 
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from 63.5 to 53 years old. On the municipal side, Xiamen of Fujian Province was not approved 
to become a sub-provincial unit until 1994, which means that before 1994 the leaders of Xiamen 
had lower political rankings than the capital city of the Province, Fuzhou. Thus, the mean ages of 
Xiamen leaders from 1977 to 1992 were relatively younger as low-ranked officials tended to be 
younger than governors or other provincial leaders. Still, the data show that older leaders were 
replaced with younger ones after the 13
th
 Congress in 1987 when the retirement age of Chinese 
leaders was institutionalized.  
Table 3.4 Provincial and City Leaders Age Changes (1977-1992) 
Province 1977-79 Count Mean 1980-82 Count Mean 1983-87 Count Mean 1988-92 Count Mean 
Shanxi 5 65 2 58.5 3 56.6 2 56 
Guangdong 3 67 3 63 3 57.3 2 55 
Guizhou 4 59.5 2 63.5 4 53 3 55.1 
City 1977-79 Count Mean 1980-82 Count Mean 1983-87 Count Mean 1988-92 Count Mean 
Guangzhou 1 71 2 58.5 2 55 4 57.5 
Harbin 1 64 3 58 1 58 2 52.5 
Xiamen 1 57 2 56 1 50 2 47.5 
Source: Author’s Database.  
               When regional leaders reached their retirement ages, not only do they need to save 
some opportunities for the young, but also they would acquire no upward political mobility in the 
future. Noticeably, especially since the 1990s, a number of regional leaders transferred from 
executive posts (party systemic or governmental) to non-executive posts (regional NPC or 
CPPCC
63
) when they approach to retirement age. Politically they are still considered important 
regional leaders as their political ranking in the civil service system have not been changed or 
dragged down. But being moved or transferred to the non-executive posts means that getting 
further promotions would be unlikely. This transfer can be seen as a certain type of preparation 
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for some regional leaders’ retirement for old age. Meanwhile, in the post-Deng Xiaoping era, 
where regular retirements of leaders are lawfully clarified without personal exceptions, we need 
also notice that provincial leaders share a smaller age gap compare that of the city leaders in 
China. Shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, the age standard deviation of provincial leaders in 1990s is 
4.8 compare to that of 3.8 in 2000s. And current city leaders have the largest range of ages (from 
32 to 58). Without major political and social interruptions such as the Cultural Revolution, and 
with diverged age distributions among Chinese city leaders in the 21
st
 century, it could be an 
interesting phenomenon that city leaders may have more diverse personal backgrounds as lower 
ranked regional leaders while provincial leaders may be more homogenous, in terms of personal 
experiences and professional trainings. Is it because to become a provincial leader one usually 
has to wait longer that the years of waiting in line makes many others quit longing for upward 
mobility in the hierarchy? Because different Chinese cities in different regions are quite 
unevenly developed it makes the requirements for selecting city leaders much more specific and 
dynamic, and more locally oriented compared to that of provincial leaders. Whatever the cause, 
the issue will be studied in the later parts of the chapter by combining other characteristics of 
Chinese city leaders.  
2. Gender and Nationality 
 
            Two of the long time oppressed social groups throughout Chinese political history have 
been women and ethnic minorities in China. Although the Communist Party was known to have 
liberated the poor and the disenfranchised social groups in China by establishing the “People’s 
Democratic Dictatorship,” known after 1949 as the People’s Republic of China, overwhelmed by 
the thousands of years of male-dominance in social life and outnumbered by the Han majority in 
most parts of China, Chinese women and minorities are still considered weak voices in 
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contemporary Chinese politics. The CCP has been investing its political resources to ease the 
tension between the majority and the minorities in political life by recruiting more ethnic 
minorities with CCP membership into the political system and by saving legislature seats and 
governmental posts for the minorities, especially in the “autonomous regions,” where 
traditionally and historically the habitats for the Chinese minorities. As early as in Mao Zedong’s 
era, Mao had stressed the importance of handling the relationship between the majority and the 
minorities in general. Ethnic chauvinism, which comes from the overpowered ethnic majority, is 
seriously dangerous for any Communist party to maintain its political dominance and social 
stability. As Mao said: “We concentrate on fighting against Han nation’s Chauvinism as well as 
regional nationalism, but that [regional nationalism] is generally not the key point…. In Soviet 
Union, the relationship between the Russian nation and the minorities is very abnormal, we 
should learn from their lesson.” 
64
 However, the first generation of the CCP central leaders’ great 
blueprint for harmony among all nationalities in China was never carried out in later years due to 
the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution. Again, violent mass movements and radical communist 
ideologies did not considered ethnic minorities in China as social groups with special needs 
(socioeconomic underdevelopment and strong religious influences in people’s life). Thus, local 
political elites and minority nationality regional leaders must sacrifice their beliefs and interests 
in exchange for survival.
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               Deng Xiaoping was indeed a pragmatic political leader who constantly emphasized the 
importance of order and stability in Chinese society as the foundation of his reformist strategies. 
Since the 1980s, proportional representation of the ethnic minorities among Chinese regional 
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governments was institutionalized as a crucial policy of the CCP’s regional policy. In 
autonomous ethnic minority regions, the governmental head is regularly a member of the local 
ethnic group who is also a CCP member. A number of posts in the government, local NPC and 
CPPCC are also saved for the minorities where the numbers of the Han regional officials would 
not look overwhelming compared to that of the minorities. However, as the local CCP committee 
is the most executive political sub-system, the local CCP chief post is actually regularly 
controlled by a Han national regardless of the local population proportion. Among the CCP 
central leaders, including those in the Politburo, the CC, the NPC and CPPCC presidents and 
vice presidents, there are also proportional seats saved for leaders with minority nationality 
background.  
Table 3.5 Nationalities among Chinese Regional Leaders 
Post Han Percentage Non-Han 
Minorities 
Percentage Total Percentage 
Provincial 354 95.7 16 4.3 370 100 
City and 
Municipal 
286 95.3 14 4.7 300 100 
  Source: Author’s Database 
                As is shown in Table 3.5, among the 670 regional leaders surveyed in this chapter, it 
happens, though purely randomly, that only 30 of 670 leaders were actually ethnic minorities. 
Among provincial leaders, only 16 (4.3 percent) were not Han nationals; only 14 (4.7 percent) 
city and municipal leaders were not Han nationals. And among the 30 minority regional leaders, 
all of them were CCP members and most of them worked in their native provinces (Guangxi and 
Xinjiang) where their ethnic background could be beneficial for their political career mobility. 
Here, the author would like to point out that it might be statistically convincing that the study 
surveys all ethnic minority regions to track down all the leaders with non-Han nationality 
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background. However, the purpose of this study was not designated for an analysis of the 
Chinese ethnicity and political demographics. The 30 minority leaders look minor compared the 
entire 670 regional leadership cohort, but it has shown to the readers that the practice of allowing 
proportional representation of the minorities mainly work at special regions where the Han 
nationals are not the only majority ethnic group. Among the regions and provinces in Eastern, 
Southern and Central China, where the Han nationality dominates demographically, the absolute 
majority of the regional leaders are still made up from Han nationals. Furthermore, according to 
published reports, by 2008 there were 2.915 million governmental officials (at least holding a 
post as a deputy divisional head) across China who were ethnic minorities, which were about 7.4 
percent of the entire governmental official population.
66
 Kunming, the capital city of Yunnan 
province located in Southwestern China, is a city with 890,000 minority nationals or 13.8 percent 
of its entire urban population. By 2011, 17.7 percent of governmental officials in Kunming were 
ethnic minorities; the percentage was higher than the minority population percentage of all urban 
dwellers of the municipality.
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 In the entire Tibet autonomous region, where there were 208,000 
CCP members in 2011, 77,000 of them were both Tibetans and governmental officials. These 
77,000 Tibetan governmental officials compose 70 percent of the entire governmental official 
population in Tibet.
68
 It is still not clear that how many minority officials in Yunnan or Tibet 
have occupied high-ranked executive positions in the regional governments, or how many of 
them are chief leaders instead of being deputies or committee members. But as this study has 
mentioned earlier, the proportion is what really matters to the CCP center. Ethnic minorities must 
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have their proportional representation in regional political system to show the center’s policy 
preference and political investments to help create a peaceful political atmosphere between the 
Han and non-Hans.  
 
 
                Regardless their age, nationalities, passions, talents and experiences, historically before 
the establishment of the PRC, Chinese women could only participate in politics through informal 
channels. Empress Dowager Cixi of the Machu-Qing Royal Family was the undeniable central 
leader of China from 1861 during the Second Opium War to 1908 upon her death. Though 
powerful, she acquired no official title except the Mother of the Emperor (s). No female senior 
official was ever recruited under the Nationalist rule of China before 1949 not to mention the 
male dominated polygamy system and female prostitution were both legal until the Communists 
took over China. Economically, socially, and politically suppressed by men, Chinese women 
only acquired official recognitions as an important political force under CCP rule. Still, the 
political participation among Chinese women has been lower compared to that of Chinese men. 
Up to the 17
th
 CCP Politburo, there have only been 5 women so far who have achieved the posts 
as Politburo members. These 5 are (were): Jiang Qing (1969, Mao Zedong’s wife), Ye Qun 
(1969, then CCP Deputy Chairman Lin Biao’s wife), Deng Yingchao (1978, then Premier Zhou 
Enlai’s widow), Wu Yi (2002, then Deputy Premier), and Liu Yandong (2007, now Vice 
President of CPPCC and Councilor of the State Council). Except Wu Yi and Liu Yandong, who 
achieved Politburo posts based on their leadership experiences and promoted under Hu Jintao’s 
leadership, the other three female Politburo members were more or less overshadowed by their 
famous husbands.  
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Table 3.6 Gender Distribution among Chinese Regional Leaders 
Post Male  Percentage Female Percentage Total Percentage 
Provincial 334 98.2 6 1.8 340 100 
Municipal 293 97.7 7 2.3 300 100 
Source: Author’s Database 
                 For the unthinkable difficulties for a politically passionate Chinese woman to become 
a Politburo member or a central leader, it can be equally difficult for any woman to become a 
provincial leader in contemporary China. As is shown in Table 3.6, among the 340 provincial 
leader surveyed in this study, only 6 of them (less than 2 percent) were women. And noticeably, 
the first woman ever to become a governor in China did not happen until 1983.
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 Before that, 
female politicians were even rarer in the CCP politics. Among the 300 mayors and municipal 
leaders surveyed, there were only 7 women, which made less than 3 percent of the leadership 
body. However, all the increases in women’s appearances in regional politics in China occurred 
in post-Deng Xiaoping era. Similar to the rule for ethnic minorities to become regional leaders, 
proportional representation for Chinese women in the political system has also been 
institutionalized. According to official reports, by 2010, 87.1 percent of provincial governments 
across China have women officials (did not specify the ranks or posts) in the leadership groups. 
The same level of the year 2000 was only 64.5 percent. Among all municipal governments in 
China, 89.4 percent of municipal governments have female officials in leadership positions (did 
not specify the ranks or posts) are women in the year 2010, compared that of the year 2000 was 
only 65.1 percent.
70
 However, even with the satisfying increase in the numbers of Chinese 
women as political leaders, we still do not know how many women are actually appointed as 
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executive regional leaders instead of working in the non-executive posts and having much less 
influences on the policy decision-making processes.  
                 Overall, in post-Deng Xiaoping era, Chinese women’s political participation seems to 
be higher than before, with the increasing number of women as regional governmental officials. 
However, do the disadvantages of gender (female) and nationality (non-Han) now serve as their 
natural advantages for political promotions by maximizing the center’s preferences on 
proportional representation, or do they remain as genuine weaknesses such that these leaders 
have little chance to acquire executive posts in the political system? The following chapters of 
the study will reveal more correlations of these leaders’ political mobility throughout their entire 
political careers.  
3. Locality 
 
                 To govern one of the biggest countries in the world, the relationship between the 
central government of China and its local authorities has always been more or less problematic. 
The Chinese bureaucracy that recruited officials through national Confucian essay examinations 
was said to be invented in order to prevent regional aristocracies from resisting the central 
government’s policies. Therefore, the divisions and distributions of the regional governance 
structure served to separate regional leaders’ power and keep the balance among local 
governmental branches so that the central government could always maintain its strong 
influences over regional affairs.
71
 The design of the Chinese regional governmental systems 
requires highly skillful techniques to avoid any possible failures that could cause conflicts among 
local authorities and make the system inefficient and incapable of implementing the central 
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government’s policies. In consequence, one of the primary requirements used by Chinese leaders 
before 1949 was to appoint non-locally born officials to be the regional leaders in a region.  
                 It is quite common among Western politicians who campaign for governmental 
positions to emphasize their strong local background in order to gain popularity and votes from 
the locals. Under democracies, locality can be seen as a link between politicians and their local 
voters. Voters tend to think better of the candidates with specific local background as it may 
show their better understandings of local issues and more concerns about local voters’ 
livelihood.
72
 However, in Chinese politics, overwhelmingly strong local connections between an 
official and one’s native hometown region was considered a problem by the central government. 
An official’s strong ties with his localities indicated the risk that this official could build up his 
personal leadership and trust network too easily so that other regional leaders might be 
outnumbered and the central government’s commands could be blocked. For example, in the 
Qing Dynasty’s rule of China for 267 years, there were only three natives of Shanxi Province 
who ever were appointed as regional leaders in the province, and the regulation was that regional 
leaders must be transferred to a different region every three years to prevent them rooting 
locally.
73
 Appointing non-native officials to a region was considered an effective means of 
centralizing regional politics and fiscal revenues, and more importantly, to prevent any sort of 
localism that can harm the entire political system. In fact, even after the establishment of the 
party-state regime in China in 1949, the CCP and its central leaders still had concerns about the 
degree of authoritativeness of Chinese regional government. There are different scholarly 
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arguments over the locality issue under the CCP’s early rule of China. Some scholars argue that 
the CCP had ignored the inherent problem of appointing natives to be local leaders, thinking that 
as native are generally more familiar with local issues and situations such that they might handle 
them better than non-native leaders. And this optimistic argument insists that this is the trend 
even in contemporary Chinese politics―that natives are seen more and more among regional 
governments in China.
74
 Some other scholars, on the other hand, argue that the expanding power 
and influence of the provincial secretaries had made Mao Zedong uneasy as early as the 1960s. 
Mao felt that his authority and power were weakened by other central leaders and Chinese 
provincial chiefs. Thus, Mao’s initiation of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 was aimed at 
regaining his power as the absolute leader of China. This argument can be used to explain why 
most provincial leaders were removed and purged during the Cultural Revolution. As a result, 
however, Mao’s fight against localism caused disastrous social and political effects.
75
 A more 
theoretical approach, held by some scholars, points out that the early CCP party-state regime 
emphasized the inner-party balance of power, ideological education, strong party disciplines and 
frequent mass political movements, all of which actually reduced the opportunities for native 
regional leaders to build their personal ties within the regional political system. The 
characteristics of the early CCP rule concentrated on strengthening the personal leadership of 
Mao instead of any other form of decentralization of power.
76
  
               While all the research on the locality listed above has contributed to the study of 
regional politics and political leaders in China, none of the arguments mentioned above had 
analyzed all important aspects of the issue. The fundamental difference between Mao’s China 
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and Deng’s China was neither corruption nor inner-party competition for the top leadership; 
instead, it was the installation of the central-planning economy (under Mao) and the 
transformation to market economy (under Deng). Along with the installation of the planned 
economy was totalitarian political centralization, and along with the transformation to market 
economy was a post-totalitarian technocratic regime. Neither of the economic-political system 
had a precedent in Chinese history, and actually brought more complexes into the existing 
problems. To the center, there are good reasons and bad reasons for appointing natives to be 
regional leaders at their hometowns. The advantages show a leader may get started fairly quickly 
as one needs no time to adjust in a familiar environment, and proficient knowledge of locale’s 
geographies and demographics is indeed helpful for a regional leader. On the other hand, 
Chinese society is an atmosphere connected by family units, social capital but with low social 
mobility. As is discussed in chapter two, such an atmosphere, either social or political, prevents 
many regional leaders from pursuing higher vocational excellence and encourages leaders to 
chase their personal gains, abuse their power for rent-seeking corruptions and stay in power as 
long as possible. Corruption has emerged as a very common excuse used by the center uses to 
remove or demote a regional leader or any other CCP leader; it is due to the organizational and 
institutional features of corruption among Chinese officials.
77
 As a result, when a native is 
appointed to be a regional leader in one’s hometown region, it is likely that the leader will spend 
tremendous time and energy building up his personal networks in order to influence crucial 
regional governmental decisions to achieve the leader’s utmost personal interests. This would be 
the last thing the CCP center expects to happen if the center’s commands are being blocked or 
deliberately delayed by regional governments.  
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                 Among the 610 regional leader in China surveyed by this study, the “native born” or 
“hometown” is define by looking at the leader’s hometown province. There are 34 provincial 
regions in China with most of them have municipalities and cities, and in a relatively smaller 
provincial region, these municipalities can be very close to each other in distances. If a leader’s 
locality is measured by which municipality one is from, it can be rather common that a leader’s 
hometown municipality is only miles away from where the leader works. But the dummy 
variables might still be coded “0” for the leader is a “non-native.” If so, the accuracy of the study 
will be significantly affected by the carelessness of the research design. Therefore, to faithfully 
reflect the realistic situation to the utmost, the dummy variable is only coded “0” if either a city 






             One might also argue with the study’s approach that makes no distinction between a 
leader getting transferred or appointed from a very distant province to a new post and a leader 
getting transferred from a neighboring province which is only hundred kilometers away. 
However, a province is an ideal administrative unit that can be compared to the units based on its 
socioeconomic and political heterogeneity. Calculating a leader’s moving distance between two 
posts of the leader’s might be slightly helpful if the readers are interested in provincial customs 
of China. However, as this is not a cultural or anthropological study, the author believes the 
moving distance factor beyond provincial level is trivial.   
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Table 3.7a Non-Natives’ Appointments as Regional Leaders in China 
Post Time Native % Non-Native % Total % 
Provincial 1950s 21 32.3 44 67.7 65 100 
City 1950s 21 40.4 31 58.6 52 100 
Provincial 1960s 15 38.5 24 61.5 39 100 
City 1960s 3 33.3 6 66.7 9 100 
Provincial 1970s 11 23.4 36 76.6 47 100 
City 1970s 7 46.7 8 53.3 15 100 
Provincial 1980s 34 51.5 32 48.5 66 100 
City 1980s 20 57.1 15 42.9 35 100 
Provincial 1990s 21 38.2 34 61.8 55 100 
City 1990s 24 48 26 52 50 100 
Provincial 2000s 27 27 73 73 100 100 
City 2000s 35 45.5 42 54.5 77 100 
Total N/A 239 39.2 371 60.8 610 100 
Source: Author’s Database 
Table 3.7b Native and Non-Native Regional Leaders in China 
Post Native % Non-Native % Total % 
All Provincial 129 34.9 241 65.1 370 100 
Post-Deng Provincial 41 31.1 91 68.9 132 100 
All Municipal 157 52.3 143 47.7 300 100 
Post-Deng Municipal 95 57.9 69 42.1 164 100 
Source: Author’s Database 
                 As is shown in Table 3.7a, despite of the range of time and changes of the central 
leadership from Mao Zedong, to Deng Xiaoping, to Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the CCP center 
has always kept a certain percentage of regional leaders in as non-natives, while the center has 
also made sure that native leaders in local governments could be utilized for sustainable 
governance. Therefore, there has not been a remarkably significant drop of the native leaders in 
the regional governments. In the 1950s, about one third (32.3 percent) of regional leaders were 
locally raised who worked in their hometown provinces as party secretaries, governors and their 
deputies; and about 67.7 percent provincial leaders were outsiders or non-natives. Such a ratio 
remained until the occurrence of the Cultural Revolution, when senior leaders were removed and 
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purged. In 1990s and 2000s, the ratio of non-native leaders in Chinese provinces regained slowly 
back to 61.8 percent and 73 percent, which were about the same level of that of the 1950s. In 
other words, significant changes in the ratio of natives to non-natives appointed as Chinese 
provincial leaders only happened during the Cultural Revolution and a few years afterwards 
(before the opening of the 12
th
 CCP National Congress in 1982). Other than that, the center’s 
policy and determination of mixing up natives and non-natives across provinces remained 
constant. The similar situation can be applied to city leaders in China through the years. In the 
1950s, about 40.4 percent of city leaders were “locals” where 58.6 percent of them were non-
natives. In the 2000s, 45.5 percent of city leaders in China who were appointed to the posts were 
natives. While there are many more city municipalities in China than the number of provinces, 
and a number of provinces have influences to decide municipal level personnel arrangements, it 
is not surprising that there have been a higher percentage of natives appointed as city leaders 
than the stricter limit on natives becoming provincial leaders.  
 
Table 3.8 Regional Chief Posts Held by Non-Native Officials 









1950s 32 50 64 34 51 66.7 
1960s 6 9 66.7 18 34 52.9 
1970s 8 14 57.1 27 37 73.0 
1980s 16 35 45.7 27 52 51.9 
1990s 26 46 56.5 30 46 65.2 
2000s 27 68 39.7 38 54 70.4 
Total 115 222 51.8 174 274 63.5 
Source: Author’s Database 
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                 The difference between a chief leader and other deputy or vice leaders in a regional 
government of China has been discussed in chapter two of this study. In most cases, CCP chief 
secretary is more powerful than his deputies or other departmental heads who are standing 
committee members. The governor in a province is supposedly the executive officer who is more 
powerful than all the vice governors and departmental heads. The same situation can be applied 
to municipal governments as well: city secretaries and mayors are politically more important 
than their deputies. In consequence, do more natives occupy the chief posts than the non-natives 
in regional governments of China? This study shows that non-native regional leaders are more 
likely to be named to the chief posts, where natives are more commonly seen in deputy or vice-
level posts. As is shown in Table 3.8, through the 60 years of the CCP rule of China, 63.5 
percent of all provincial chiefs (first secretaries and governors) were actually working outside 
their native provinces. And 51.8 percent of chief city leaders (secretaries and mayors) in China 
were serving in non-native provinces’ municipal governments. The findings show that although a 
certain percentage has been kept for natives to serve in regional governments as leaders, the 
center still keeps the chief posts mainly for non-native leaders from other provinces. The center 
is concerned with growing ties and connections among the sub-national native leaders and their 
localities, and such connections can cause localism, both economic and political, which would 
become an obstacle for the center’s policies. The potential problems of having native regional 
leaders can lower the center’s authority at the regional levels. By all means, the fact those 
provincial chiefs are important political leaders in China; therefore, the center must minimize the 
risks when it arranges the appointments. Both the provincial chief secretary and the governor of a 
province have decisive power over numerous decisions.  
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      Currently, the majority of the provincial chiefs in China are also Central Committee members 
of the CCP, which means that these leaders can also affect the center’s decisions by altering their 
legal votes in the CC. By appointing provincial chiefs, the center has a lot to weigh and consider, 
and natives controlling the chief posts more or less would increase localism. However, among all 
the chief city leaders studied here, the natives slightly outnumber non-natives among posts in 
municipal governments. It is possible that the personnel arrangements have been a combination 
of central preferences and the provincial decisions where at a lower level of an administrative 
region, natives are not only more acceptable by local residents, but also are more experienced 
with local customs. This study suggests that if any scholarly study tracks down to village level 
personnel arrangements in China, we expect to see many more natives take village chief posts 
than non-natives. Non-natives get little chance in village political campaigns. It is not because of 
localism is common among China’s rural villages, but because it is almost unthinkable for a non-
native farmer to be moved across provinces to become the head of a completely strange village. 
Village chiefs in China do not have wages; they only have allocations which are limitedly 
granted by township authorities. Without the economic and social privileges enjoyed by the 
municipal and provincial leaders, it makes no sense for a non-native farmer to compete with 
natives for a village official post―he would be better off to operate a small business or to work 
in the cities.  
4. Education 
 
            The education of a leader is commonly regarded as an important indicator of the leader’s 
partisanship, ideological preferences and future career movement. In classical elite theories, as 
well as in studies of political elites in democracies, empirical evidence shows that candidates 
with higher educational levels are more likely to be elected to legislatures, and the career patterns 
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of the elites are likewise correlated with their educational background.
78
 Generally speaking, the 
higher one’s educational level is, the more one tends to participate in political life, the more 
universal values one tends to recognize and accept, and the more professional one tends to be in 
their chosen occupation one engaged in. Historically, Chinese political leaders and elites were 
ideally supposed to be well-educated with thorough knowledge of Confucian philosophy and the 
humanities to work not only as bureaucrats for the monarchs, but also as moral models able to be 
appointed to regional governmental posts representing the empire’s high standards of moralism 
and for good governance.
79
 However, when the Leninist-based Chinese Communist Party took 
power in 1949, such an education of CCP officials was not considered a requirement for 
recruiting. By contrasting regional leaders’ educational levels overall and especially the 
educational indicators in the 1950s and 1960s to those of the post-Deng Xiaoping era (see Table 
3.9) the study argues the followings:  
              In the first place, when most leaders’ educational levels were low, higher educational 
attainment was not a crucial requirement to become a regional leader in China. Most regional 
leaders appointed by the CCP in 1950s and 1960s were revolutionary veterans who joined in the 
Chinese Revolution as early as the 1920s. The requirements for recruiting revolutionaries were 
definitely different from the requirements for recruiting provincial and municipal leaders in 
China. Therefore, as most revolutionaries came from humble socioeconomic backgrounds (many 
of them even described themselves to be “dirt poor” before they became revolutionaries of the 
Red Army), opportunities for formal school education were indeed scarce. Even among the 
Politburo members, who were supposed to be the leaders of leaders, it was rare. Among all 17 of 
8
th
 CCP Politburo members elected in 1956, only 5 of the 17 had ever attended to college-level 
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institutions or equivalents, and none of them was issued a degree. Among 116 provincial leaders 
of the 1950s and 1960s surveyed in the study, only 39 of them (33.6 percent) had ever achieved 
higher education, though the term used on their curriculum vitae was “the recognition of 
university culture,” which roughly meant to have taken college courses or been enlightened 
intellectually by higher education related institutions. But the lack of outstanding university 
degrees and impressive GPAs did not affect any of these provincial leaders’ careers as regional 
leaders. The situation was much the same for Chinese city leaders in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Among 105 city leaders surveyed in the same time range, only 21 of them (20 percent) claimed 
to have “the recognition of university culture.” Accordingly, despite their educational levels, 
there was almost no distinction among leaders with higher education and those without. In other 
words, back to the early years of CCP’s rule of China, education was not a crucial factor which 
was decisive for the center in appointing regional leaders. The reason was fairly simple: because 
only a small percentage of the CCP cadres received higher education. It was, in fact, an 
intellectual privilege so rare among most of the cadres. Mao Zedong, the top leader himself, was 
not enthusiastic at all for formal education.  
 
Table 3.9 Educational Background of Chinese Regional Leaders 
Time Post College % No College % Total 
1950s-60s Provincial 39 33.6 77 66.4 116 
Post-1997 Provincial 102 100 0 0 102 
All Time Provincial 190 55.9 150 44.1 340 
1950s-60s City 21 20.0 84 80.0 105 
Post-1997 City 116 97.5 3 2.5 119 
All Time City 176 69.3 78 30.7 254 
Total N/A 644 62.2 392 37.8 1036 
Source: Author’s Database 
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                 In the second place, when most leaders’ educational levels got higher and reached a 
certain degree, higher educational level was no longer a crucial indicator for one’s upward 
political mobility. Among 102 provincial leaders in China who received their posts from 1997 to 
2010, all of them (100 percent) claimed to have achieved college level higher education. And 
among 119 city leaders in China of the same time period, 116 of them (97.5 percent) had 
received higher education when they were appointed to their municipal posts. For this time, most 
leaders listed on their curriculum vita that what they had were formal degrees with different 
major fields, but no longer “the recognition.” As a matter of fact, in post-Deng era, Chinese 
regional leaders have become much more educated compared to the early CCP leaders of China. 
However, when something that used to be scarce has become something common, the 
meaningfulness of using it in filtering elites and non-elites will also drop tremendously. Most 
post-Deng era Chinese regional leaders were able to complete their higher education while 
pursuing their political careers. Thus, if everyone who studies can get a degree sooner or later, 
how much the center still weighs a leader’s education is unknown. Starting in 2012, the Chinese 
central governmental system and all province-equivalent governmental systems will no longer 
recruit new civil servants with bachelor’s degrees who have less than two years of full-time 
working experiences.
80
 The policy announced by the Ministry of Human Resource and Social 
Security of the PRC indicates that bachelor-degree level education is no longer considered an 
educational advantage among young civil servants who only have studied hard to pass the civil 
service recruiting exams. This event stirred some controversies among college graduates in 
China for they felt that their education had become cheap and common such that the job 
requirements for becoming a civil servant certainly had been raised. Only when higher education 
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has become easy to achieve, would the center begin to evaluate applicants with other 
requirements. Instead, the newer requirement for recruiting future officials of the CCP 
concentrates more on the comprehensiveness of the fresh college graduates who have dealt with 
realistic social and political issues with administrative skills rather than those who merely know 
how to score high in exams. Being a leader, or to be a leader who occupies a government post, it 
may be more necessary to acquire some “contextual intelligence” that helps one “discern trends 
in the face of complexity and adaptability while trying to shape events.” 
81
 For the contextual 
intelligence can be more helpful in accomplishing tasks better and getting promoted more 
promptly.  
                 Finally, advanced degree came after senior leadership posts but not vice versa. In the 
post-Deng era, some regional leaders have attained doctorate degrees. Among 221 provincial and 
municipal leaders surveyed in the study, 11 of them now have doctorate degrees (5 percent) and 
19 of them have master’s degrees or attended master’s programs without claiming the degrees 
(8.6 percent). Compared to Chinese regional leaders in the 1950s and 1960s, where none of the 
regional leaders had advanced degrees, it is considered as great education progress among 
Chinese regional leaders. However, among the advanced degree holders who were (are) also 
regional leaders, only 1 of the 30 was a professional researcher before he pursued a career in 
politics. Others were already regional leaders (though at lower ranks) when they started graduate 
school. And the leaders who went to graduate school have not given up their day jobs entirely, 
meaning most of them were part-time graduate students. And there were 20 of the 30 graduate 
school-trained leaders who were trained at regional party schools or the Central Party School of 
the CCP. Party schools do offer graduate programs like other regular universities in China, 
however, most party school based graduate programs have specialized programs for CCP 
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officials but not available to regular students. In other words, being a medium-high ranked 
regional leader in China, there are even specialized graduate studies programs offered to you.  
                 In sum, in contemporary Chinese politics, education may no longer be a crucial factor 
in studying career mobility of regional leaders in China, but the personal ties established during 
leaders’ educational experiences may be used to explain factional politics in China, which is also 
related to the topic of the political mobility of the regional leaders. Related discussions will be 
presented in later chapters of the study, yet education is still used in the author’s analysis of 
regional leaders’ political mobility in order to filter certain variables.  
B. Organizational and Professional Background of Regional Leaders in China 
                 In fact, among studies on political elites done in the past, biological features of elites 
have been considered by scholars as very important independent variables that they determine an 
elite’s political views and social activities in later times of his life. In this study, biological 
backgrounds of Chinese regional leaders are to be combined with a few other independent 
variables in order to explain the leaders’ political mobility throughout their careers under the 
CCP’s superiority. Most political elites under Communist or post-communist regimes are 
considered by political scientists to be technocrats, as the make of the authoritarian elite and their 
behaviors are different from that of the statesmen and politicians under democracies. Therefore, 
the author of this study believes that it is of vital importance to examine’ Chinese regional 
leader’s career movements by putting them back to the regime-related institutions, in order to 
avoid any premature, biased or single-dimensional analysis. By all means, the Communist Party 
of China is the most visible and vibrant political institution in contemporary Chinese society, 
hence, the following analyses of the study concentrate on organizational and professional 
backgrounds of Chinese regional leaders.  
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1. Party Membership and Party School Trainings 
 
            Needless to say, under CCP party-state regime, being a Communist party member is the 
presetting that is crucial among all other requirements to become a regional leader in China. 
Unlike two-party system or consensus government of democracies, where winning the majority 
in parliament by a political party cannot eliminate different voices from other political 
oppositions. Under the party-state regime, the CCP is the dominantly political force in Chinese 
politics. Being unchallengeable, any great decision will be made by the insiders of the CCP and 
the decision-making process involves no outsiders. In other words, the game of Chinese politics 
has set its primary rule which is that players must all be CCP members. Indeed, there are more 
than 80 million CCP members in China, 
82
 not all of them can or will step into real politics. In 
fact, most of them are affiliated with local CCP organizations, but are not involved in any of the 
center’s policy-making processes. Our findings show that, among all regional leaders in China 
since 1949, the absolute majority of them were (are) CCP members. In Table 3.10, among 254 
city leaders surveyed, 251 of them were (are) CCP members (98.8 percent), only 3 exceptions. 
Among 340 provincial leaders surveyed, accordingly 97.3 percent of them were (are) CCP 
members and only 5 exceptions. However, there has been significant change of numbers of non-
CCP regional leaders in post-Deng Xiaoping era compared to that of Mao’s and Deng’s eras. The 
CCP members’ majority of the regional leadership remains overwhelming, but there are always 
limited regional governmental seats saved for non-CCP members at all times.   
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Table 3.10 CCP Party Membership Counts of Chinese Regional Leaders 
Time Leader Post CCP Member Count % Non-CCP Count % Total % 
All Time City  251 98.8 3 1.2 254 100 
1997-2010 City  146 97.3 4 2.7 150 100 
All Time  Province 335 98.5 5 1.5 340 100 
1997-2010 Province 117 98.3 2 1.7 119 100 
Source: Author’s Database.  
                 Moreover, even if non-CCP members stand some chance to move upward in the 
political system in the future, it would be most unlikely that they can take the chief posts in 
regional governments. Among the regional leaders studied in this dissertation, all chief posts of 
Chinese provinces and cities have been occupied by CCP members. There were a few exceptions: 
at the very beginning of the People’s Republic of China, to show the CCP’s representativeness of 
all the people in China, Mao Zedong appointed a few non-CCP political activists to be governors, 
including the governor of Hunan Province, Mao’s hometown.
83
 However, after the Anti-Rightists 
Campaign in 1957 where most minority parties’ leaders were politically isolated by the CCP, 
chief posts in Chinese regional governments were no longer appointed non-CCP leaders to be 
regional leaders. In all, it is the party’s strong will that the political dominance of the CCP in 
China must remain unchallengeable, though strictly limited governmental seats can be given to 
non-CCP members in order to show the party’s “generosity” to outsiders and its willingness for 
“multiparty collaboration.” 
84
   
                 The nationwide party school system of the Communist Party of China was created 
during the years of the Great Chinese Revolution by the party. It was partially because of the 
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poor educational level among early revolutionaries and also for strengthening the Leninist 
ideological influence among all CCP members. Inspired by the Communist party system of the 
Soviet Union, the first CCP party school was established in 1933 at a Communist settlement in 
Jiangxi Province 
85
 while the outside regions were still encircled by the KMT armed forces. 
Through the years, the CCP party school system has also undergone great transformations as 
Deng’s economic reform transformed Chinese society fundamentally. Before the early 1990s, the 
party schools expanded all over China from counties to the center. During Jiang Zemin’s 
leadership as the CCP General Secretary, establishments of county-level party schools had been 
demolished yet the city-level and provincial level party schools remained. Though shrinking in 
numbers, the importance of the party schools has not been declining at all. In contemporary 
China, being sent to training programs at party schools, especially being sent to the Central Party 
School in Beijing, is still considered a vital political opportunity for a younger cadre to gain 
career experiences; for anyone with a promising political future, it means a chance to meet some 
of the most important figures in Chinese politics. Furthermore, the headmaster post of the CCP 
Central Party School has always been taken by one of the top leaders in China. Since 1993, then 
Vice President Hu Jintao became the headmaster of the Central Party School, and Hu was 
succeeded by then Vice President Zeng Qinghong as the headmaster of CPS in 2002 after the 
16
th
 National Congress of CCP. It happened shortly before Hu became President of China in 
March 2003. After the 17
th
 CCP National Congress in 2007, Xi Jinping, incumbent Vice 
President of China, headed the Central Party School by replacing Vice President Zeng. As a 
matter of fact, due to its importance in leader selections and successions of the CCP politics, the 
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party school system in China is still a vitally important political institution attached to the 
communist party. 
Table 3.11 Party School Training Experiences of Chinese Regional Leaders 
Time Leader Post All Leader Count % Party School Attendance % 
All Time City 289 100 197 68.2 
1950s City 52 100 3 5.8 
1980s City 38 100 10 26.3 
1997-2010 City 154 100 62 40.3 
All Time Province 340 100 119 35.0 
1950s Province 65 100 10 7.1 
1980s Province 66 100 24 36.4 
1997-2010 Province 102 100 65 63.7 
Source: Author’s Database 
                  By contrasting party school trained regional leaders in China over the years, from 
Mao’s era to post-Deng’s era, our findings (shown in Table 3.11) prove the author’s hypothetical 
expectations on the political importance of the CCP party schools to Chinese regional leaders to 
be correct. Firstly, the number of party-school trained CCP regional leaders in China has been 
steadily increasing in the past few decades, especially in post-Deng Xiaoping era. Overall, there 
have been 197 city leaders out of 289 (68.2 percent) have been trained at party schools. And 35 
percent of provincial leaders of in the PRC’s history (119 of 340) have been trained at party 
schools before they became provincial leaders in China. Also, the percentages of party school-
trained city leaders increased from 5.8 percent in the 1950s to 26.3 percent in the 1980s and 
eventually reached 40.3 percent in post-Deng Xiao era from 1997 to 2010. The same percentages 
rises among provincial leaders with party school training increasing from 7.1 percent in the 
1950s to 36.4 percent in the 1980s and 63.7 percent in the 1997-2010 eras. The significant rises 
of party school training background among Chinese regional leaders may be seen as proof of the 
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party’s higher and higher standards for more professional and skilled leaders with better 
education and competence before they are appointed to head the regional governments around 
China.  
                  Secondly, the nationwide party school system of the CCP has been offering various 
training courses above and beyond traditionally orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideological education. 
Instead, a growing number of Chinese regional leaders completed their graduate school programs 
at the Central Party School and provincial-level party schools and received master’s and doctor’s 
degrees in fields other than Marxism, such as economic management. Among the graduate study 
programs booklets collected by the author from regional CCP party schools in China, some offer 
master’s degree programs in “National Economy” with concentrations on “modern property 
theories” and “macroeconomic policy study;” 
86
 some offer 2- to 3-year master programs in 
economic management with listed courses such as accounting, banking and monetary policies, 
and “electronic business and marketing”. 
87
 Though it is doubtful how effective these training 
programs offered by the party schools can be to turn technocrats into economists and business 
experts, it indicates some positive changes advocated by the center such that Chinese political 
elites are to be ready for greater economic changes and globalization in the near future.  
                  Last but not least, a party school training background may not be a crucial factor that 
affects a regional leader’s future career mobility. It does, however, have two important functions 
that might have made some leaders stand out from others with a similar curriculum vita. One is 
the comprehensive knowledge and global perspectives the leader can learn from party school 
education, as it is by all means designed as a leadership program to develop specialized expertise 
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in relevant subjects. The other function of party schools is to establish social networks for other 
regional leaders from different parts of the province/country. Though it is hard to monitor the 
interactions among the leaders during their party schools training, the network itself is 
undeniably valuable to a leader’s political career.  
2. Communist Youth League Experiences of Regional Leaders 
 
                  Party memberships and party school trainings are tied to Chinese regional leaders’ 
career choices before most of them received promotions to regional leadership posts. Under most 
circumstances, when an official or party cadre joined in the Communist party and was chosen to 
be trained at the party school(s), he is more likely to spend most time of his career inside the 
political system and long for the next upward movement toward a higher post. Unlike in 
democracies, where partisanship can be switched as a result of a voter’s change of political 
beliefs and policy preferences, in Chinese politics a CCP member’s partisanship was formed at a 
younger age. It usually takes more than two years for someone who expresses interest in 
becoming a CCP member to actually becoming a member. Furthermore, even before one has 
shown any particular interests in party membership, the totalitarian structure of the Communist 
party has already established pro-Communist organizations among Chinese youth, such as high 
school students, young farmers, and soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army. The dominant part 
of all the sub-structures is the Chinese Communist Youth League, known as the League, which is 
in charge of selecting and assisting younger Chinese to become CCP members in their later years 
of life.  
                  Arguably the largest political party in the world, CCP has highly strict and picky 
standards for recruiting new members into the party. For instance, after one shows interests in 
becoming a CCP member, one must wait until the party organization collects others’ opinions of 
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one’s application, and a “political inspection” of one’s direct family members and relatives is 
also required. Finally, after all these procedural steps and if one is provisionally accepted as a 
CCP member-to-be, it takes another full calendar year for a “to-be” member to become an 
official member.
88
 The Communist Youth League recruits its members applying a similar 
philosophy, but practically it is much simpler and costs less time. Therefore, before a young 
person decides to become a CCP member when reaches the age requirement of 18, he or she can 
choose to become a League member at the age of 14. According to the last consensus published 
in 2008, there are currently more than 75 million League members in China.
89
 Meanwhile, as an 
important sub-structure of the CCP, the League is also the major patron of other social 
organizations among Chinese youth, such as the National College Students Association, the 
Association of the Young Volunteers, and the Communist Young Pioneers. In other words, the 
totalitarian characteristic of the Communist party entails controlling almost each and every 
aspect of a society where its citizens are organizationally connected and controlled by different 
units and sub-systems of the party. The League serves the function of maintaining the party’s 
dominant control over Chinese youth and their politically related social activities.  
                 The Communist Youth League was not commonly regarded as a prominent political 
organization in Chinese politics until in the early 1980s. When Deng Xiaoping became the top 
leader of China, he promoted to the center several younger leaders known as the Reformists who 
were in charge of carrying out Deng’s reformist ideas to real policies. One of them was Hu 
Yaobang, who had been the chief of the League from 1953 to 1978. Long years of leadership 
experience as the League’s chief secretary, Hu Yaobang had been familiar with many younger 
party cadres and was well-acquainted with their competences and capabilities. When Hu 
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Yaobang was promoted by Deng Xiaoping to be the General Secretary of the CCP in 1981 (he 
resigned as the General Secretary in January 1987 but remained to be on the Politburo), he also 
promoted a number of his old time protégés to important political posts in China. Most of them 
were relatively young and in favor of reformist policies, opposed to some of the senior leaders 
who disagreed with Deng Xiaoping’s “Open Door” reform. Those who were close to Hu 
Yaobang in the 1980s included current President of China and CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao 
(then Secretary of the Youth League) and Premier of the State Council Wen Jiabao (then 
Director of the Office of the CCP Central Committee). Hu Yaobang’s resignation and death in 
the late 1980s did not lead to the decline of former League officials getting crucial promotions. 
Instead, the League-affiliated leaders achieved more and reached higher in the political system of 
China. President Hu Jintao, who had years of working experiences as a student leader, headed 
the League in 1984 as the First Secretary and left the post when he was appointed the CCP 
secretary of Guizhou Province in 1985. In 1992, Hu Jintao became a Standing Member of the 
Politburo at the age of 49 and was expected by Deng Xiaoping as Jiang Zemin’s successor. With 
the League background, provincial leadership experience (in Gansu, Guizhou and Tibet), the 
headmastership of the Central Party School from 1993 to 2002, and graduation from the elitist 
Tsinghua University, the self-made President Hu was considered to have promoted many CCP 
cadres with League background to important regional and ministerial positions as the network 
was crucial for Hu Jintao to consolidate his rule and to carry out his preferred policies.   
                  In this study, regional leaders labeled with League background means they had at 
some time worked as League officials at an officially recognized League branch or regional 
committee. For those regional leaders who had ever been League members, but never took any 
fulltime job post at a League organization, they would not be coded as having League 
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background. With these clarifications, our findings support the author’s hypothesis on the 
increase of regional leaders’ League background in Chinese politics. As is shown in Table 3.12, 
there has been a significant growth of League background among Chinese regional leaders. 
Nearly one-sixth of regional leaders in China have had League working experiences; as the 
number for city leaders is 17.7 percent (51 of 289) and for provincial leaders is 16.2 percent (55 
of 340). Such an increase was not a gradual change but rather a short-term phenomenon that took 
place especially in post-Deng Xiaoping era. In the 1950s, only 5.8 percent (3 of 52) of the city 
leaders surveyed had League experiences. And only 3.6 of percent provincial leaders (2 of 56) 
had League background. Even in the 1980s, 19.7 percent of provincial leaders had League 
background (13 of 66). However, between 1997 and 2010, 29.4 percent of provincial leaders had 
League working experiences (30 of 102); and 36.4 percent of city leaders (56 of 104) had League 
working experiences before they became city leaders. The growth of League connection to the 
regional leaders is being viewed by outsiders as a rapid rise of the League-affiliated officials in 
Chinese politics. Noticeably, not all the regional leaders with League experience were connected 
with the center of the Communist Youth League or had acquired their major promotions based 
on President Hu Jintao’s personal instructions. In fact, many regional leaders with a League 
background had worked at local League offices and took governmental posts from these local 
departments of the League. It could mean that the rise of League-affiliated officials has become a 
nationwide trend―working for the League wherever the offices are helps one experience upward 
political mobility in the future; one does not need to be directly connected with President Hu 
Jintao. It is the systemic setting or arrangement that the League and its outstanding protégés have 




Table 3.12 Youth League Working Experiences of Chinese Regional Leaders 
Column1 Leader Post All Leader Count % League Background % 
All Time City 289 100 51 17.7 
1950s City 52 100 3 5.8 
1980s City 34 100 2 5.9 
1997-2010 City 154 100 56 36.4 
All Time Province 340 100 55 16.2 
1950s Province 56 100 2 3.6 
1980s Province 66 100 13 19.7 
1997-2010 Province 102 100 30 29.4 
Source: Author’s Database 
 
C. Conclusion 
                 This chapter takes a closer look at some of the most important personal characteristics 
and biological features of all the regional leaders in China recorded by this study. There is no 
doubt that political elite must be studied as a political being as well as a physical being. This 
research based on leaders’ personal backgrounds contains crucial information of the regional 
leaders in China. The information is what we need in order to make further analysis of the 
leaders and their career paths in following chapters of this study. At the beginning of the chapter, 
the author hypothetically expects that when compared to those in the earlier time periods of the 
PRC, contemporary Chinese regional leaders have not only improved their social status and 
political importance through economic reform, but also gradually changed their personal 
backgrounds by becoming more well-educated and politically trained for serving in regional 
governments of China.  
          In general, there are some aspects of Chinese regional leaders’ backgrounds and personal 
characteristics that we need to keep in mind before we go any further. First, post-Deng Xiaoping 
era’s Chinese regional leaders are relatively older compared to previous cohorts of regional 
leaders under Mao. It was due to the merit-based promotion mechanism of Chinese technocrats 
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that a leader usually would get promoted to the next higher post in the system. In consequence, 
as city leaders usually spend less time in the service, they are also relatively younger than 
provincial leaders in China; and provincial leaders are relatively younger than most of the central 
leaders who actually reached the high profile after serving at every step lower.  
          Second, the Chinese ethnic majority, the Han Chinese, occupy the majority of the regional 
leadership posts and all male leaders have visible advantages over female regional leaders. In a 
country such as China, the consistency of state building also reflects the ethnic majority’s 
involvement as the dominant part of the process. Except in ethnic minorities’ autonomously 
administrative regions, one expects to see more minority-background regional leaders sitting in 
responsible posts, still the party chief positions are mostly taken by Han Chinese candidates. And 
Chinese women’s political participation was mostly forbidden until the creation of the People’s 
Republic in 1949. As Chinese women had been suppressed by the opposite sex for centuries 
through every level of the society, it is still not common yet to see Chinese women in chief 
political posts.  
          Third, political localism has posed challenges to almost all the central governments in 
Chinese history. Central leaders must balance between native political elites and non-native 
elites when staffing regional governments and other bodies around China. Traditionally, natives 
were regularly excluded from regional governments so as to minimize any potential localism 
which can foster corruption, local networks, and the decline of the center’s authority. As a matter 
of fact, it seems that the CCP has recently allowed a much greater percentage of natives to be 
regional leaders in their hometown provinces. And there are relatively more native city leaders in 
municipal governments than that of provincial governments, for the smaller unit it is, the less 
likely the center can exclude potential local influences over personnel arrangements, and 
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municipal personnel arrangements are mostly conducted by the provincial governments instead 
of the CCP center. Again, it is for the political privileges and socioeconomic benefits that one is 
willing to work at a distant location away from one’s native area. Thus, we expect to see more 
non-natives taking chief posts instead of deputy or vice positions in regional governments across 
China.  
           Fourth, the results show that contemporary Chinese regional leaders, as political and 
social elite of China, have become much more educated compared to elite in Mao’s and Deng’s 
eras. In addition, it has been asserted in this chapter that when Chinese higher education has 
transformed through years, having a college degree has become an basic job requirement to 
recruit regional governmental officials, then the education level indicator might no longer be 
especially significant in deciding a regional leader’s political mobility. A young leader needs to 
achieve more than a school diploma to expect a promotion in his leadership career.   
           In addition to personal background information, this chapter also examined some other 
important features concerning regional leaders in China. These factors can be related to the 
organizational and professional settings of the party-state directed by the Communist party.  
           First, being CCP member is definitely essential for potential candidate who is interested in 
becoming political elites in China. Most regional leaders are CCP members; members of other 
minority political parties are rarely appointed as chief regional governmental leaders. Also, the 
nationwide party school system plays its important political function in training governmental 
officials and younger cadres, enhancing the party’s ideological control, upgrading regional 
leaders’ knowledge reserves, and making personal connections among regional leaders 
themselves. The influence of party schools, especially provincial party schools and Central Party 
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School has not declined in post-Deng era; they actually gained organizational strengths by 
attracting higher ranked officials as well as greater social and political resources in the country.  
             Second, one of the newer phenomena seen in recent decades in Chinese politics has been 
the significant rise of the Communist Youth League affiliated regional leaders, also known as 
tuanpai (the Clique of the League). Due to two general secretaries of the CCP, Hu Yaobang and 
Hu Jintao, Youth League affiliations have become politically important to many CCP officials’ 
career mobility. Our study shows that in recent years, there has been an important rise of League-
based leaders on the map of Chinese political power.  
               By examining the background and characteristics of Chinese regional leaders, we can 
conclude that the making of Chinese regional leaders can be a rather complicated and non-linear 
process related to a series of personal, social, economic, and political factors. In fact, the feature 
of Chinese technocratic politics being dominated by the CCP has made some features of the 
regional leadership highly homogeneous (such as education, party membership, genders, and 
ethnic groups), while some other features remain complexly heterogeneous (locality and the 
League background) such that different indicators must be combined to improve the existing 
literature. Here, one should remember that the readers that most regional leadership posts are 
actually interchangeable; for instance, a governor can be promoted to a provincial party chief, 
and a vice secretary of the provincial party committee can be transferred to a mayor post at an 
important big city. Due to the dominance of the CCP in Chinese politics, where authority over 
making personnel decisions exclusively remains in the center’s hands, political mobility issue 
can be practically more complicated than simply electing leaders as under democracy. The 
communist party must balance the interests of all the parties involved in the leaders’ 
rearrangements such that each qualified candidate can be filtered by the center multiple times to 
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reach the final decisions. Again, the center always needs capable protégés to be in charge of the 
regional governance systems in China, but it is crucial that the center’s superior authority must 
be maintained at all times.  
                 This third chapter of this study analyzes matters of the most important personal 
backgrounds and characteristics of Chinese regional leaders, by establishing the correlation 
between the traits of the leaders and the political mobility patterns in their careers. Regional 
leaders’ previous governmental posts in the Chinese political system and the locations of their 
previous governmental posts are also highly important independent variables to be thoroughly 
studied in this study. The next chapter of will be devoted to evaluate regional leaders’ career 
paths and the geopolitical settings of their previous governmental posts. The results reveal what 





FISCAL REVENUES, GEOPOLITICAL SETTINGS AND POLITICAL MOBILITY OF 
CHINESE REGIONAL LEADERS 
 
               Being a highly centralized country run by the state bureaucracy for its highest central 
leaders, the economic and business centers in China, where the revenues were generated for the 
government through taxation, historically had occupied great political importance as well. In fact, 
as the center’s core interests had been tightly tied with the economic centers in specific Chinese 
regions, the coordination and conflict between regional elites and the center had existed long 
before the Communist party’s rule of China.
90
 The primary goal of the central government’s 
taxations on business firms was to collect enough money for the Empire and for the emperors’ 
massive spending. On one hand, the center needed to secure its dominance in local economies by 
monitoring local elites; on the other hand, locales also needed the authority of the center to 
maintain necessary social orders and protect local elites’ interests in disputes with the peasants 
and workers. In other words, “[s]tatesmen and elites aimed to defuse discontent over tax issues 
based on household self-interests, the community’s welfare, and the state’s desire to sustain a 
stable relationship with local society.” 
91
 When the CCP took over China, even though heavy 
taxation on the peasants was considered the “shackles and chains” put on them by the imperial 
regime, and while land reforms nationwide in the early 1950s guaranteed rural peasant’ 
households with contracted farming land lent by the state to secure their basic livelihood, by 
centralizing Chinese economy under the CCP center’s tight control, the relatively developed 
economic regions in China were under greater pressure from the center, and their incumbent 
regional political elites were replaced with veteran revolutionary cadres, who politically 
                                                          
90
 R. Bin Wong. China Transformed (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), p.240.  
91
 Wong. Ibid, p.243.  
117 
 
controlled the regional governments and also operated the regional economy through state-
owned firms.  
              Although during Mao Zedong’s era, the Chinese economy was framed and structured to 
concentrate on heavy industries and the machinery manufacturing sectors by adapting the highly 
similar model borrowed from Stalinist Soviet Union, Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform initially 
concentrated on the decentralization of the central planning economy which used to be strictly 
manipulated by the state. 
92
 The shared purpose of both Mao’s central planning economy and 
Deng’s socialist market had been to modernize China at a rapid pace to make it industrialized 
and developed. The legitimacy of the CCP’s rule does not come from the claim that every 
Chinese would enter into the ideal society of Communism merrily, only under the guidance of 
the CCP; at least it was not the entirety of the party’s plan. The legitimacy of Communist rule 
from the very beginning was based on the fact that the CCP promised the Chinese people a better 
quality of life.
93
 However vaguely defined, life was supposed to become better under the new 
regime. The people’s welfare and livelihoods should have improved, or been improving under 
the CCP’s leadership. Hence, the better quality of life promise has driven the center to produce 
higher economic growth rates and achieve greater and greater GDP increases year by year. 
94
 In 
consequence, the common view held by both the center and its regional political leaders is: the 
greater the economic growth across China’s different regions, and the higher growth rates and 
GDP numbers they achieved at the end of every year, the more stable the CCP’s rule will be. 
Furthermore, when the tasks assigned by the center have been well-accomplished by the regional 
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leaders, the regional leaders’ tenures are also secured; they can continue acting as both the 
leaders of their regions and the agents of the center to the people of the regions.  
               The scale of China’s national economy has recently become one of the largest in the 
world. However, as the Western world’s China watchers keep bashing the Chinese government’s 
monetary policies and manipulation of the renminbi currency exchange rates, many have ignored 
the fact that socioeconomic development among China’s different regions is highly uneven. Yet, 
the CCP center has not found any effective solutions.
95
 Meanwhile, as in any post-totalitarian, 
party-state controlled and technocrats-operated state, many of the fundamental socioeconomic 
issues can be anatomized by looking at the structure of the Chinese political system. The 
conflicts of interests between a regional government and the central government of China may 
have caused different economic policy outcomes such that the center can influence regional 
governments through the allocations and other financial support. Moreover, the political 
importance of a region in China can also be evaluated through the center’s fiscal indicator that is 
by taking a look at the tax revenue indexes in recent years. Last but not least, under the party-
state regime, sustainable economic growth and regional governments’ financial conditions and 
fiscal contributions to the center are among the decisive factors that determine regional leaders’ 
political mobility in the future. Regional economic growth is one of the most desirable 
achievements of a regional government that the CCP center expects. Yet, the distribution of 
political-economic resources among different regions of China is astonishingly uneven and 
inconsistent. Therefore, by looking only at a region’s economic achievement in determining a 
regional leader’s political career can be rather biased when different indicators do not account for 
the highly secretive political realities happening in Chinese politics. As a result, we must also 
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study each regional leader’s leadership posts prior to his appointment to the new leadership post. 
The professional experiences of regional leaders certainly play important part in influencing the 
center’s final decisions on regional political personnel arrangements, and the center is surely 
willing to promote a technocrat who combines loyalty, capability and integrity, and one’s 
previous working experiences would supply some of the information that the center is searching 
for in making such decisions.  
                Therefore, in this chapter, the first part concentrates on analyzing the political 
importance of China’s regions, using empirical data of different regional governments’ social 
and economic achievements over the past three decades (i.e., since the initiation of Deng’s 
reform). The second part of the chapter makes its evaluation of Chinese regional leaders’ 
previous posts, profession experiences, and how both factors can affect these regional leaders’ 
political mobility throughout their careers as regional leaders. The third part of the chapter 
combines our findings in part one and part two, and tries to sort out some of the most important 
patterns of Chinese regional leaders’ career mobility. The following hypotheses are going to be 
examined in this chapter of the study. 
Hypothesis 4.1: Chinese regions (provinces, municipalities, and cities) with greater economic 
contributions to the national economy and with faster economic growth, their regional leaders 
receive more promotions from the CCP center than those leaders from other parts of the country. 
In general, more socially and economically developed regions in China, their regional leaders are 
politically ranked higher than the rest of the regional leaders in China. 
Hypothesis 4.2: Among regional leaders in China, leaders with previous local governmental 
leadership experience receive more promotions than those without local experience. In other 
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words, provincial leaders with mayor experiences get promoted more than those without such 
experience; and city leaders with local (county or city district) government leadership experience 
get promoted more than those without such experience. 
Hypothesis 4.3: There are certain patterns that are evident in Chinese regional leaders’ political 
mobility paths through the decades. For a regional leader, being transferred to developed regions 
means a promotion. Furthermore, regional leaders serve in Eastern Chinese provinces will 
receive more promotions than those leaders serving in other regions of China. Finally, leaders in 
chief positions (i.e., party chiefs, governors and mayors) get more promotions than their deputies 
(i.e., vice-secretaries, vice governors and vice mayors).  
A. Regional Political Importance Evaluated through the Levels of Socioeconomic Development 
                 In domestic politics, accurately comparing an administrative region’s political 
importance to other regions of the country can be most difficult. It is especially true when the 
situation involves a relatively large country with a sophisticated domestic economic system and a 
large population. In democracies, where the majority of regional leaders are usually locally 
elected instead of being appointed by the central government, the political importance of a region 
can be vaguely gauged through the region’s population, economic productivity, and its history of 
producing powerful statesmen capable of running a regional government as well as the whole 
nation. The degree of competitiveness of candidates’ political campaigns might be used as an 
indicator to show how a certain region’s political identity can affect the national elections; also 
important are the local political or electoral institutions of a region that impact candidates’ 
campaign schedules. 
96
 However, in Chinese politics, where the CCP emphasizes cadres’ 
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absolute loyalty and its authoritative rule of China, the center keeps the nature of the political 
hierarchy of all Chinese regions exclusively to itself. Yet, this study suggests that we may not be 
as accurate as the CCP center itself when evaluating Chinese regions’ political importance; 
nevertheless, we may estimate such a hierarchy by using published indicators such as GDP 
values, taxation revenues, and social welfares; these data can be used as complex indicators of a 
Chinese region’s socioeconomic development and political priority compared to other regions in 
China.  
1. Weighing Economic Growth and GDP Achievements in Chinese Politics 
 
            Regional economic differences have existed in China throughout its history. As the 
natural condition determines a region’s agricultural characteristics, traditionally, the most 
productive regions of China, both agriculturally and industrially, were located alongside the 
Yangzi River (the Long River) where generous rainfalls and warm climate have made the 
regions ideally suitable for crop farming, tea growing, and silk manufacturing.
97
 Being far away 
from the wars with the Grassland nomadic tribes and having greater ethnic homogeneity and 
cultural integrity made the central and lower Yangzi River valley the historical economic centers 
of China. These more developed regions occupied a position of national economic dominance 
until the Communist Revolution. Studies show that shortly after the installation of the totalitarian 
regime with its economic concentration on heavy industrial development and energy intensive 
growth under Mao Zedong’s leadership, the level of uneven development among Chinese 
regions was actually low, meaning that other inland regions were not significantly poorer than 
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the State of New Hampshire is the first state held the primary and draws national political attention and publicity.  
97
 Wong. Ibid, p.17.  
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the coastal China. 
98
 However, Deng’s reform in the late 1970s involved a state-led fundamental 
change in Chinese economic structures, where energy-intensive heavy industries were surpassed 
by small-scale, labor-intensive, export-orientated, and privatized enterprises from the coastal 
provinces of China. These changes in economic life have allowed provincial units to play a much 
more important role in economic management than the ministries at the center which were 
traditionally in charge of planning and coordination and which reflected the strategic importance 
of provincial leaders.
99
 In other words, the decentralization of the Chinese economy has given 
regional governments more autonomy in adopting economic policies to suit their local conditions; 
and the center, while loosening its control, still plays its authoritative role by influencing regional 





                  Moreover, Deng’s reformist policies have also empowered provincial leaders and 
regional officials with great authority in the allocation of economic resources in their provinces. 
Their political and economic decisions greatly influence the economic performance of these 
provinces. For this reason, they are also held accountable for the corresponding results arising 
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from their decisions. As a result, “[t]o a degree, provincial leaders are just like the middle-level 
managers in a multidivisional corporation who are responsible for their divisional 
performance.”
100
 Not only are regional leaders in charge of making personnel arrangements and 
deciding on budgets and public spending, they are also taking control of attracting foreign 
investments and negotiating with business leaders and corporate representatives in signing 
contracts and making deals. In as much as foreign investors need the local authorities’ influence 
on land-contracting with local farmers, to ease the local communities’ environmental concerns 
and other sorts of protections they seek in business activities, regional political elites are key 
strategic actors.
101
 The CCP center’s preference on promoting private shares in the national 
economy does not mean that the Chinese Communists are ready to embrace capitalism, at least 
not ideologically. This is true especially of the center, which has always held somewhat 
“ambivalent” attitude toward private sectors and foreign investments in China.
102
 As a matter of 
fact, giving regional governments more autonomous power to promote local economy and to 
create faster GDP growth have been seen as the center’s important move to improve the Chinese 
people’s quality of life. With improved quality of life and more economic freedom, it also 
enhances the legitimacy of the party-state regime’s claim to be the only political party in China 
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              Meanwhile, previous studies have shown that the center would like to promote its 
legitimacy by promoting the growth of China’s GDP and related economic numbers. However, 
scholarly works have ignored the fact that regional economic achievement is among the few 
indicators that differentiate all the technocrats in Chinese political system. Chapter three of this 
study analyzed one thousand Chinese regional leaders’ personal background information and 
found that most CCP cadres in the post-Deng Xiaoping era had similar educational background, 
age profile, gender (mostly male), nationality, and training experiences (party school system). In 
consequence, if one wishes to differentiate a regional leader from others with the same political 





             For instance, if a regional leader happens to be an important official from Beijing, 
Shanghai, or Guangdong Province, which are considered the most “open” regions in China, 
others would naturally connect the official with his region’s economic achievement and 
modernization. For other regional leaders from less economically vibrant parts of China, one 
may need to point out the place on the map before the conversation continues to the next stage. 
The City of Shanghai is important in Chinese politics because it has the largest population, the 
largest scale of economy, and maybe the highest density of international visitors to China. 
Therefore, when CCP cadre-technocrats are becoming more and more homogeneous as a group, 
then whoever makes the economy grows faster will receive more promotions.  
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Table 4.1 Largest Provincial Economies, Their Population, and Their Leaders’ Political 
Rankings (2010-2011) 














37775.49 1 104.3 1 East Yes Yes 
Shandong 33621.32 2 95.79 2 East Yes Yes 
Jiangsu 33478.76 3 78.66 5 East Yes Yes 
Zhejiang 22716.98 4 54.43 10 East Yes No 
Henan 19724.73 5 94.02 3 Central No Yes 
Hebei 17067.99 6 71.85 6 Central No Yes 
Liaoning 14696.23 7 43.75 14 Northea
st 
No No 
Shanghai 14344.73 8 23.02 24 East Yes Yes 
Sichuan 14050.78 9 80.42 4 West No Yes 
Hunan 12939.85 10 65.68 7 Central No Yes 
Hubei 12866.05 11 57.24 9 Central No No 
Fujian 11855.08 12 36.89 17 East No No 
Beijing 11469.28 13 19.61 26 East Yes Yes 
Anhui 10191.48 14 59.5 8 Central No No 
Inner 
Mongolia 
8967.52 15 24.7 23 West No No 





























Shanghai N/A 230.2 2 1687.24 1 Provincial 
Beijing N/A 196.1 3 1377.79 2 Provincial 
Guangzhou Guangdong 100.46 7 1060.45 3 Sub-Provincial 
Shenzhen Guangdong 103.5 6 951.09 4 Sub-Provincial 
Suzhou Jiangsu 62.4 35 916.8 5 City 
Tianjin N/A 111.5 5 910.88 6 Provincial 
Chongqing N/A 281.6 1 789.42 7 Provincial 
Hangzhou Zhejiang 78.62 18 594.58 8 Sub-Provincial 
Wuxi Jiangsu 59.92 44 575.8 9 City 
Qingdao Shandong 75.8 21 566.62 10 Sub-Provincial 
Foshan Guangdong 71.9 25 563.85 11 City 
Wuhan* Hubei 82.88 13 551.56 12 Sub-Provincial 
Chengdu Sichuan 125.79 4 550 13 Sub-Provincial 
Dalian* Liaoning 60.8 41 515 14 Sub-Provincial 
Ningbo Zhejiang 56.46 51 512.58 15 City 
Nanjing Jiangsu 74.13 23 508.6 16 Sub-Provincial 
Shenyang Liaoning 81 15 501.5 17 Sub-Provincial 
Changsha Hunan 65.29 31 450 18 Sub-Provincial 
Yantai Shandong 65.15 32 435.85 19 City 
Tangshan Hebei 72.47 24 430 20 City 
Source: Author’s Database  
(Population of the City of Guangzhou is cited according to the census of 2009; Shanghai and 
Beijing are also listed in Table 4.1 as provincial regions.) 
                Among 31 provincial regions in China (with Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau 
excluded), Table 4.1 shows the top 15 largest provincial GDPs. The majority of them (7 of 15) 
are located in the East geographic region of China, while only a few (2 of 15) are located in the 
West. The top four of regions are located on the east coast and enjoying great locational 
conveniences and benefits in trading with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong, some of 
the Mainland China’s most important trade partners. In terms of population density, most 
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economically productive provinces also have large population, though Beijing and Shanghai are 
not physically large in area but are very “crowded” in density. Furthermore, the top six 
provincial units in terms of GDP (Guangdong, Shandong, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang) plus Shanghai 
and Beijing, have their regional CCP chief secretaries are currently sitting as CCP Politburo 
members, the politically most prestigious positions a regional leader can reach in the hierarchical 
system. And among the 15 largest provincial economies in China, the majority of their governors 
(9 of 15), who are actually one level lower than the chief party secretaries in a provincial 
political system, are also seated on the CCP’s Central Committee. Being a CC member is 
likewise seen as a central leadership post; because CC members can participate as voting 
members in a number of high-level decision-making processes. 
                  As provinces located in different regions of China can differ from each other in terms 
of their levels of modernization and socioeconomic development, e.g., the economy of 
Guangdong province is almost about 300 times as big as that of Tibet in the Southwest China. 
Large cities with over a million residents tend to be less severely differentiated from one another. 
Table 4.2 lists the twenty biggest cities in China in terms of their population and municipal 
economic size. Shanghai and Beijing are in the advanced stage of development among all the 
regions in China; no matter that they are counted as big cities or central-directed municipalities, 
their economies make great contributions to the whole country. The party chiefs and mayors of 
the two cities are also politically important. Guangdong province has three of its cities 
(Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Foshan) occupying the top positions on the table which means it is 
also an economic engine of industrialized China. Two of the three cities, Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen, are also sub-provincial political (and administrative) units. It is realistically true that 
when regional leaders get moved or relocated to Guangzhou or Shenzhen from other less 
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developed regions, it is considered a major promotion for the leaders. Next to Guangdong 
province, Jiangsu province also has three of its cities listed as top twenty municipalities. Though 




, and Nanjing 23
rd
), they are 




, and Nanjing 
16
th
). Overall, other than the four centrally directed municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin 
and Chongqing) that are provincial units, among the remaining 16 on Table 4.2, 10 of them (62.5 
percent) are actually sub-provincial administrative units meaning that they are important both 
economically and politically to the center. Noticeably, even the smallest of the 20 cities 
(Tangshan of Hebei Province) has a registered population of 4,300,000. Considering the tasks of 
governing multimillion dwellers in a city, it can be as overwhelming as governing a province. If 
a leader can do well in governing any of these big cities, surely it is an achievement that deserves 
the center’s attention.  
              In addition, despite the GDP index which is frequently used to measure regional 
economic and industrial development, urban population and labor forces are also being used to 
measure regional economic contributions to that of the national economy.
104
 The next part of our 
analysis is going to take a more comprehensive look at on regional socioeconomic development 
and political importance in China.  
2. Financial Revenues and Allocations of Chinese Regions 
 
            Historically, financial revenues collected from all regions of the country have been a 
major source of income for the Chinese central government as the central government spent 
massively on infrastructure and financed the bureaucracy to run the nation under the emperors’ 
                                                          
104





 Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China the center’s control over 
the national economy, as might be expected, tightened compared to the Republic of China’s 
government under Chiang Kai-shek and KMT’s leadership. With a centrally planned economy, 
everything and all types of economic activities must be strictly monitored by the state and well-
planned in advance by the state’s planning bureaus. Unlike in a market economy where politics 
does not influence the market’s behavior directly but rather through indirect ways, in socialist 
systems, economic life is under the socialist party-state’s scrutiny where the economy is 
controlled by the technocrats instead of investment bankers, and politics determines the market. 
106
 Thus, since the nationwide establishment of the party-state and totalitarian regime, Chinese 
regional governments have been tied politically and financially with the central government: on 
one hand, regional governments must be responsible for carrying out the center’s economic plans 
and practicing them religiously; on the other hand, the center relies on regional governments’ 
revenues to operate the entire China’s socialist economic construction. The CCP center was 
entitled to squeeze the fatty parts out of its regional branches; and when it did, it made decisions 
by itself as to where and how the center was going to spend. In other words, the fiscal and 
financial systems adapted by the CCP since 1949 determined that every regional leader in China 
must always represent the center at each local governmental office, not only as a political 
administrator, but also as a tax collector. In return, it is the central government, instead the 
regional government itself, that determines how many financial returns (allocations) a regional 
government can keep for itself for local public projects for use of the people.  
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                  Table 4.3 shows the changes through the years in how the Chinese government has 
divided its national revenues into two parts within the political system: the center and the 
regional governments. As is shown in the table, from the 1950s to mid-1970s, even the poor 
performances of the national economy could not stop the center from taking the majority of the 
national financial revenues; and the autonomy of Chinese regional governments to make their 
own economic policies to stimulate their local economic growth was extremely limited. For 
example, in 1953, only 26.1 percent of revenues were kept for regional governments, and in 
1968, only 38.7 percent of revenues were kept for regional governments. Even in 1973, when the 
national economy made a limited recovery, regional governments still could only keep 44.4 
percent of all the revenues allocated by the political system. Deng Xiaoping’s reform gave more 
autonomy to regional governments and individuals in economic life. We can also notice the 
achievements of the reform by calculating the allocations of the revenues through the years.  
                As is shown in Table 4.3, from 1978 to 2003, which were the years of rapid growth in 
the Chinese economy, Chinese regional governments also controlled more financial revenues for 
themselves, instead of surrendering the last grain left in the jar to the center. This was especially 
true in the 1990s, where in 1993, when the center only kept 28.3 percent of the revenues and in 
1998, the center only kept 28.9 percent to itself. However, limited financial power weakened the 
center’s authority in political life and its control in conducting the gigantic economic system to 
function as it commanded. In the late 1990s, to overcome the negative effects caused by the 1997 
financial crisis, the CCP center tightened its hands over state revenues in order to have more 
control over the national economy of China. As a result, in recent years, the center has taken the 
majority of the revenues (53.29 percent in 2008 and 51.12 percent in 2010). By doing so, the 





 In other words, while the CCP center understands that regional 
governments’ interests should be respected, and that their progressive economic plans should be 
encouraged, the center’s decisive role must be recognized as unchallengeable at all times.  
                Because regional financial revenues are crucial to the CCP center, we may also 
hypothesize that among regional governments in China, those which generates the most revenues, 
it should have relatively more political importance to the central government. In other words, the 
region that is financially important to the center, it will deserve higher political importance in 
Chinese politics. And its regional leaders appointed by the center will be more high-ranked in the 
political system compared to those leaders who work in regions where they make fewer revenues 
to the center. We have already found that regional leaders in Chinese regions with higher GDP, 
also occupy higher posts in the hierarchical political system by being selected as Politburo 
members or Central Committee members with voting rights. Furthermore, according to the 
official economic data published by Chinese government, these regions with higher GDP are also 
making more financial contributions to the center; financially they weigh more than other 
regions in China. As is shown in Table 4.4, in the year of 2005, the top GDP producers in China 
were also the biggest revenue-makers in the country. The ranking of revenues by regions was: 
Guangdong, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Beijing (ranked 1 to 6
th
 on Table 4.4). Among 
them, Guangdong, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong, and Beijing were also top regions 
which spent more revenues than other regions in China (ranked 1, 2, 2, 5, and 9
th
 on Table 4.4). 
And their regional chief CCP secretaries are currently all Politburo members. 
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Table 4.3 China’s Governmental Revenues with Comparisons between Central and Regional 










1953 219.21 162.05 57.16 73.9 26.1 
1958 400.36 177.22 223.14 44.3 55.7 
1963 332.05 192.31 139.74 57.9 42.1 
1968 357.84 219.49 138.35 61.3 38.7 
1973 808.78 449.33 359.45 55.6 44.4 
1978 1122.09 532.12 589.97 47.4 52.6 
1983 1409.52 759.6 649.92 53.9 46.1 
1988 2491.21 845.04 1646.17 33.9 66.1 
1993 4642.3 1312.06 3330.24 28.3 71.7 
1998 10798.18 3125.6 7672.58 28.9 71.1 
2003 24649.95 7420.1 17229.85 30.1 69.9 
2008* 61330.35 32680.56 28649.79 53.29 46.71 
2010* 83080 42470 40610 51.12 48.88 
Source: 1953-2003 data cited from China Financial Yearbook (2006)  


























Beijing 919.21 2.9 6 1058.31 3.1 9 
Tianjin 331.85 1 16 442.12 1.3 25 
Hebei 515.7 1.6 9 979.16 2.9 10 
Shanxi 368.34 1.2 12 668.75 2 15 
Inner 
Mongolia 277.46 0.9 19 681.88 2 15 
Liaoning 675.28 2.1 7 1204.36 3.5 6 
Jilin 207.15 0.7 24 631.12 1.9 17 
Heilongjian
g 318.21 1 16 787.79 2.3 12 
Shanghai 1417.4 4.5 2 1646.26 4.9 2 
Jiangsu 1322.68 4.2 3 1673.4 4.9 2 
Zhejiang 1066.6 3.4 4 1265.53 3.7 5 
Anhui 334.02 1.1 15 713.06 2.1 14 
Fujian 432.6 1.4 11 593.07 1.7 20 
Jiangxi 252.92 0.8 22 563.95 1.7 20 
Shandong 1073.13 3.4 4 1466.23 4.3 4 
Henan 537.65 1.7 8 1116.04 3.3 7 
Hubei 375.52 1.2 12 778.72 2.3 12 
Hunan 395.27 1.2 12 873.42 2.6 11 
Guangdong 1807.2 5.7 1 2289.07 6.7 1 
Guangxi 283.04 0.9 19 611.48 1.8 19 
Hainan 68.68 0.2 29 151.24 0.4 30 
Chongqing 256.81 0.8 22 487.35 1.4 24 
Sichuan 479.66 1.5 10 1082.18 3.2 8 
Guizhou 182.5 0.6 25 520.73 1.5 22 
Yunnan 312.65 1 16 766.31 2.3 12 
Tibet 12.03 0 31 185.45 0.5 27 
Shaanxi 275.32 0.9 19 638.96 1.9 17 
Gansu 123.5 0.4 28 429.35 1.3 25 
Qinghai 33.82 0.1 30 169.75 0.5 27 
Ningxia 47.72 0.2 29 160.25 0.5 27 
Xinjiang 180.32 0.6 25 519.02 1.5 22 
Source: China Financial Yearbook (2006) 
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Shanghai East 1 74.89 8 1952.04 3 30 8 
Beijing East 2 75.92 1 2456.01 1 60 1 
Tianjin East 3 75.44 3 1464.22 4 17 18 
Zhejiang East 4 69.82 23 1050.02 10 27 10 
Jiangsu East 5 75.35 4 919.22 14 43 2 
Guangdong East 6 72.02 18 937.51 12 37 5 
Shandong East 7 72.32 16 649.51 25 40 3 
Inner 
Mongolia 
West 8 73.81 11 1096.09 8 10 25 
Liaoning North-
east 
9 75.26 5 926.9 13 40 4 
Fujian East 10 74.41 9 871.99 17 17 18 
Jilin North-
east 
11 74.11 10 859.12 18 24 14 
Hebei Central 12 69.92 22 649.56 24 30 8 
Heilongjiang North-
east 
13 72.12 17 698.72 22 25 13 
Henan Central 14 72.82 14 617.93 27 28 9 
Shanxi Central 15 71.02 21 843.27 19 16 19 
Source: 
1 
By 2010, retrieved from http://www.armluntan.cn. 
2 
By 2010, retrieved from http://tieba.baidu.com/f?kz=766839419. 
3 
By 2009, retrieved from http://info.i0532.net/action-blogdetail-uid-12116-id-1392.html.  
4 
By 2006, retrieved from http://bbs.city.tianya.cn/tianyacity/Content/333/1/23956.shtml.  
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(¥ 100 Million) 
National 
Ranking 
Shanghai Provincial East 2540.3 1 2873.6 1 527 1 
Beijing Provincial East 2026.8 2 2553.9 2 470 2 
Shenzhen Sub-Provincial East 880.82 3 1106.8 3 149 3 
Tianjin Provincial East 821.38 4 1069 4 131.4 6 
Suzhou City East 745.18 5 900.55 6 139.5 4 
Guangzhou Sub-P.&Cap. East 702.58 6 790
1 
7 121.1 7 
Chongqing Provincial West 681.83 7 1018 5 135.5 5 
Hangzhou Sub-P.&Cap. East 520.79 8 671.35 8 97.8 8 
Nanjing Sub-P.&Cap. East 434.5 9 518.8 10 N/A N/A 
Ningbo Sub-Provincial East 432.8 10 530.9 9 N/A N/A 
Wuxi City East 415.91 11 511.9 11 74.7 10 
Dalian Sub-Provincial Northeast 400.2 12 500.8 13 N/A N/A 
Chengdu Capital City West 387.5 13 506 12 81.9 9 
Qingdao Sub-Provincial East 377 14 452.6 15 N/A N/A 
Shenyang Capital City Northeast 320.2 15 465.4 14 N/A N/A 
Wuhan Sub-P.&Cap. Central 316.1 16 390 16 59.4 11 
Zhengzhou Capital City Central 301.9 17 386.8 17 54.4 12 
Foshan City East 254 18 305.96 19 N/A N/A 
Changsha Capital City Central 246.3 19 312.42 18 46.3 13 
Xiamen Sub-Provincial East 240.6 20 289.17
2 
21 N/A N/A 
Source: Author’s Database.  
1
Number based on Guangzhou government’s estimation, not actual final result. 
2
Xiamen was out of top 20 in 2010, the 20
th
 was Nantong, a city 
located in Jiangsu Province.  
3 
Number collected through the published results in March 2011, only top 13 were ranked. “Sub-P.&Cap.” means the city is a sub-provincial 
political unit and also the capital city of its province. 
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                  Moreover, previous scholarly works have studied the Chinese regional economies by 
heavily relying on each region’s GDP growth and total size and comparing them to that of entire 
China. Such an approach surely is a means that provides a direct look at Chinese regional 
differences. However, by doing so, readers may likewise ignore the uneven development of 
socioeconomic levels among regions in China. This study suggests that we take more factors into 
consideration in comparing regional developmental gaps. As is shown in Table 4.5, the top 
fifteen GDP provinces in China in the year of 2010, their population’s life expectancy and social 
welfare indexes are also ranked accordingly at the same time. Noticeably, the population of the 
centrally directed municipalities in China (e.g., Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing) has 
greatest life expectancies in the nation (No.1 Beijing, No.3 Tianjin, and No.8 Shanghai). Top 
GDP regions Guangdong and Zhejiang are ranked lower on the table with shorter population life 
expectancies, but they are large provinces with complicated geographic settings. There are 
certain regions in these two provinces where are very mountainous and much less developed. But 
these top GDP producers in general also spend more on public education for their people 
compare to that do other provinces in China. Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin’s educational 
spending is significantly higher than other regions, and Beijing’s educational spending per capita 
in 2009 (¥2456) was four times that of Henan Province (¥618). Finally, as the national higher 
educational system is mostly sponsored by the government, and where most collegiate and 
higher educational institutions are public, we also find that biggest regional economies also have 
higher concentration of colleges, with Beijing (60), Jiangsu (43), Shandong (40), Liaoning (40), 
and Guangdong (37) occupying the table’s top five spots.   
               Furthermore, after 30 years of continuously prolific GDP growth, many of the regional 
governments in China have already mastered the techniques of improving their economic 
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numbers and making their local GDP grow. That is to say, to evaluate a Chinese region’s 
economic resources regional GDP growth rates in China must not be the sole criterion. There are 
two reasons evident.  
               First, GDP growth supported by strong investment and industrialization might have 
little to do with improvements in regional quality of life. For instance, GDP numbers can be 
boosted by exporting a region’s natural resources, but the negative effects would be 
environmental pollution, shocking interruption of people’s conventional way of life,
108
 and the 
regional government’s ignorance to social welfare such as public education and health care.  
               Second, as it is true in China’s case, GDP numbers can be artificially inflated by 
governmental officials to look better than they actually are. Even a governor of a province 
sometimes has to use other indexes to correct GDP growth reports in order to reduce their 
artificial parts.
109
 Instead, we should rely more on the regional revenues index to evaluate 
Chinese regional economies. Because the more revenues a province (or a city) would surrender 
to the center at the end of the year, the more gross revenues it has made during this fiscal year. 
Regional governments tend to keep more to themselves, as it is mutually true to the central 
government as well. Thus, the regional revenues index can be a more reliable resource of a 
region’s political importance to the center, as the center highlights those regions more frequently 
that give more to the center.  
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                Both Tables 4.4 and 4.6 show the national rankings of annual revenues among Chinese 
regions. In Table 4.4 for example, in 2005 the top revenue generators among provincial units of 
China were Guangdong, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Beijing. All of them are located in the 
East of China. Beijing is politically crucial to the Communist government, while the remaining 
five of them are very industrialized regions with well-developed economic sectors. In Table 4.6, 
after comparing top twenty cities or municipalities in China that provide the most revenues for 
the center annually, we notice that Shanghai and Beijing, either as provincial-equivalent 
municipalities or as super-sized Chinese cities, make great financial contributions to the center. 
Meanwhile, bigger cities on the east coast of China in general make more financial contributions 
to the center than that of the cities in mid-west Chinese regions. And among the top 20 revenue 
providers, 4 of them are provincial municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing), 9 
of them are sub-provincial cities (45 percent), and 8 of them are provincial capitals (40 percent). 
Needless to say, a capital city is politically more important, as a political center can influence its 
economic policy-makings. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that these top revenue providers for 
the CCP center, as generators of Chinese economic growth, also occupy important positions in 
the political system of China. Even among low-ranked smaller cities, being able to generate 
additional revenues is considered a political achievement for its regional officials, as more 
revenues draw more attention from the top leaders. 
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               Overall, financial revenues, allocations, and other comprehensive socioeconomic 
indexes used in this part of the study have shown that the economically more developed regions 
in China, enjoy higher quality of life than other regions in China. It proves the author’s 
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hypothesis to be reliable that these more developed regions merit greater investment from the 
center, and their regional leaders are considered to be more prominent than other regional leaders 
in China. The GDP index can be used to evaluate a region’s political importance, as many 
previous scholarly works have shown. However, the results here have pointed out that relying 
solely on GDP factors to explain regional leaders’ career movements can be biased. For instance, 
if the governor of Shanxi province in Central China receives a transfer to be the governor of 
Jiangsu province in East China, it is a promotion. But it is not only because Jiangsu has much 
greater GDP than Shanxi, but because other socioeconomic factors (people’s life expectancy, 
educational spending, and college concentration) can demonstrate that Jiangsu is much more 
developed as a province than many other provinces in China. Thus, it is convincing to all that 
this particular governor is getting a promotion.  
B. Previous Posts and Chief Leadership Experience of Chinese Regional Leaders 
               As discussed in chapter three of this study, the CCP center has its elaborate system of 
making comprehensive evaluations of Chinese regional leaders before it decides to give any 
promotion, demotion or transfer to any of the important regional political figures. However, as 
has also been discussed, some of the important indicators the center uses are based on biological 
features or personal characteristics of regional leaders and party cadres such that others would 
not stand a chance in the leadership competition. For instance, gender (being male), ethnicity 
(being a Han Chinese), or locality (serving at one’s native province) and other natural advantages 
they possess are characteristics that others cannot compete with. Meanwhile, there are some 
other factors that seem to be relatively fairer when applied to all cadres with certain 
qualifications for regional leadership competitions; examples of such are educational level, CCP 
membership, and professional training (party schools’ educational or training-program 
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experiences). By examining Chinese regional leaders’ background information over the past six 
decades, the analysis here suggests that it seems that the CCP center cares not only about a 
regional leader’s personal characteristics, but also values a great deal of the leader’s previous 
occupational experiences and achievements. Basically, the merit system that rewards some 
regional leaders with upward political mobility acknowledges those regional leaders with 
creditable experiences who have done their jobs properly. The analysis presented here so far 
suggests a few assumptions to use before we explore any further Chinese regional leaders’ 




                First, as the primary expectation the center has for a regional leader is a well-governed 
regional government, the center values those potential candidates with governance experiences 
(i.e., those who have previously worked on leadership posts). Second, compared to Mao’s era 
where background combinations of regional leaders were more diverse (as they used to be 
revolutionaries who came from various strata of Chinese society), in the post-Deng era, Chinese 
regional leaders have a more uniform background. We now expect to see more regional leaders 
(higher in percentile) with previous experience as lower-level local leaders before they were 
appointed to the higher regional governmental posts. In other words, despite the importance of 
personal characteristics (gender, nationality and locality), more current regional leaders had been 





Table 4.7 Chinese Regional Leaders’ Local Working Experiences 




Provincial No Mayor 
Experience 
106 28.65 




City No Local 
Experience 
76 25.33 










 Total 670 100 
Source: Author’s Database (1950-2010) 
Table 4.8 Mao Zedong Era Regional Leaders’ Local Working Experiences 




Provincial No Mayor 
Experience 
19 33.93 




City No Local 
Experience 
22 34.92 










 Total 119 100 
Source: Author’s Database (1950-1976) 
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               Our findings show that there are (were) a large number of Chinese regional leaders who 
had worked as lower-ranked local governmental officials before they received promotions to 
become regional leaders at the next-higher level of governments. As is shown in Table 4.7, 
among the 670 regional leaders surveyed in the current study, 488 of them (72.8 percent) 
whether provincial or city level worked previously as local officials. And 182 of them (27.2 
percent) had no local-government based occupational experiences before they received the posts 
as Chinese regional leaders. Among all 370 provincial leaders, 264 out of 370 (71.4 percent) 
worked at some point in their careers as city leaders. Keeping in mind that city leaders are 
considered regional political elites, it means that the majority of provincial leaders in China in 
general had become political elites by virtue of their career moves to achieve higher rankings in 
the political system. City leader working experiences (e.g., being mayors or city CCP secretaries) 
may have helped them a great deal to become provincial leaders; as has been discussed in 
previous chapters of the study, most current central leaders of China had provincial leadership 
experience before they marched from provincial capitals to Beijing. Our findings also show that 
among all 300 city leaders from the1950s to 2000s, 224 of them (74.7 percent) had worked 
previously as local leaders in regional governments. These regional political units include 
counties, smaller cities, and administrative districts of big cities such as in Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Tianjin where even a city district can have a population over one million.  
         In addition, the result shows that in Mao’s era of Chinese politics, there were lower 
percentages of regional leaders in China with previous regional governmental working 
experiences. In other words, many communist cadres in Mao’s era got promoted to be regional 
leaders without even having worked as regional leaders before. Among 119 regional leaders 
surveyed, with a concentration in the 25 years preceding Mao’s, 78 of them (65.6 percent) had 
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occupational histories as regional leaders while 41 of them (34.5 percent) never worked in 
regional government, either at the provincial or lower-ranked local government levels. It can be 
viewed as proof that regional leaders in Mao’s era came from more diverse background, as 
former revolutionaries instead of school-trained technocrats (Table 4.8).  
Table 4.9 Post-Deng Xiaoping Era Regional Leaders’ Local Working Experiences 




Provincial No Mayor 
Experience 
23 17.4 




City No Local 
Experience 
48 29.3 
City Total 164 100 
All  Local 
Experience 
225 76.0 





Total 296 100 
Source: Author’s Database (1997-2010) 
               Our findings also show a significant increase in prior leadership experience among 
post-Deng Xiaoping era Chinese regional leaders. As is shown in Table 4.9, among 132 post-
Deng provincial leaders categorized by the study, 109 of them (82. 6 percent) had previously 
worked as city leaders in different parts of China; while only 23 of them, 17.4 percent of the 
entire provincial leadership body, had had no regional governmental working experience. 
Among 164 post-Deng city leaders (mayors and party secretaries) studied, 116 of them (70.7 
percent) had worked as leaders in local governments (counties, smaller cities, or administrative 
districts of big cities). But 71 of them (24 percent) had no local governmental working 
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experiences whatsoever before they were appointed by their regional leadership posts (Table 4.9). 
This result revealed by this study shows that in contemporary Chinese politics, regional 
leadership posts are more frequently occupied by CCP cadres with previous leadership 
experiences than by those who never worked as regional leaders at any level of the political 
system.  




Business 6 1.6 
Central 42 11.4 
City Leader 100 27.3 
Education 1 0.3 
Governor 16 4.4 
League Official 2 0.5 
Military 24 6.5 
Provincial Secretary 82 22.3 
Vice Governor 36 9.8 
Vice Secretary 53 14.4 
Others 5 1.4 
Total 367 99.9 
Source: Author’s Database (1950-2010) 
               Furthermore, supporting the assumptions presented earlier, some other noticeable 
details emerged in the process of recording provincial leaders’ occupational histories. As is 
shown in Table 4.10, there have been some major patterns in the career paths taken by Chinese 
provincial leaders who became provincial elites in China. Among 367 provincial leaders 
examined by the study, a large number of them (100 of 367, or 27.3 percent) worked as city 
leaders in China before they were promoted to be provincial leaders (governors and provincial 
party secretaries). Eighty-two of the 367 (22.3 percent) provincial leaders were already 
provincial party chiefs before they were moved, meaning that what they had received were 
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opportunities to change their locations, either from the developed parts of China to the rest of the 
country or vice versa. Did their moves count as promotions, demotions or lateral change? We 
will need to specify in the following part of the study by tracking their career mobility. Similarly, 
there are (were) 16 governors, 36 vice governors and 53 vice secretaries of the 367 provincial 
leaders surveyed who received career movements while they were already provincial political 
elites. Combine these provincial elites (82 chief secretaries, 16 governors, 36 vice governors, and 
53 vice secretaries), and then we have 187 of the 367 provincial elites (51 percent) who were 
tenured provincial leaders. There have been 24 military officers ever appointed as provincial 
leaders (6.5 percent), but all of them were named as provincial leaders under Mao’s regime. No 
military officer has been found to receive a civil servant post ever since, evidence that the 
Chinese bureaucracy after Mao Zedong has become civilianized. Also, there were two 
Communist Youth League leaders who became provincial leaders directly after leaving League 
leadership posts. The two cases were Hu Qili (League Secretary prior to becoming Tianjin party 
chief in 1980) and Li Ruihuan (League Secretary prior to being Mayor of Tianjin in 1983). Mr. 
Hu and Mr. Li were colleagues and personal friends; when Hu left Tianjin top post, he 
recommended that Li be appointed his successor. Among 367 provincial leaders surveyed, there 
were six leaders who got promoted from business posts and one from education. However, none 
of them worked in private business or in an educational institution; instead, they were all 
employed by state-owned firms and university. By all means, regional leadership posts are open 
to qualified party cadres, but not to elites from the private sectors of China.  
               Overall, all regional leaders coded with previous regional leadership experiences were 
those who actually worked in local governments (county, city or district levels) as leaders, not 
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merely as committee members or division heads. Thus, our findings here have revealed two 
trends in post-Deng Chinese regional leaders. They are:  
      (1) Compared to Mao’s and Deng’s era, post-Deng Chinese regional leaders share more 
similar prior professional background as the majority of them used to be lower-ranked political 
elites before they were promoted to be higher-ranked regional leaders in China. Evidence shows 
that these newer leaders are (were) less diverse in terms of their occupational histories, as many 
of them spent their careers climbing the hierarchical political system, working from junior 
positions to get promoted step by step. Not only their personal features share many things in 
common (mostly male, Han Chinese, college-educated), but their career paths in general are also 
similar to one another.  
 
      (2) The root cause of the homogenization of Chinese regional leaders’ before they received 
the center’s promotion may not be the idiosyncratic personal reasons of the top leaders; instead, 
it could be the consequential result of the center’s desire to fill regional governments with the 
CCP technocrats. First of all, a regional leader must be someone who is capable of 
accomplishing the center’s complex tasks. Thus, candidates with local leadership credentials 
(and who actually achieved something while working as a local leader) seem to be suitable. Last 
but not least, the leader to-be must be loyal to the party and the center. Thus, years of experience 
serve as observational periods for the center to examine a potential regional leader’s capabilities 
and trustworthiness. To be sure, regional leaders in China are supposed to be defenders of the 
party-state regime, not challengers to the center who dare to try anything to decentralize the 
center’s authority.  
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C. Toward the Political and Geopolitical Patterns of Political Mobility among Chinese Regional 
Leaders 
1. Classification of Regional Leaderships Posts, Regional Settings, and Background 
Analysis 
 
            This chapter of the study has argued that Chinese regional leaders’ previous leadership 
experiences are important indicators of their future political mobility. The relevant research 
extant has not commonly taken into consideration both the prior posts of the leaders and the 
priori physical locations where the leaders (used to) work. Again, it is argued here that the CCP 
center values each regional leader’s credentials as the center looks among them for a potential 
future leader of China on the world stage. Therefore, elaborate systems have been applied by the 
center to guide its personnel decisions for regional governments.  
             First, according to Chinese law, a provincial leader, which is equivalent to a minister of 
the central government on the political ranking chart, can work as a provincial head of 
government for a maximum of 2 terms. Each term is 5 years; thus, it would be a 10-year-period 
for a provincial leader working at the same post. A city leader can continuously work for 2 terms 
as well, and each term is again 5 years, resulting in a maximum 10 years term.
111
 Nevertheless, 
before the finalization of the laws was issued in 2004, after multiple changes during the mid-
1990s, regulations on how many terms a regional could serve at one’s current post was only 
vaguely defined and often overlapped between the party system and the administration. Table 
4.11 shows that the mean number of service years among Chinese regional leaders from the 
1950s to 2000s is 5 years; it is 4.3 years for Chinese city leaders surveyed by the study.  
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             Second, there have been cases of provincial leaders serving 14 years in a provincial 
government, and one city leader served 17 years in the same post. Both cases were found in 
Mao’s era and the early years of Deng’s rule when the retirement of Chinese political elites had 
not been constitutionalized and formalized as laws. Here, the present analysis has hypothesized 
that the longer a regional leader serves, which means that his leadership post has become 
stabilized, the more likely it is for the leader to receive a promotion (upward political mobility). 
Because the merit system adopted by the party-state bureaucracy rewards cadres with great 
loyalty and faithful service, the longer years one serves the party, the greater a regional leader’s 
chance to get promoted.  
          Third, as is shown in Table 4.12, all the regional leaders surveyed in this study are clearly 
classified by their current posts. Among all provincial leaders, the present study focuses solely 
on provincial CCP secretaries (156, or 42.2 percent), vice secretaries (49, or 13.2 percent), 
governors (130, or 35.1 percent) and vice governors (35, or 9.5 percent). These are the most 
responsible posts in the executive branch of provincial governments. Among all the city leaders 
recorded in this study, there are likewise four types of leaders: city CCP secretaries (152, or 50.7 
percent) and vice secretaries (14, or 4.7 percent) from the party system, and mayors (109, or 36.3 
percent) and vice mayors (25, or 8.3 percent) from the executive. In chapter two of this study, 
party chiefs and governmental heads are classified as decision-makers of the executive branches 
of Chinese regional governments. The regional People’s Congress system and Political 
Consultative Conference system are clearly of political importance, but they do not occupy the 
decision-making parts of the Chinese political systems. By studying the executives of Chinese 
regional governments, one is more likely to find out revealing facts and trends of contemporary 
Chinese politics. As a matter of fact, even among the executives of Chinese regional 
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governments, the selection processes of governors and mayors (as heads of the administration), 
and party secretaries (as heads of CCP party-organizations) are actually different; so are the job 
requirements expected of these new leaders. Here, it is hypothesized that governors and mayors 
as administrative heads have different career paths and political mobility, compared to these of 
party leaders of regional governments. As has been discussed, party chiefs are ranked one level 
higher than administrative chiefs. 
 
Table 4.11 Length of Service Years among Chinese Regional Leaders (Years) 





359 5.0 2.6 14 1 
City Leaders 300 4.3 2.5 17 1 
Source: Author’s Database 
Table 4.12 Distribution of Posts among Regional Leaders 




Governor 130 35.1 
Vice Secretary 49 13.2 
Vice Governor 35 9.5 
Total 370 100 
City CCP Secretary 152 50.7 
Mayor 109 36.3 
Vice Secretary 14 4.7 
Vice Mayor 25 8.3 
Total 300 100 
Source: Author’s Database 
150 
 
               Fourth, the study also finds that examining the posts before and after an individual 
assumes the post of regional leader is necessary to draw accurate conclusion about regional 
leaders’ political mobility. Therefore, every regional leader coded by the study has at least three 
types of movements recorded in the database: what post was held by this leader before becomes 
a regional leader? What is (was) one’s current post held at the same time the data were sampled 
by the study? What is (was) the post held by the leader afterwards (after the leader had left one’s 
current post)? In other words, we must be aware of where a regional leader came from, what the 
regional leader does (did) in the government currently, and where the leader was relocated (or 




Table 4.13 Previous Governmental Positions Held by Provincial Leaders 
Previous Position Held Frequency % 
Business 7 1.9 
Central Govt. 42 11.4 
Education 1 0.3 
Governor 16 4.4 
Youth League 2 0.5 
City Mayor 100 27.2 
Military 24 6.5 
Provincial Secretary 82 22.3 




Other 5 1.4 
Total 368 100 




Table 4.14 Position Held by Provincial Leaders afterwards 
Position Held after Provincial 
Leadership 
Frequency % 
Central Government 99 27.4 
County Official 1 0.3 
CPPCC (National) 10 2.8 
Governor 44 12.2 
Military 6 1.7 
Mayor 1 0.3 
National People's Congress 23 6.4 
Provincial Secretary 139 38.4 
Vice Governor 12 3.3 
Vice Secretary 22 6.1 
Other 5 1.4 
Total 362 100 
 Source: Author’s Database 
              Table 4.13 shows the array of prior posts held by these officials before they were 
appointed as provincial governmental heads of China. These occupational types are: provincial 
party secretary (22.3 percent), governor posts (4.4 percent), posts at Chinese central government 
(11.4 percent), vice provincial secretaries (14.4 percent), vice governors (9.8 percent), military 
officers (6.5 percent), Communist Youth League officials (0.5 percent), city mayors (27.2 
percent), state-owned business (1.9 percent), education (0.3 percent), and others (1.4 percent). 
These data indicate that the majority of Chinese provincial leaders were appointed from positions 
as provincial governmental officials (chief and vice secretaries, governors and vice governors, 
which total 50.8 percent of all cadres). A large number of them were mayors or city chiefs prior 
to the promotion, and posts in the central government were the next largest sources of personnel 
getting promoted to provincial leaders. Thus, the data show the center’s strong preferences in 
choosing provincial leaders with regional governmental leadership experience. Government-
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related working experiences are more valued by the center than experience at firms and 
educational institutions. Moreover, if we look at the subsequent postings of provincial leaders 
(i.e., after worked as provincial leaders of China), 38.4 percent of them became chief provincial 
party secretaries, 12.2 percent of them became governors, 3.3 percent of them still worked as 
vice governors, and 6.1 percent of them as vice provincial secretaries. As shown in Table 4.14, 
another large portion of them (27.4 percent) went to the center and became ministerial or even 
higher political leaders in China. Thus, when provincial leaders leave provincial governments, 
the majority of them remained in executive branches of the Chinese governmental system. Only 
2.8 percent worked at CPPCC and 6.4 percent of them worked at National People’s Congress, 
both considered as parliamentary units of Chinese politics. In other words, provincial leaders 
remain in power (executive branches) when they leave provincial leadership posts.  
Table 4.15 Position Held by City Leaders afterwards 
Position Held after City Leadership Frequency Percentage 
Dismiss, Death or Unknown (0) 36 12 
Non-Governmental (1) 12 4 
City Vice Secretary (2) 1 0.3 
Mayor  or City Chief (3) 10 3.3 
Transfer (4) 57 19 
Vice Governor (5) 50 16.7 
Provincial Vice Secretary (6) 39 13 
Provincial CPPCC or Congress (7) 39 13 
Governor (8) 20 6.7 
Provincial Chief Secretary (9) 10 3.3 
Central Govt. or Minister (10) 26 8.7 
Total 300 100 
Source: Author’s Database 
                Meanwhile, similar results are also found in studying the career paths of Chinese city 
leaders’ career paths after they left city leadership posts. Here, the subsequent post of city leaders 
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(after they have left their city leaderships) was coded from 0 to 10. The data show that a great 
number of Chinese city leaders (57 of 300, 19 percent) accepted locational transfers without a 
major upgrade of their political rankings. As seen in Table 4.15, these city leaders served at some 
other cities after their current posts, entailing a geographic change instead of a normative change 
of ranks. There were also many other city leaders who got promoted to be provincial leaders 
immediately after their terms were served in the cities: 3.3 percent of them became provincial 
party secretaries, 6.7 percent of them became governors, 16.7 percent of them became vice 
governors, and 13 percent of them became provincial vice secretaries. In all, 39.7 percent of all 
the city leaders observed received provincial promotions to posts as new provincial leaders of 
China. Also, 8.7 percent of city leaders became ministerial leaders at the central government 
level once they left city leaderships posts. Aside from dismissed, death, or retirement due to age, 
most city leaders stayed in the bureaucracy instead of stepping out of it for some other 
occupation. Only 4 percent accepted non-governmental positions, although not necessarily 
leaving politics for good. As has suggested in previous chapters of the study, a political elite in 
China enjoys more than mere political power and publicity. It can be very difficult, therefore, to 
leave one’s regional elite lifestyle behind for one who has been entitled to it and has grown used 
to it.  
       Finally, geographic (locational) changes or relocations can have significant political 
meaning to Chinese regional leaders once they are transferred between regions in China. As 
highlighted earlier, different regions in China have different levels of political importance to the 
CCP center. Even if Chinese provinces are not different from each other in terms of population 
and administrative priority, they do have different degrees of socioeconomic development, and 
most of all, their revenue contributions to the central government make some of the regions stand 
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out from others. As the findings shown in Table 4.16 and 4.17, a great number of provincial 
leaders (106 of 370, or 28.7 percent) were moved to the central governmental system in Beijing 
after serving their terms as Chinese provincial leaders. Combined with those who were move to 
NPC and CPPCC posts (served as committee chairs or vice chairs of NPC and CPPCC), more 
than one third (36.2 percent) of Chinese provincial leaders eventually become central 
governmental officials, rightly considered political elites of China. In addition, a large of number 
of provincial leaders (21.4 percent) continued their leadership services in East China as 
provincial leaders of the more developed regions of the country. The rest of them, if not retired, 
demoted or dead, also continued working as provincial governmental heads in other regions of 







Table 4.16 Provincial Leader Changes of Regions afterwards 
Provincial Leader Regions 
after 
Frequency Percentage 
Dismiss, Death or Retire(0) 13 3.5 
West (1) 65 17.6 
Northeast (2) 11 3.0 
Middle (3) 68 18.4 
East (4) 79 21.4 
Central Government (5) 106 28.7 
NPC or CPPCC 28 7.6 
Total 370 100 








Dismiss or Death (0) 6 2.0 
West (1) 62 20.7 
Northeast (2) 26 8.7 
Middle (3) 65 21.7 




NPC or CPPCC (6) 2 0.7 
Total 300 100 
Source: Author’s Database 
        While central governmental positions are actually foreseeable for Chinese provincial leaders, 
as their junior counterparts in Chinese cities, the majority of city leaders are not likely to get 
promoted to the central government immediately after their city leadership services. As Table 
4.17 reveals, only 29 of 300, or 9.7 percent, arrived in the central leadership. And as city leaders 
are usually younger than provincial leaders, they rarely go immediately to work at NPC or 
CPPCC either, as these posts are reserved for more senior members of governments (only 0.7 
percent of them were moved to NPC and CPPCC). Still, the majority of Chinese city leaders 
have to continue working at regional governments after their current terms. However, we do see 
a great number of them transferred to East China instead of staying where they were or moving 
to the Mid-West (36.7 percent of all city leaders accepted Eastern regional posts afterwards).  
      These descriptive statistical findings support our theoretical hypotheses that city leaders as 
relatively junior political elites in China, compared to provincial leaders and central leaders that 
they also need to serve a longer time and gain more local working experience before being 
156 
 
promoted higher in the hierarchical political system. Furthermore, as East China is economically 
important to the CCP center, we also see a higher concentration of political elites working in the 









2. Political Mobility Analysis of Chinese Provincial Leaders 
 
            As we have clearly defined Chinese provincial leaders’ current posts (the posts they held 
while being sampled by the study) in provincial governments, and the differences (both political 
and personal) of occupying different posts, our analysis now turns to concentrate on career 
movements beyond the positions of provincial leaders in certain regions, and the regional 
changes among different Chinese provinces. First, the author examines provincial leaders’ 
political mobility by applying three different logistical regression models to identify independent 
variables that potentially might affect a provincial leader’s career movements.  
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Table 4.18 Logistical Models Explaining Provincial Leaders’ Political Mobility 
Source: Author’s Database 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Promotion Demotion Transfer 
Age -0.020 0.010 0.004 
 (1.05) (0.22) (0.18) 
College Edu. 0.527 0.975 -0.898 
 (1.77) (1.49) (2.59)** 
Native Province -0.093 0.300 -0.193 
 (0.33) (0.49) (0.60) 
Length -0.089 0.284 -0.080 
 (1.54) (2.47)* (1.17) 
Tenured 0.906 -1.873 -0.451 
 (2.85)** (2.70)** (1.32) 
League Experience 0.435 0.216 -0.180 
 (1.16) (0.30) (0.45) 
Party school -0.469 -0.179 0.477 
 (1.59) (0.27) (1.47) 
Gov. now 0.624 -1.313 -0.021 
 (1.57) (1.52) (0.05) 
Sec. now 0.014 -0.462 0.313 
 (0.04) (0.66) (0.79) 
Developed Region 0.215 0.586 -0.670 
 (0.52) (0.52) (1.58) 
Mayor Experience 0.760 -0.561 0.113 
 (2.68)** (0.86) (0.34) 
Gov. before 0.027  0.363 
 (0.04)  (0.49) 
Sec. before -0.685 0.310 0.705 
 (2.03)* (0.39) (1.87) 
Minister before 0.408 -0.313 -0.047 
 (0.79) (0.25) (0.08) 
Vice Gov. before 0.318 0.950 -0.219 
 (0.61) (0.98) (0.36) 
Vice Sec. before 0.283 0.978 -0.432 
 (0.67) (1.12) (0.87) 
Constant 1.051 -4.836 -0.425 
 (0.92) (1.89) (0.34) 
N 368 352 368 
LR chi2 44.68 15.11 28.27 
Prob>chi2 .0002 .4437 .0294 
Pseudo R2 .106 .128 .082 
(Standard Errors in 
parentheses)  
*p≤ .05;**p≤ .01 
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            The three models of logistics regression are:  
Model 1: Provincial leaders receive promotion (or not) due to factors associated with 
these leaders’ age, educational level, serving in one’s native province (or not), how many 
years they have served, continuing serving as provincial leaders (or not), having 
Communist Youth League experiences (or not), having received party school training (or 
not), currently serving as governor of the province (or not), currently the chief CCP 
secretary of the province (or not),  whether the province is among the top revenue 
contributing provinces of China (or not), a leader having had any city governmental 
leadership experience (or not), a leader having been a governor before his current post (or 
not), a leader having been a CCP provincial secretary before (or not), a leader having 
been a CCP provincial vice secretary before (or not), a leader having been a vice 
governor before (or not), and a leader having had ministerial or central governmental 
experience (or not), and having been a vice-ministerial leader before (or not).  
Model 2: Provincial leaders receive demotion (or not) due to factors associated with these 
leaders’ age, educational level, serving in one’s native province (or not), how many years 
they have served, continuing serving as provincial leaders (or not), having Communist 
Youth League experiences (or not), having received party school training (or not), 
currently serving as governor of the province (or not), currently the chief CCP secretary 
of the province (or not),  whether the province is among the top revenue contributing 
provinces of China (or not), a leader having had any city governmental leadership 
experience (or not), a leader having been a governor before his current post (or not), a 
leader having been a CCP provincial secretary before (or not), a leader having been a 
CCP provincial vice secretary before (or not), a leader having been a vice governor 
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before (or not), and a leader having had ministerial or central governmental experience 
(or not), and having been a vice-ministerial leader before (or not).  
Model 3: Provincial leaders receive parallel transfer (or not), meaning no change of ranks, 
due to factors associated with these leaders’ age, educational level, serving in one’s 
native province (or not), how many years they have served, continuing serving as 
provincial leaders (or not), having Communist Youth League experiences (or not), having 
received party school training (or not), currently serving as governor of the province (or 
not), currently the chief CCP secretary of the province (or not),  whether the province is 
among the top revenue contributing provinces of China (or not), a leader having had any 
city governmental leadership experience (or not), a leader having been a governor before 
his current post (or not), a leader having been a CCP provincial secretary before (or not), 
a leader having been a CCP provincial vice secretary before (or not), a leader having been 
a vice governor before (or not), and a leader having had ministerial or central 
governmental experience (or not), and having been a vice-ministerial leader before (or 
not).                  
            Among all the independent variables, higher education, native province, tenure, party 
school training, current posts, city leader before, and top revenue provinces are all coded as 
dummy variables. The results of the regressions are shown in Table 4.18 and are discussed below. 
            First, whether a Chinese provincial leader receives a subsequent promotion or not, the 
outcome is positively affected if the leader has had city leadership experience; it is also 
positively affected if the leader is a tenured provincial leader (i.e., had served at least one full 
term), and served as a provincial CCP secretary before the current post. In other words, a 
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provincial leader is more likely to receive promotion if he: has been a city leader before, has 
tenure at his post as a provincial leader, or has been (or will become) a CCP secretary of a 
province. These dummy variables are significant in determining whether a provincial official 
receives promotion or not. Meanwhile, having had higher education, and if one’s current position 
(at the time when observed in the study) is the governor of a province, both of these factors have 
positive influences on the leader’s future promotion. However, the significance levels are lower 
than that of city leadership experiences, tenure, and chief secretary posts. None of the other 
dummy independent variables in the promotion model are statistically significant.  
            Second, whether a Chinese provincial leader is demoted or not, is correlated with 
education level and tenure in a governor post at a lower significance level. Provincial leaders 
observed in the study who received subsequent demotions were those without higher education 
but currently working as governors. However, the educational factor is not solely responsible for 
leaders’ demotions. The demotion score is significantly related with all provincial leaders’ length 
of services and previous provincial tenures. But it has no realistic meaning of such significance: 
demoted leader are those who are not tenured and have worked as leaders for shorter periods of 
time. It is a fact instead of being statistical proofs. No other independent variables have 
significance in affecting the demotion outcomes of provincial leaders. 
            Third, whether a Chinese provincial leader receives a parallel transfer or not is positively 
correlated with having higher education and having been a provincial secretary before his current 
post. Provincial leaders with college education who had worked as provincial chief-secretaries 
previously are more likely to receive transfers to different provinces. Meanwhile, having party 
school training and had a posting in a developed and revenue-contributing province both have 
positive affect on leaders being transferred laterally. But they are significant at lower confidence 
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intervals. No other independent variables are statistically significant in explaining the variation 
in the transfer data. 
            Furthermore, in order to track down the locational and regional shifts of Chinese 
provincial leaders after they served in provincial governments, the study also applies a 
multinomial regression model to examine the correlation between regional changes and the 





The regional change model is: the destination region a leader is relocated to after his 
provincial leadership posting is affected by that a leader’s age, educational level, service 
in his native province, length of years served, tenured or not, Communist Youth League 
experience, party school training, previous service as governor (or not), as secretary (or 
not), service in developed provinces (or not), previous service as governor (or not), 
previous service as provincial secretary (or not), previous service as vice governor (or 
not), as vice secretary (or not), previous service as ministerial leader (or not), previous 
posting in any of East China’ provinces (or not). Except age and length of service years 
are numbered, all other independent variables are dummy variables (0 or 1). Codes for 




Table 4.19 Multinomial Logistics Model Explaining New Regions after Provincial Leadership 
 Transferred to Regions After Provincial Leaderships 













Age 1.025 1.064 1.093 1.026 1.039 1.136
**
 
 (0.0440) (0.0346) (0.0633) (0.0272) (0.0251) (0.0492) 
       
College 0.910 0.368 0.411 0.673 0.540 0.474 
 (0.627) (0.188) (0.320) (0.275) (0.203) (0.282) 
       
Native 0.762 0.430 0.115 0.965 0.820 1.219 
 (0.517) (0.203) (0.130) (0.344) (0.286) (0.626) 
       
Length 1.248 1.172 1.028 0.991 1.065 1.074 
 (0.166) (0.107) (0.176) (0.0802) (0.0825) (0.122) 
       
Tenure 0.519 1.629 1.408 2.099 1.388 1.290 
 (0.349) (0.837) (1.268) (0.889) (0.540) (0.785) 
       
Y. League 2.214 3.224
*
 1.276 1.107 0.865 0.254 
 (1.580) (1.583) (1.517) (0.510) (0.405) (0.279) 
       
Party school 1.283 1.305 0.201 0.828 0.923 0.798 
 (0.856) (0.587) (0.225) (0.313) (0.343) (0.451) 
       
gov_now 0.417 0.397 2.540 0.944 0.497 2.118 
 (0.370) (0.236) (3.081) (0.465) (0.244) (1.901) 
       
sec_now 0.445 0.734 1.423 0.572 1.046 2.573 
 (0.355) (0.402) (1.748) (0.294) (0.470) (2.318) 










(0.327) (0.0225) (0.175) (1.289) (862815578.9) (0.208) 
       
gov_bef 0.00000190 1.886 0.000000535 2.175 0.433 0.408 
 (0.00265) (2.142) (0.000893) (1.736) (0.532) (0.539) 








 (1.220) (0.140) (0.495) (0.161) (0.187) (0.0671) 
       
vgov_bef 1.563 3.843 1.392 1.089 1.788 2.143 
 (1.974) (2.756) (1.834) (0.718) (1.093) (1.722) 
       
vsec_bef 0.685 1.119 0.841 1.075 0.556 0.172 
 (0.840) (0.690) (0.806) (0.561) (0.313) (0.157) 
       
minister_bef 0.384 0.361 0.000000252 0.119
**
 0.278 0.222 
 (0.489) (0.262) (0.000224) (0.0865) (0.189) (0.172) 
       





 (0.596) (0.215) (0.189) (0.121) (0.603) (0.0910) 
       
N 368      
 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 




           Since most of the provincial leaders observed in this study were transferred to the central 
government to continue their services in the executive branch of Chinese political system, region 
code 5 for central government as a dependent variable is used as the base outcome for 
comparison. As shown in Table 4.19, when using the central governmental posts as base 
outcome, our findings are as follows: 
         (1) Provincial leaders who changed their serving locations to West China are positively 
affected by their college education, Communist Youth League background, have worked 
previously in a developed province, and were serving as current provincial secretaries. These 
independent variables have statistical significance on the likelihood of being relocated to the 
West.  
         (2) Provincial leaders who served in their native provinces were likely to be reappointed as 
provincial leaders in the Northeast, if they were not transferred to the central government. 
Provincial leaders from developed and top revenue-making provinces are also likely to be 
appointed as Northeastern provincial leaders, if they were not transferred to the central 
governmental. But the significance is at a lower confidence interval.  
         (3) Provincial leaders who previously served as provincial secretaries or as ministerial 
officials, and previously (not currently) worked in Eastern Chinese provinces, are likely to be 
relocated to Central Chinese provinces (in the middle of the country), unless they are getting 
promoted to the central government of China. All these variables seem to have strong 
significance on the outcomes.  
165 
 
         (4) Provincial leaders with provincial secretary experience, ministerial experience, previous 
work experience in East China provinces, and higher education are likely to be relocated to the 
East.  
         (5) If provincial leaders are not promoted to the central governmental posts, those leaders 
with older age, provincial secretary or vice-secretary experience, ministerial leadership 
experience, and previously (not currently) worked in the East, are more likely to be relocated to 
NPC or CPPCC leadership posts. Also, leaders who currently worked in developed provinces of 
China, were more likely than others to receive NPC or CPPCC posts.  
         (6) Statistically, all the independent variables applied in the model have failed to explain 
why some provincial leaders were dismissed.  
          As has been suggested in a previous chapter of the study, if a provincial leader cannot get 
promoted to a central governmental leadership post, one might consider as acceptable choice in 
one of the developed provinces in East China. And Central provinces, financially and 
economically, are also better outcomes than the Northeast and the West. Here, this study applies 
the regional change model by changing the base outcome to the West (coded as 1). The results 
(Table 4.20) suggest that:  
         (1) If provincial leaders were not getting relocated to Western provinces of China after they 
had served in provincial governments, they were likely to be relocated to the Northeast of China 
if they had had party school training, and if they currently worked in developed provinces. Both 
factors are significant on the results at a lower confidence interval, yet they are more significant 
than all other independent variables on the outcomes.  
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         (2) Provincial leaders currently worked in a developed province of China, assuming a 
Communist Youth League background, are more likely to be relocated to the middle of country 
(Central provinces), if they were relocated to neither the West nor the Northeast.  
         (3) If provincial leaders were not relocated to any of the three regions mentioned above, 
which are the West, the Northeast and the Central, those leaders with Youth League background 
and previous Eastern provincial leadership experiences were more likely to stay (or be relocated) 
in the East. Both factors have a strong influence on the outcomes.  
         (4) Several independent variables are shown to be significant in explaining why some 
provincial leaders were relocated (promoted) to central governmental leadership posts. Leaders 
with older age, higher educational achievements, work as Youth League officials (either the 
League central or regional organizations), currently working in a developed and industrialized 
province of China as the CCP provincial secretary, are significantly more likely to be promoted 
to the center of Chinese politics. Having any one of these factors would enhance a leader’s 
upward political mobility. He does not need to have multiple factors. Previously serving as vice 
governors and currently serving in an Eastern province, also have a positive influence on leaders’ 
promotion, but only at a lower confidence interval.  
         (5) Provincial leaders, if not relocated to the West, the Northeast, the Middle provinces, or 
to the central government in Beijing, who received posts in NPC and CPPCC systems were 
likely leaders with a Youth League background, who currently serve as governors from 




         (6) Finally, leaders who previously served in Eastern provinces were likely to be promoted 
to NPC and CPPCC in Beijing, but the significance is robust at a lower confidence interval. On 
the contrary, regional leaders who previously served in other regions of China have not shown 














          The details of the analytical models are shown in Table 4.20. 
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Table 4.20 Multinomial Regression Model Explaining Regional Changes (Base outcome 2) 
 Transfer to Regions after Provincial Leaderships 

















age 0.963 1.028 0.964 0.977 0.940 1.068 
 (0.0470) (0.0630) (0.0337) (0.0329) (0.0306) (0.0512) 
       
Higher Edu. 2.474 1.118 1.829 1.469 2.718 1.289 
 (1.917) (0.931) (0.979) (0.770) (1.388) (0.867) 
       
Native 
Province 
1.771 0.266 2.244 1.907 2.325 2.834 
 (1.341) (0.312) (1.089) (0.937) (1.099) (1.697) 
       
length 1.066 0.877 0.846 0.909 0.854 0.916 
 (0.151) (0.153) (0.0803) (0.0861) (0.0778) (0.110) 
       
tenure 0.319 0.864 1.289 0.852 0.614 0.792 
 (0.246) (0.826) (0.722) (0.468) (0.315) (0.551) 
       









 (0.524) (0.475) (0.181) (0.147) (0.152) (0.0873) 
       
Party school 0.983 0.154 0.634 0.707 0.766 0.611 
 (0.716) (0.175) (0.302) (0.340) (0.345) (0.375) 
       
gov_now 1.052 6.405 2.381 1.253 2.522 5.341 
 (1.008) (7.981) (1.452) (0.793) (1.500) (5.006) 
       
sec_now 0.606 1.937 0.778 1.424 1.362 3.504 
 (0.518) (2.418) (0.465) (0.801) (0.745) (3.221) 










 (9.166) (4.619) (33.48) (2.66015e+10) (21.37) (5.162) 
       
gov_bef 0.00000101 0.000000284 1.153 0.229 0.530 0.216 
 (0.00141) (0.000473) (1.213) (0.328) (0.602) (0.314) 
       
sec_bef 7.721
*
 2.559 1.544 2.155 4.815
*
 0.360 
 (7.169) (2.686) (1.129) (1.464) (3.235) (0.367) 
       
Vice-gov_bef 0.407 0.362 0.283 0.465 0.260 0.558 
 (0.523) (0.476) (0.207) (0.326) (0.187) (0.466) 
       
Vice-sec_bef 0.612 0.752 0.961 0.497 0.894 0.154
*
 
 (0.764) (0.736) (0.588) (0.326) (0.552) (0.147) 
       





(1.445) (0.000620) (0.299) (0.675) (2.012) (0.571) 
       
East_bef 1.880 0.475 0.670 3.751
**
 2.173 0.279 
 (1.414) (0.432) (0.336) (1.781) (1.014) (0.213) 
       
N 368      
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
Source: Author’s Database  
                In comparing the two different outcomes after running the same regional change 
multinomial regression model, it makes more sense when we set the base outcome to be the West 
instead of the Central Government. In brief, regional revenues and economic development can 
explain many cases of provincial leaders’ political mobility. Economic growth and 
developmental performance matter in regional leaders’ political careers, as some scholars have 
found that “the Chinese central government tends to promote provincial leaders who perform 
well economically and terminate provincial leaders who perform poorly…economic performance 
matters for provincial leaders’ career prospects [and] is robust to various sensitivity tests.”
113
  
                Meanwhile, Youth League working experience and the holding of posts of governors 
or party secretaries can also explain many cases of provincial leaders’ political mobility. 
However, none of these independent variables applied in all the regression models explain 
provincial leaders’ demotion or dismissal cases very well.  
3. Political Mobility Analysis of Chinese City Leaders 
 
                As in any clearly defined hierarchical political system, the higher a cadre moves the 
fewer choices of posts left for the cadre to compete for. Provincial leaders in China, by whatever 
standard, are already senior governmental leaders in Chinese politics, even if they get transferred 
to a different region without gaining a prominent promotion in the hierarchical system, they 
                                                          
113
 Hongbin Li and Li-an Zhou. Ibid, p.1760.  
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should not be considered as the losers of the games of throne. By all means, when one has served 
as a provincial leader peacefully and competently until one’s retirement age, the material 
compensations and social prestige that accrue are far from disappointing.  
          However, the case is different for a city leader in China. First of all, there are many more 
city leaders than provincial leaders, and only a limited number of them can receive great 
promotions (to become provincial leaders or even higher) even if the party-state’s merit system is 
fairly based on a regional leader’s performance and achievements. Simply put, there are not 
enough posts for everyone, and the higher you aim, the more difficult it is for you to reach. 
Second, city leaders on average are younger than provincial leaders, as provincial leaders are at 
the late stage of their careers. City leaders are in the middle yet crucial stage of their political 
careers, and they can be more anxious and ambitious to compete with one another for scarcely 
granted promotional opportunities, especially when the opportunity is to promote one from 
regional government to the CCP center. To many scholars and China watchers from the outside, 
Chinese technocrats (as it can be the same for all bureaucracies under authoritarian regimes) are 
collectively defined and assumed to have great similarities with each other. Nevertheless, they do 
end up very differently and unexpectedly based on their background and experiences as leaders 
in different regions across China. Therefore, in order to more accurately reflect the political 
reality of the party-state system, here, it is important to apply a few more models of analysis to 
find out where the city leaders have gone after they served in their current posts. Besides getting 
promoted, transferred or demoted, many city leaders entered into a provincial leadership group, 
and some of them even acquired central governmental positions afterwards. Thus, our logistical 




Table 4.21 Logistics Regression Analysis of City Leader’s Political Mobility 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Promotion Demotion Transfer Provincial after Finally Central 
      
Age -0.0153 -0.0493 0.00317 -0.0191 -0.0354 
 (-0.73) (-1.16) (0.12) (-0.93) (-1.51) 
      
Gender 0.0905  -0.987 0.0452 0.0499 
 (0.11)  (-1.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
      
College 0.239 -1.090 -0.325 -0.245 0.891
*
 
 (0.72) (-1.69) (-0.77) (-0.74) (2.32) 
      
Native 
province 
-0.168 0.619 0.450 -0.0112 -0.367 
 (-0.62) (1.03) (1.25) (-0.04) (-1.22) 
      
CCP 
member 
0.170   -0.890  
 (0.13)   (-0.66)  
      
Length year 0.0243 -0.00221 0.0734 0.0975 0.00980 
 (0.38) (-0.02) (0.92) (1.52) (0.14) 
      
Tenure 0.666 0.474 -1.105
*
 -0.164 0.0682 
 (1.83) (0.53) (-2.38) (-0.44) (0.16) 
      
League 0.0635 0.824 -0.961 0.543 -1.167
*
 
 (0.18) (1.19) (-1.58) (1.52) (-2.50) 
      
Party school 0.361 -0.948 0.193 0.386 -0.321 
 (1.15) (-1.15) (0.46) (1.27) (-0.93) 
      
Local before 0.665
*
 0.260 -0.631 0.765
*
 -0.295 
 (2.14) (0.35) (-1.64) (2.43) (-0.83) 
      





 (0.94) (0.81) (-1.16) (2.69) (2.21) 
      
City sec. 
now 





 (1.96) (0.06) (-0.98) (4.19) (2.93) 
      
Big revenue 
cities 
0.437 0.0909 -0.0963 0.0547 0.547 
 (1.53) (0.16) (-0.26) (0.19) (1.65) 
      
Eastern 
before 





(-0.97) (-0.64) (1.16) (1.06) (-1.22) 
      
Constant -0.764 -1.067 0.408 -0.386 -2.366 
 (-0.41) (-0.42) (0.25) (-0.20) (-1.20) 
N 299 289 296 299 296 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
Model 1: Chinese city leaders receive promotion (or not) due to the factors associated 
with these leaders’ age, educational level, serving in one’s native province (or not), how 
many years they have served, having tenured as leaders (or not), having Communist 
Youth League experience (or not), having received party school training (or not), 
currently serving as the mayor of the city (or not), currently serving as the chief CCP 
secretary of the city (or not), whether the province or the municipal region is among the 
top revenue contributing provinces of China (or not), whether a leader has had any city or 
lower-level local governmental leadership experiences (or not), and whether a leader has 
been a regional or local leader in an Eastern province (or not).  
Model 2: Chinese city leaders receive demotion (or not) due to the factors associated with 
these leaders’ age, educational level, serving in one’s native province (or not), how many 
years they have served, having tenured as leaders (or not), having Communist Youth 
League experience (or not), having received party school training (or not), currently 
serving as the mayor of the city (or not), currently serving as the chief CCP secretary of 
the city (or not), whether the province or the municipal region is among the top revenue 
contributing provinces of China (or not), whether a leader has had any city or lower-level 
local governmental leadership experiences (or not), and whether a leader has been a 
regional or local leader in an Eastern province (or not).  
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Model 3: Chinese city leaders receive parallel transfer (or not) due to the factors 
associated with these leaders’ age, educational level, serving in one’s native province (or 
not), how many years they have served, having tenured as leaders (or not), having 
Communist Youth League experience (or not), having received party school training (or 
not), currently serving as the mayor of the city (or not), currently serving as the chief 
CCP secretary of the city (or not), whether the province or the municipal region is among 
the top revenue contributing provinces of China (or not), whether a leader has had any 
city or lower-level local governmental leadership experiences (or not), and whether a 
leader has been a regional or local leader in an Eastern province (or not). 
Model 4: Chinese city leaders receive provincial leadership position (or not) promotion 
(or not) due to the factors associated with these leaders’ age, educational level, serving in 
one’s native province (or not), how many years they have served, having tenured as 
leaders (or not), having Communist Youth League experience (or not), having received 
party school training (or not), currently serving as the mayor of the city (or not), currently 
serving as the chief CCP secretary of the city (or not), whether the province or the 
municipal region is among the top revenue contributing provinces of China (or not), 
whether a leader has had any city or lower-level local governmental leadership 
experiences (or not), and whether a leader has been a regional or local leader in an 
Eastern province (or not).  
Model 5: Chinese city leaders receive central governmental posts promotion (or not) due 
to the factors associated with these leaders’ age, educational level, serving in one’s native 
province (or not), how many years they have served, having tenured as leaders (or not), 
having Communist Youth League experience (or not), having received party school 
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training (or not), currently serving as the mayor of the city (or not), currently serving as 
the chief CCP secretary of the city (or not), whether the province or the municipal region 
is among the top revenue contributing provinces of China (or not), whether a leader has 
had any city or lower-level local governmental leadership experiences (or not), and 
whether a leader has been a regional or local leader in an Eastern province (or not).                 
     Here, Model 4 is applied to examine why some city leaders have made a greater career jump 
than others―how they managed to be promoted into provincial governments instead of staying 
at the city leadership level of the political system. Model 5 is applied to examine what might 
possibly affect city leaders’ political mobility such that after a longer time period (if not 
immediately) they finally got promoted to central leadership positions in China (CC members, 
Politburo, or ministerial posts). It is surely a smashing achievement for one to make one’s way 
from a leader of a Chinese city (as there are thousands cities) to be a central governmental leader. 
The results of all five of the logistics regression models are shown in Table 4.21. Our findings 
are: 
(1) City leaders who received promotions or upward political mobility were more likely 
to be those leaders who were tenured on their leadership posts, who had previously 
worked in local government (lower than city-level governments) as governmental 
heads, and who currently served as party secretaries of the cities, instead of serving at 
other posts. Also, city leaders who worked in developed regions with great revenue 
contributions to the central government tended to be promoted more frequently than 
those who worked in less developed parts of China. But this relationship is only 
statistically significant at a lower significance interval. 
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(2) City leaders who were demoted or dismissed afterwards were not associated 
statistically with any independent variables. No convincing statistical proof was 
found among the independent variables as to what had caused leaders to be dismissed.  
(3) City leaders who received parallel transfers without outstanding changes of 
hierarchical rankings were likely to be those leaders who were tenured (finished at 
least one term of service), and who were local governmental leaders previously (local 
experience). Also, leaders with a Youth League background were more likely to be 
transferred.  
(4) Several independent variables seem to affect the likelihood of being provincial 
leaders afterwards. City leaders, who are promoted to be provincial leaders 
immediately after their city chief posts, were those with local governmental 
leadership experience, currently served as mayors or city secretaries (party chiefs). 
Also, longer years of service, Youth League experience and party school training, and 
previously work as governmental heads in an Eastern province of China, all influence 
the odds of being transferred.  
(5) Among all the city leaders observed in the study, those who finally achieved central 
governmental leadership positions of China, were those with better educational 
background (with college degrees), with Youth League experience, who had worked 
as mayors or chief party secretaries of cities. Also, by controlling the independent 
variables mentioned above, leaders with older age, who had worked in developed 
provinces of China, and who had previously worked in Eastern provinces were more 
likely than other leaders to be promoted to central government at later stages of their 
political careers.  
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                  Furthermore, it is of equal importance to show the cross-regional mobility of city 
leaders as the models mentioned above also test the leader’s horizontal political mobility. 
Therefore, we may adopt the regional change model (multinomial logistic regression) of regional 
leaders again in examining city leaders’ regional changes after they served in certain regions of 
China.  
The regional change model for Chinese city leaders is: the region a leader was 
relocated to after one’s city leadership is explicable in terms of a leader’s age, 
educational level, served in native province, length of years served, tenured (or not), 
Communist Youth League experience, party school training (or not), service as mayor 
(or not), as party secretary (or not), service in developed provinces ( and great 
revenues contributing cities) (or not), previous service as local leaders (or not), 
previous service in secretary (or not), previously worked in Eastern Chinese 
provinces (or not). Except age and length of service years are numbered, other 
independent variables are dummy variables (0 or 1). Codes for different regions are 
shown in Table 4.17. Meanwhile, in order to analyze city leader’s political mobility 
across regions, the model also runs with controlling different outcomes as base 
outcomes. 
Situation 1: In running the regional change model, set dismiss, retire, or death (coded 
0) as the base outcome, in order to have other outcomes’ possibilities compared with 
city leaders being dismissed, dead or retired. 
Situation 2: In running the regional change model, set West (coded 1) as the base 
outcome, in order to have other outcomes’ possibilities compared with city leaders 
being relocated to the West of China. 
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Table 4.22a Multinomial Regression Analysis of City Leader’s Regional Changes afterwards 
 (1)      (2)      
 Region after 
City Leaders 
     Region after 
City Leaders 






























age 0.904 0.966 0.892 0.900 0.937 0.677 1.106 1.069 0.987 0.996 1.037 0.749 
 (0.0659) (0.0739) (0.0640) (0.0621) (0.0708) (0.273) (0.0807) (0.0455) (0.0314) (0.0360) (0.0450) (0.298) 
             
college 2.676 2.207 3.442 1.855 11.01 1.27764e+15 0.374 0.825 1.286 0.693 4.116 4.77472e+14 
 (3.601) (3.058) (4.545) (2.346) (15.52) (3.15104e+18) (0.503) (0.572) (0.698) (0.423) (3.241) (1.17759e+18) 
             
Native 4.766 5.070 6.802 5.758 4.027 2.41e-14 0.210 1.064 1.427 1.208 0.845 5.06e-15 
 (5.745) (6.267) (8.134) (6.673) (4.937) (3.67e-11) (0.253) (0.538) (0.555) (0.561) (0.437) (7.69e-12) 
             
Length 
year 
1.383 1.487 1.300 1.551 1.581 0.328 0.723 1.075 0.940 1.122 1.143 0.237 
 (0.548) (0.596) (0.514) (0.605) (0.636) (0.684) (0.287) (0.126) (0.0882) (0.117) (0.146) (0.486) 
             
tenure 0.378 0.538 0.654 0.369 0.125 0.0800 2.643 1.421 1.729 0.975 0.329 0.211 
 (0.582) (0.861) (1.002) (0.543) (0.194) (0.281) (4.065) (1.036) (0.952) (0.648) (0.229) (0.684) 
             
league 0.521 0.509 0.344 0.447 0.254 280.0 1.918 0.976 0.660 0.857 0.487 537.1 
 (0.699) (0.705) (0.461) (0.582) (0.357) (1744.2) (2.573) (0.566) (0.305) (0.492) (0.329) (3277.6) 
             
Party 
school 
0.744 0.626 0.392 0.654 0.469 6.22e-17 1.344 0.841 0.527 0.878 0.630 8.36e-17 
 (0.991) (0.857) (0.520) (0.847) (0.635) (1.20e-13) (1.790) (0.458) (0.220) (0.459) (0.348) (1.62e-13) 
             
Mayor 
now 
0.000000334 0.000000465 0.000000610 0.000000659 24.25 6.34247e+12 2990886.7 1.390 1.825 1.971 72515483.3 1.89696e+19 
 (0.00142) (0.00197) (0.00259) (0.00280) (120632.7) (3.11514e+16) (1.26940e+10) (0.983) (1.060) (1.531) (1.88287e+11) (4.68891e+22) 
             
City sec. 
now 
0.000000198 0.000000102 0.000000270 0.000000292 5.796 4.84951e+11 5051415.4 0.515 1.362 1.475 29276114.7 2.44969e+18 
 (0.000840) (0.000432) (0.00114) (0.00124) (28836.0) (2.38186e+15) (2.14394e+10) (0.374) (0.768) (1.102) (7.60155e+10) (6.05514e+21) 




0.439 0.640 1.315 2.573 2.434 4.36e-08 2.276 1.456 2.993** 5.856*** 5.540** 9.92e-08 
 (0.460) (0.688) (1.357) (2.545) (2.649) (0.0000342) (2.381) (0.762) (1.213) (2.883) (3.109) (0.0000779) 
             
Eastern 
before 
0.0253** 0.0595* 0.0461* 2.173 0.113 49073438.2 39.54** 2.354 1.823 85.90*** 4.453* 1.94023e+09 
 (0.0324) (0.0776) (0.0575) (2.710) (0.143) (3.85512e+10) (50.69) (1.682) (1.106) (51.31) (3.011) (1.52421e+12) 
N 299      299      
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 4.22b Multinomial Regression Analysis of City Leaders’ Regional Changes afterwards 
 (3)      
 Region after 
City Leaders 
    












NPC or CPPCC 
6 
Age 1.035 0.935 0.923 0.931 0.970 0.701 
 (0.0791) (0.0398) (0.0383) (0.0403) (0.0480) (0.279) 
       
College 0.453 1.213 1.560 0.841 4.990 5.78959e+14 
 (0.628) (0.841) (1.039) (0.580) (4.307) (1.42789e+18) 
       
Hometown 0.197 0.940 1.342 1.136 0.794 4.76e-15 
 (0.244) (0.475) (0.672) (0.612) (0.472) (7.23e-12) 
       
Length year 0.673 0.930 0.875 1.043 1.063 0.220 
 (0.270) (0.109) (0.102) (0.125) (0.152) (0.452) 
       
Tenure 1.860 0.704 1.217 0.686 0.232 0.149 
 (2.978) (0.513) (0.906) (0.548) (0.195) (0.486) 
       
League 
experiences 
1.964 1.024 0.676 0.878 0.498 550.1 
 (2.721) (0.594) (0.399) (0.582) (0.378) (3362.7) 
       
Party school 1.598 1.189 0.627 1.044 0.750 9.94e-17 
 (2.189) (0.647) (0.342) (0.635) (0.481) (1.92e-13) 
       
Mayor now 2151038.3 0.719 1.313 1.418 52152960.9 1.36429e+19 
 (9.12951e+09) (0.508) (0.921) (1.170) (1.35415e+11) (3.37226e+22) 
       
City sec. now 9814112.1 1.943 2.645 2.865 56878927.8 4.75937e+18 
 (4.16534e+10) (1.412) (1.944) (2.396) (1.47686e+11) (1.17642e+22) 
       
Big revenue 
cities 





 (1.682) (0.360) (1.028) (2.215) (2.384) (0.0000535) 
       
Eastern before 16.80
*
 0.425 0.774 36.50
***
 1.892 824358039.3 
 (21.89) (0.304) (0.498) (23.15) (1.328) (6.47601e+11) 
       
N 299      
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***





Situation 3: In running the regional change model, set the Northeast (coded 2) as the 
base outcome, in order to have other outcomes’ possibilities compared with city 
leaders being relocated to the Northeastern provinces of China. 
           The results (shown in Table 4.22a and Table 4.22b) suggest the following:  
           (1) For Chinese city leaders, if they are not retiring or being demoted after their leadership 
services, those leaders who got transferred to the West, the Northeast, and the Middle provinces 
of China were likely to be those who had previously served at Eastern Chinese provinces, 
meaning that they still could continue their leadership but with changes of locations. The results 
show that city leader with prior Eastern regional leadership experience stayed in the government 
longer (more durable) than those who did not.  
           (2) City leaders who got promoted to central governmental posts were those who had 
higher education and who had previously worked in the East. But the significance interval is 
lower.  
           (3) City leaders who got transferred or relocated to the Middle and the Eastern provinces 
of China were those leaders served at developed cities of China (with great revenue contributions) 
and had Eastern regional leadership experience. It seems clear that previous regional or local 
governmental experience may have helped those leaders stay in the relatively more developed 
regions of China, instead of moving to the poorer side of the country.  
           (4) City leaders not relocated to the West and the Northeast of China, who got promoted 
to central government were those who had higher education, were with tenures, had previously 
worked in Eastern regions, and were currently serving as city leaders in develop cities that made 
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great revenue contributions. These independent variables’ influences on the likelihood are 
statistically significant (All results shown in Table 4.22a and Table 4.22b).   
            In addition, the results of “regional change regressions” of provincial and city leaders 
show that:  
            (1) Due to the center's deliberate arrangements, talented bureaucrats are always sent to 
the developed provinces in China but less competent regional leaders always serve in 
underdeveloped parts of the country.  
            (2) This uneven (or unfair) arrangement actually may have increased the gap between the 
developed coastal regions of China and less developed Mid-West China. People, as they want, 
deserve better leadership if they cannot elect their regional leaders. 
D. Conclusion：Chinese Political Elites “on the Go” 
1. Political Mobility and the Preferred Characteristics of Chinese Regional Elites  
 
            In this part of the study we have intensively studied the patterns of Chinese regional 
leaders’ career mobility by providing applicable research models to analyze the specific cases 
under observation. The analysis suggests examining Chinese regional political leaders’ career 
mobility with a broader and more comprehensive perspective by analyzing their personal 
background, previous professional experiences of working at different levels of governments in 
Chinese politics, and more importantly, how different Chinese regions’ geopolitical settings have 
influenced these regional leaders’ political careers in the future. As the previous chapter of the 
study has pointed out, in contemporary Chinese politics CCP officials need to be of a younger 
age (as there are retirement requirements on age), have had higher education and have 
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demonstrated expertise in administrative management. In this chapter, the study also points out 
that regional leader’s local leadership experiences matter; those who worked in executive 
branches of the regional governments in China (provincial or municipal party committees and 
governments) had advantages over those who worked in non-executive branches of the 
governments (NPC or CPPCC systems and attached offices) or those with other professional 
background (educational institutions or state-owned business firms).  
                  As a matter of fact, by applying the analytical research models designed to examine 
the political mobility of Chinese regional leaders from the 1950s to 2000s, the findings show that 
Chinese regional political elites with certain personal characteristics tied to their professional 
career choices tend to receive more upward career assignments than those who do not possess 
any of these personal characteristics. These factors are: relatively younger age (more years to 
stay in the executive posts before retiring), higher educational credentials (though the study does 
not specify or compare college education with advanced post-graduate degrees), professional 
leadership training in the party school system, and relatively longer years of serving the 
government (tenured leaders) that can prove one’s loyalty to the party-state.  
                  Furthermore, because all the cases are randomly selected from different time periods 
of Chinese political history and from different regional settings of Chinese political economy, 
there are not considerable numbers of female regional leaders or leaders with ethnic minority 
background. Thus, gender and nationality factors do not have significant influences on career 
movements in the research models. However, it is firmly believed that if it is a study on ethnic 
groups or gender preferences in Chinese politics is undertaken, we may see more robust 
outcomes by controlling other independent variables and focusing on gender and ethnicity only. 
Against all odds, gender and ethnicity factors by far are not crucial factors that can solely affect 
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the decision-makings of the CCP center or alter the entire regime; instead, it is believed that only 
fundamental change of regime shall bring much more dynamics to both of the two groups in 
Chinese political life.  
                  Moreover, the nativity of regional leaders serving at their hometown provinces (either 
provincial leaders or city leaders) does not seem to have convincingly strong negative effects on 
regional leaders’ political mobility. In other words, the study has found no evidence that a 
regional leader cannot get promoted because one is a native who heads a region government in 
one’s native province. Despite exceptional cases, we conclude that it is some other set of factors 
that may have prevented a particular regional leader from being promoted or making parallel 
transfers as regional leaders. The CCP center does not appear to judge a regional leader only on 
the basis of nativity or locality. Previous studies suspected that the CCP center viewed localism 
as a threat to the center’s authority, and that the center might, therefore, treat native and non-
native regional leaders differently. Our findings show that native-born leaders sooner or later 
change the regions where they serve as regional leaders, and the majority of them do not tend to 
stay at their native provinces throughout their careers. From a natural perspective, then, there is a 
real circulation of elites. It is suggested here that it is the localism that concerns the center, not 
any individual regional leader from a particular province of China that alarms the center. At least 
we have no proof in concluding that native-born leaders receive no promotions.  
2. Political Mobility and Regional Leaders’ Performance 
 
            Needless to say, one of the most overpowering features of Chinese political-economic 
phenomena is the sustaining economic growth under the authoritarian party-state regime. Some 
of the previous studies on the issues have suggested that economic achievements may affect 
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Chinese regional leaders’ political mobility as the center prefers those leaders who have made 
the economy look good. 
114
  
            Our findings show that this issue should be discussed from both of its sides: first, more 
developed regions (provinces and their major metropolitan municipalities) do enjoy more 
socioeconomic development in addition to higher GDP growth. It is likely that officials who are 
appointed to be regional leaders in developed provinces of China have much larger shoes to fill 
in as they must keep the economic growth fast enough to keep their posts. Second, it happens 
recently that GDP growth numbers tend to reflect less realistic situations of Chinese regional 
economic development; the numbers fabricated by regional officials can be deceptive, designed 
to cheer the Chinese people up and please the CCP center. Therefore, we adopt regional revenues 
incomes and their contributions to the center as an adjustment. The results have shown our 
hypothesis to be convincing that regional leaders from higher revenue contributing regions get 
promoted higher, faster, and greater.  
             As most economically developed provinces are in the East, our analysis has also applied 
another independent variable to observe how many incumbent regional leaders in China 
previously had served in the East as governmental heads. The results show that regional leaders, 
who previously worked in the East and currently worked in a developed region, had greater 
possibilities of getting promoted. And they actually have greater chances to be relocated to the 
central government in Beijing, which means that their political careers will have entered into a 
much more advanced stage than the rest of the regional leaders in China. China’s reform of its 
personnel control system coincided with the beginning of its economic reforms. A crucial 
turnaround in personnel management was the wholesale change in the evaluation criteria for 
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 Li and Zhou (2005), and Bo (2002). 
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government officials. Political conformity, which was the only important pre-reform criterion for 
promotion, gave way to economic performance and other competence-related indicators. 
Although political loyalty remains important, generating more financial resources for the center 
(and for the local government as well) has proved to be an efficient means for leaders to show off 
their achievements in governance. In other words, they are the “employees of the year (fiscal 
year)” who are expecting to be rewarded by the center.  
              Our findings show that when it comes to political mobility opportunities, there exist 
actual differences between more executive posts and less executive posts in Chinese regional 
governments. Findings of the study show that among provincial leaders, CCP chiefs and 
governors are more likely to be promoted than vice party secretaries and vice governors. There is 
only one governor of a province at a time, and the same is true of the party chief of the province. 
But there can be several vice secretaries and vice governors in charge of different departments 
inside the regional political system. Therefore, the “CEOs” of regional governments, governors 
and party chiefs so to speak, are the ones who think of the big pictures and run the entire systems. 
Among city leaders observed in the study, city party chiefs and mayors received more 
promotions than vice secretaries and vice mayors. As city governments are ranked lower than the 
provincial governments, vice city secretaries and vice mayors are more junior regional leaders 
(and they are younger in general); it takes longer for them to climb up the administrative 
hierarchy, and promotion opportunities come later as well.  
              The findings support the hypothesis made in the previous chapters of the study: the CCP 
is a political party with strong discipline that runs the party-state, and the CCP center has its 
strict rules in promoting regional leaders that one’s achievements must be proved by one’s 
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loyalty and performance altogether. Though there are exceptions, in post-Deng’s Chinese politics, 
the center is extremely cautious to make the regional leaders do “great leaps upward.” 
115
  
              The East of China is the better-looking side of the country, but we must keep in mind 
that the rest of China combined has more developmental issues and more complicated 
governance-related problems (poverty, infrastructure, education, welfare, multinational groups, 
and natural resource related environmental issues). As a matter of fact, in addition to the 
evidence the study has found that regional leaders from the developed regions of China get more 
opportunities. Our findings also show that regional leaders serving in other regions of China with 
particular credentials or personal experiences can get the spotlight attention from the CCP center 
as well, even though the chances seem to be greater for those who work at the East. Two other 
important indicators applied by the study are local leadership experience and Communist Youth 
League official experience. Our study finds that in the post-Deng era regional leaders with 
administrative experience in the Communist Youth League have been attracting more and more 
political opportunities from the center. As we have discussed in the prior chapter of the study, the 
smaller group containing officials with Youth League working experiences inside the CCP was 
developed at a relative later stage of the CCP’s rule. Our analysis shows that regional leaders (as 
well as the central leaders who came from regional governments) classified as Tuanpai (the 
clique of the League) came with very different personal background, and the concentration of 
League-related regional leaders is most pronounced in the Mid-west provinces of China.  
         Furthermore, our findings show that this locational disadvantage does not stop Youth 
League-related regional leaders from getting outstanding opportunities of promotion; having 
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 One the important feature of contemporary Chinese politics is that the center tries to make leadership transitions 
more smooth and semi-predictable. Relevant studies on the topic see Bruce J. Dickson. “Threats to Party 
Supremacy.” Journal of Democracy, 14(1), (2003):27-35, and Andrew G. Walder. “Career Mobility and the 
Communist Political Order.” American Sociological Review, 60(3), (June 1995):309-28.  
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Youth League experience has a significantly positive influence on regional leaders who received 
promotions. In terms of regional changes after the fact, leadership posts in the less developed 
parts of China have not stopped League-related regional leaders from getting relocated to the 
central government in Beijing. Can this background advantage (having worked for the Youth 
League) overcome a regional leader’s locational disadvantage (serving at the Mid-west regions 
of China)? And why are League-affiliated regional leaders are not concentrated in the developed 
provinces of China? The next chapter of the study will discuss more about on this topic.  
                 In addition, another significant factor that has affected regional leaders’ political 
mobility in a general sense is having local governmental experience. Our findings show that 
among all provincial leaders in China observed by the study, those who have had city leadership 
experience were more to win promotions than those who have not. Provincial leaders who have 
serve as city leaders had greater promotions. Likewise, city leaders who have had leadership 
experience at lower level local governments were more likely to get promotions than those who 
have not.  
                 Overall, Chinese regional leaders who had served in local governments before they 
were appointed to governmental heads at other local governments tend to get more subsequent 
promotions than those regional leaders who came from the central government, state-owned 
business or education institutions. The significance of local work experience on regional leaders’ 
political mobility suggest that the CCP center values regional leaders’ credentials and 
achievements before they receive regional governmental posts or serve as regional political 
chiefs in China. After all, leaders who have spent their previous careers at local governments 
very likely would know local politics more than those have not had any similar working 
experiences in the regional governmental system. Bureaucracy in general is a merit system where 
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professional training and specialized expertise are more encouraged, but where passion and 
enthusiasm for being politicians are less necessary and helpful. Apparently, the center values 
those regional leaders who are more familiar with agenda-settings and solution-orientated 
governing skills. Presumably, most authoritarian regimes do likewise.  
3. The Unveiled Opacity: Downward Mobility of Regional Leaders 
            The patterns of promotions and transfers are adequately explained by the series of factors 
observed in the study. However, we still have not found a functioning model to explain Chinese 
regional political elites’ downward career movements, such as demotions and dismissals. Even if 
the independent variables have robust significance in explaining the outcomes of promotions and 
transfers. We may have clarified why Chinese regional leaders receive promotions, but we have 
little idea why some Chinese regional leaders have received demotions and gotten dismissals.  
            In fact, though the cases of all regional leaders observed in the study were randomly 
chosen, leaders’ demotions seem to be even more random, such that a demoted leader’s age, 
education, nativity, professional experiences (party school trainings and local experiences 
before), incumbent position (governor, secretary or mayor), locations (Eastern or Mid-west 
China), economic tribute and fiscal contribution to the center (top revenue making provinces or 
cities) and length of years serving as regional leaders do not seem to have a significant influence 
in explaining demotions. As a result, it is suggested that the demoted or dismissed regional 
leaders need to be examined and explained through other unconventional means in order to 
reveal the correlation between a leaders’ performance and the center’s drastic disapproval that 
makes the latter decide to discontinue the leader’s service for the regime.   
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              At this stage, though, the downward mobility of Chinese regional leaders does not seem 
to be affected by the conventional factors used in the study. At least we know that for whatever 
reason a CCP cadre gets dismissed by the center, it is the termination of his political career and 
the end of a regional leader’s political mobility. Therefore, as the models applied in this chapter 
analyze the political mobility of Chinese regional leaders, it is suggested that we need to study 
the demoted or dismissed cases differently and independently by applying analytical theories and 
models other than the ones we have used here. Otherwise, this study by far is effective in 
explaining the outcomes of political mobility of regional leaders.  
               Again, pointed out earlier, the teleology of any study on Chinese political elites and 
elite political mobility must ultimately be concerned with the party-state regime and any 
dynamic changes of its. Therefore, the following part of the study will continue in its efforts to 




FOR THE HARMONIOUS SOCIETY:  
BEYOND ECONOMIC REASONING AND HOW NOT TO GET PROMOTED 
 
            One of the most noticeable trends in Chinese politics in the post-Deng Xiaoping era is 
that the CCP has become less unified in ideological concentration, party organization, and the 
central leadership. Such a decentralizing trend of the party-state regime, even though the CCP 
center’s authority as the central government of the unitary state has not been severely weakened 
at all, has also caused many newer phenomena in the personnel arrangements and the selection of 
regional official in Chinese politics. As this study has suggested, the reformist policies initiated 
by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s were actually and practically a series of decentralizing 
actions aimed at limiting the center’s influences over the market and people’s economic life.  
Local authorities were encouraged to issue economic growth-centric policies featuring the 
advantages of their particular regions.  
            Meanwhile, Deng Xiaoping insisted that such decentralized reformist economic plans 
should and would not lead to visibly greater income inequality among the Chinese people, or 
unevenly developed Chinese regions. The essential guideline of his reformist ideas was to 
transform China toward “common prosperity.” The prosperous Chinese people would accelerate 
the pace to the common prosperity.
116
 In fact, more than 30 years of economic reform pushed by 
the CCP has brought countless social changes to Chinese society but not the common prosperity 
Deng Xiao predicted.  
             Furthermore, as revealed by the study, the undeniably huge developmental gaps among 
different Chinese regions might have also brought political inequality into contemporary Chinese 
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 Deng Xiaoping (1986). “Rang yi bufen ren xian fu qilai (Allow Some of Us to Be Rich First),” in Deng 
Xiaoping’s Speeches on August 16 to 19, 1986. Retrieved from http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/34136/2569304.html 
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politics. According to the analysis of Chinese regional leaders’ political mobility in the previous 
chapter of this study, regional leaders from different Chinese regions received different 
promotion opportunities. They were also being relocated differently after they have served their 
terms in a region. Though the geopolitical settings have their rigidities and are not easily subject 
to social or political changes, their uneven development resulted political differences when a 
regional leader of China makes their plans to climb up to ascend the party-state hierarchy.  
             Other than the developmental advantages that the Eastern Chinese provinces enjoy, the 
political influences of their regional leaders are also associated with the fiscal contribution they 
make to the CCP center. Unlike increasing the regional GDP growth rate, where governmental 
investments and costly public projects (e.g., cross-provincial freeway systems, high-speed bullet 
train rail tracks, metropolitan subways and urban landscapes) can boost the GDP number greatly 
in a very short period of time and put the regional governments in debt, fiscal revenues take a 
much longer time to grow. The growth is also more vulnerable (compared to GDP growth 
manipulated by the government) to external factors, such as market demands and global 
economic trends.  
              However, as the study has examined, when the CCP center grants promotion 
opportunities to regional leaders who fiscally contribute more to the center, it actually 
encourages Chinese regional leaders to squeeze more from their local people and give more to 
the center (and save more to themselves). When the economy is prosperous and flourishing, the 
negative side effects seem to be trivial as the people’s general income has been increasing. Yet 
during recession, such a means of revenue-collecting can severely deepen the cleavages between 
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local businesses and their regional governments. Some recent cases have shown popular 
discontent caused by local governments’ brutal ways of collecting taxes.
117
  
               To nurture a sustainable local economy is more difficult than to destroy its fruits.  
Hurting the local businesses, in order for the governmental heads themselves to get promoted, is 
a regretfully foolish practice as it kills the goose that lays the golden eggs. Meanwhile, due to the 
great achievements of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, the Eastern Chinese provinces are now known 
for being the economic engines of the country, and their regional governments draw much more 
political and social resources than the regional governments of the rest of China. Regional 
leaders capable of keeping the economy and revenue incomes growing have become the CCP 
center’s preferences in selecting potential elites to fill regional governmental posts. From this 
perspective, being a governmental official from Eastern China can be more preferential than 
those from other regions of China. For regional officials who do not have such advantages may 
have to try something different to show their outstanding leadership skills so as to be considered 
for promotion. Such preferential advantages, as the study examines in the priori chapter, also 
exist among Chinese regional political elites with Communist Youth League background. Youth 
League working experience seems to have helped officials get promoted to prominent 
governmental posts.   
             Besides the patterns shown in regional leaders’ promotions and transfers, few factors can 
explain the termination of the political career of Chinese regional leaders in the post-Deng period. 
Aside from age, which is the most obvious factor to determine a regional leader’s retirement (as 
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when one reaches a certain age limit, one is most likely to retire), and institutionalized retirement 
(leaving one’s office and transition of power to the successor) has not yet been found strong 
connections with other factors that can explain why many regional leaders received demotions or 
were dismissed.  
              In Mao Zedong era of Chinese regional politics, political reasons and elite power 
struggles were the main causes that resulted in regional political elites losing their prominent 
posts in regional governments. The political turbulence was extremely unstable during the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), while even the central leadership was in crisis from time to 
time due to Mao’s purges of the veteran revolutionary leaders. More than 80 percent of 
governmental officials were purged and removed during the chaotic Cultural Revolution 
period.
118
 This assertion that removals of regional leaders were due to their political standings 
against Mao’s personal leadership has been empirically studied by a number of scholars.
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              Since the 12
th
 CCP National Congress in 1982, where institutionalized retirements of 
senior leaders became a part of the personnel arranging system, regional leaders’ political 
mobility had been more connected with their governance achievements, especially regional 
economic growth and revenue incomes. Fewer regional political elites were terminated from 
their careers for exclusively political reasons. In other words, disobeying the center can cost a 
regional leader his job, but merely obeying the center (without achieving anything economically 
great) cannot guarantee the leader’s tenure. The removal of General Secretary Hu Yaobang in 
1987 and the resignation of Mr. Hu’s successor, General Secretary Zhao Ziyang in 1989 were 
both remarkable political events in Chinese politics, but neither one of them resulted in a 
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political earthquake among Chinese regional governments. Most Chinese regional leaders 
remained in their posts after 1989 even if the political atmosphere had shifted drastically. When 
former Shanghai party boss, Jiang Zemin was appointed the new general secretary of the CCP, 
the power transition was smooth.  
           This study contends that there are two reasons why most regional leaders were not 
reshuffled after 1989. First, the ultimate decision-maker, Deng Xiaoping, was still in power. 
Although Deng himself was not the constitutional head of government in China, his influence 
and directions over governmental policies and finalized decisions were undeniably decisive. This 
included the dismissal of Zhao Ziyang and the promotion of Jiang Zemin from Shanghai party 
boss to the general secretary of the CCP in 1989. Second, the importance of Chinese regional 
politics had been switched to sustaining the high-speed economic growth and the transition to the 
market economy from the central-planning system. Ideological politics was no longer the only 
consideration that the center used to determine a regional leader’s fate. Even after 1989, Deng 
Xiaoping insisted that the decision of continuing the reform was unstoppable. Deng insisted that 
“no single character of the Political Report of 13
th
 CCP National Congress shall be changed” 
120
 
to make it clear to all that he always supported the reform. The top priority of the party-state 
shifted from political struggles to socioeconomic development of China. Chinese regional 
governmental leaders have also shifted from proletarian revolutionaries to the authoritarian 
regime’s technocrats and local economic managers. They started focusing more on the 
normalized local governance issues, as most regional governments in the world do, such as the 
                                                          
120
 Cited from Wang Xiao:“Zhengzhi tizhi gaige: shisanda baogao yu shiqida baogao bijiao (The Political Reform: 
Comparison of the 13
th
 CCP Congress Report and the  17
th
 CCP Congress Report).” Retrieved from 
http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=118807, accessed August 12, 2011. 
194 
 
emphasis of the importance of economic development, increasing of revenues, and lowering the 
unemployment rates.  
               Therefore, one can hypothesize that contemporary cases of removals or dismissals of 
Chinese regional leaders are much more normalized or institutionalized compared to those of the 
Mao Zedong era. Chinese regional leaders are dismissed or demoted due to their incompetence, 
due to their violations of laws and state regulations, due to their power-abusing or corrupt 
behaviors, but not merely because they had misunderstood the central leader(s), or they took the 
wrong side during any political debates. Meanwhile, as the great achievements of Chinese 
economic reform over the past 30 years were strongly associated with governmental policies and 
support of Chinese government(s) (both the central government and regional governmental 
branches), we can further hypothesize that the demotions and dismissals of Chinese regional 
leaders in the post-Deng era are also associated with economic issues, especially cases involving 
the abuse of power and rent-seeking economic crimes of political elites. Nationwide and 
systemic corruptions among governmental officials have posed great challenges to the CCP’s 
ruling legitimacy. 
                Furthermore, in post-Deng Xiaoping era Chinese politics, especially since the 16
th
 CCP 
National Congress in 2002 when Hu Jintao was elected as the General Secretary of CCP, the 
party has mandated social orders and political stability to sustain their leaderships of the country. 
Contentious politics due to socioeconomic changes, environmental concerns due to rapid and 
nationwide industrializations, and major accidents involving great number of civilians, are the 
newest challenges to the CCP in contemporary Chinese society. None of them were foreseen by 
either Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping during their years as China’s ultimate leaders.  
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              All these governance-related issues are compelling the CCP center to take affirmative 
actions to discipline those regional leaders who fail to handle the problems well and who deserve 
to be swept from the elite. The removal of regional leaders due to any of these crisis-
management failures has not yet become institutionalized, which means not every official who 
fails to manage these issues will be fired. But having failed to manage the crises is an excuse that 
is used by the center to dismiss or demote some regional leaders. However, compared to 
avoiding economic crimes, do the social management skills of Chinese regional leaders occupy 
the same political priority on the center’s cadre policy agenda? Does the center dismiss or 
demote a regional leader because of alleged corruption activities, mistreatment of social 
movements, or major accidents involving the local people? At last, this chapter of the study gives 
a comprehensive analysis of political mobility trends among post-Deng Xiaoping regional 
leaders. With dismissal cases taken into consideration, we will now have an overall perspective 
of the subject, and a more clearly defined map of regional leader’s political mobility.  
            The essential hypotheses of the chapter are:  
Hypothesis 5.1: Compared to party politics under Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping where 
political struggles accounted for many of the removals of Chinese regional leaders, post-
Deng Xiaoping’s China dismisses such officials due to: (1) the age limits for formal 
retirements, (2) economic crimes, such as accepting bribes and engaging in corruption, (3) 
serious violations of the state’s laws and regulations, and (4) incompetence on the job and 
having made serious mistakes over governance-related issues (such as mistreatment of 
accidents, environmental issues, and other social stability-related issues).  
196 
 
Hypothesis 5.2: As is shown in the previous chapter of this study, Eastern Chinese 
regional leaders get promoted more. There are similar patterns that characterize the 
demotions and dismissals of Chinese regional leaders as well. Dismissals and demotions 
of regional leaders from different parts of China are handled differently. Some groups of 
regional leaders are more resilient than other regional leaders.  
Hypothesis 5.3: Highly ranked Chinese regional leaders are more resilient than lower-
ranked Chinese regional leaders. It is more likely that lower-ranked officials will get 
demoted than higher-ranked regional leaders. In other words, the higher one’s rank, the 
safer one may be from the center’s disciplining actions.   
A. Downward Political Mobility Analysis of Chinese Regional Leaders in Post-Deng Xiaoping 
Era 
 
                 Collectively, Chinese regional leaders who head regional governmental branches 
across the country are technocrats hired and trained by the CCP party-state and work for the 
party as its agents nationwide. Yet, individually, every Chinese regional leader is a party cadre 
who has emerged from numerous rounds of selections and attained at a certain height within the 
strictly hierarchical political system. Every step one is about to take must be carefully planned as 
any incorrect move can cost everything one has achieved so far in this elaborate political game. 
This study has already highlighted the reason why a political career means a great deal to a 
Chinese regional leader. It is not only because of the political importance that comes with being 
a governmental leader; but the social privileges and personal prestige that come along with a 
regional leader’s political power occupy great significance when one chooses to start a career in 
the government.  
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             This unique feature of Chinese politics, where power is strongly associated with all sorts 
of social and economic resources, makes the political career of a regional leader in China a 
lifetime commitment and a prominent lifestyle choice. Considering the many difficulties a 
regional leader has been through (to get promoted from the very bottom of the system), and how 
much effort (and possible sacrifice) he has made for the exchange of power and privileges, it is 
obvious that it can be unthinkably disastrous for a regional leader’s political career to be 
terminated suddenly and abnormally. In other words, no Chinese regional leader, we assume, 
would ever try to avoid promotion, let alone seek dismissal. Furthermore, to be put in prison for 
violations and crimes is definitely an extremely shameful moment for any fallen regional leader, 
especially since they were once in line for more upward political mobility in the system.  
               In studying Chinese politics of in the post-Deng era, and taking the dismissals of 
regional leaderships as results which are against most Chinese regional leaders’ motives, the 
current analysis assumes that any regional leader in China who encounters unexpected demotion 
or dismissal ordered by the center, must be given a reasonable explanation by the CCP center. 
This logic applies both to the leader himself and the public who once regarded him as their 
legitimate authority. When the CCP center announces a new regional leader, it makes sure the 
whole process looks to be a seemingly sensible arrangement for the leader has achievements that 
qualify for the reward. In like manner, when the center decides to terminate a regional leader’s 
career, it must be presented a seemingly sensible decision as well. Having no direct access to the 
CCP center’s decision-making processes, though, we predict that the top leaders of China make 
their decisions (mostly) based on objective reasons, performance-related not mere political bias. 
As a matter of fact, there are two main types of downward political mobility found among 
Chinese regional leaders who are under the center’s scrutiny. First, they could be demoted, but 
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still stay in the political system. These regional leaders would leave their current posts but accept 
lower posts in regional governments (or sometimes in the central governments but in lower-
ranked or non-executive offices). Second, they could be kicked out from the bureaucracy 
completely and be dismissed from their current posts. Such a scenario would mean the end of 
their political mobility, and many of them would also face judicial charges for the crimes they 
have committed. 
            As discussed in the previous chapter, institutionalized regular retirement due to age also 
causes the termination of a regional leader’s political career. In this study, 63 of 370 (17 percent) 
were retired due to the age limit. Also among the 370 provincial leaders, 132 of them served as 
provincial leaders in post-Deng Xiaoping era, and after their leadership service, 5.4 percent of 
them retired due to the government’s age limit regulations. We have also discussed in prior parts 
of the study the fact that regional leaders who were in offices shortly after the Cultural 
Revolution had the highest mean age among all Chinese regional leaders at all times because 
many of them were revolutionary veterans who were purged during Mao’s Cultural Revolution, 
only regaining their careers afterwards. Thus, the retirement rate since the 1990s among regional 
leaders has been more stabilized by the CCP center. Rarely are older leaders allowed to go 
beyond the age limit. Regularly retired regional leaders (as well as central leaders) leave younger 
leaders more room and freedom in regional governance. Some regional leaders actually changed 
their occupation afterwards, though it is a rare thing for a regional leader to do.  
            Among all the observations of post-Deng Chinese provincial leaders, there was one 
leader who later became university president and two leaders later ran large state-owned 
companies. Although they were no longer in the government, they still worked for the state 
(public higher education and state-owned economy). Some regional leaders chose to “resign” so 
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as to terminate their political careers. For the resigning leaders, if they resigned for purely 
personal reasons (health or other private issues), this study views the situation to be similar to an 
age-based retirement. However, if they resigned due to crimes and violations, and if they were 
charged by the legal branches of the government (The People’s Courthouses or The People’s 
Procuratorates), the study views such cases the similar situations to leaders who were dismissed 
for wrongdoing. We look at the outcomes of the political mobility of Chinese regional leaders 
regardless of causes of the termination of their political careers are what we analyze.  
1. Corruptions, Serious Violations, Accidents and the Removals of Chinese Regional 
Leaders 
 
            As a persistent ailment of Chinese politics, corruption of governmental officials in China 
has had a rather long history. The Communist Revolution and the establishment of the People’s 
Republic seemed to have reduced corruption for a short period of time under Mao’s totalitarian 
rule. Yet, the economic “opening up” and privatized market since the late 1970s seemed to cause  
increasing corruption in Chinese government, and elite corruption was one of the main customs 
voiced held by the protesters on Tiananmen Square in 1989. Some scholars consider corruption 
as the failure of the planned economy―is a generic problem existed in most Communist regimes. 
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 Others view the increasing number of corrupt officials as a developmental issue which is 
particularly associated with countries that are undergoing sociopolitical transitions in the middle 
of the painful modernization process.
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              Regardless of different pathological explanations of corruption, the undeniably high 
degree of corruption existing in contemporary Chinese politics has definitely alarmed the CCP 
center in recent years, as corrupt governmental officials have caused great losses to the country’s 
economic resources, national capacities, social capital, and public disrespect. Worst of all, 
though, corruption has weakened the CCP and its regional governments. As pointed out by China 
watchers, the large number of corrupt governmental officials stirs up greater social inequality 
and political instability; “those who are most likely to prosper are the ones who are most closely 
tied to the state. Those who have taken the lead in getting rich have little incentive to change the 
system that has allowed them, their families, and their friends to prosper.”
123
 An example of this 
corruption is rent-seeking scandals where the semi-open access to the market for the investors 
entailed pressure from powerful political figures to make doing business easier. For some 
expected amounts of bribery to lubricate the political system, business people would gain a much 
greater share of the market as a reward.
124
  
             In addition to the corruption that exists on the business side of China, where private 
enterprises seek easier accesses to the market of 1.4 billion consumers, China’s infrastructural 
boom in the recent decades provides another channel of generating numerous corruption cases. 
Due to the demands of sustainable economic growth and trillions of U.S. dollars of governmental 
investments in China’s public infrastructure, governmental officials, who do not have to be high-
ranking political figures at all, who deal with the details of expenditures are exposed to the daily 
opportunities of billions of dollars of cash flow from the governments’ vaults to the contractors’ 
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banking accounts. The absence of a well-functioning auditing structure in China gives these 
officials the perfect chances to put tremendous amounts of the governmental investments into 
their own pockets. Recently, China’s railway minister was dismissed for his involvement in the 
stealing of the national high-speed railway investments, 
125
 and many provincial leaders and 
departmental heads were caught for having stolen money from other public projects, such as 
freeway constructions. 
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 Accepting bribes can cause disturbances of the market as it violates 
the fairness of competitions. Stealing the public investments on infrastructures also generates 
serious problems that the center disproves the most. Either circumstance would alarm the center 
to take actions against corrupt governmental heads, and likely to remove them from their posts.  
                 Another issue, which is related to corruption and which stirs social controversies in 
Chinese society, is the seeming increase in safety accidents and public health crises. Due to the 
unfairness of market competition and the absence of “value-free” quality control, many 
unqualified Chinese food and drugs manufactures have entered the market not because of the 
sound quality their products, but for the bribes they have offered to the governmental officials. In 
consequence, fatal accidents due to the poor quality of these products (sometimes they were 
toxic without passing the governmental tests) have occurred, and have caused people’s anger 
toward the manufacturers and the governments’ monitoring failures. The frequency of such 
events has been rising in recent years; so has the number of the regional governmental leaders 
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               While it does not mean that each and every similar accident would cost a regional 
leader his career, the discontent of the people can damage the center’s reputation and threaten its 
rule of China. It is possible that both the center and the regional political system try to protect 
their protégés from these incidents and minimize their negative effects. Because of this, it is an 
acceptable strategy for the center to sacrifice one or two of its less favored employees. Above all, 
we must admit that certain large scale of incidents could cost some regional leaders their posts, 
as has happened before.  
               Furthermore, a relatively newer phenomenon that affects Chinese regional leaders’ 
political mobility is the land dispute issue involving the people, the government, and a third party 
(mostly real estate developers). Accidents relating to mishandled drug and food products directly 
affect Chinese people’s lives and merit the center’s great attention (and immediate counter-
measures). While land disputes are highly sensitive sociopolitical issues that until recently have 
not been widely discussed by the Chinese government.  
               All the land of China is ultimately claimed by the Chinese government as the only 
rightful owner and landlord. Dwellers and farmers living on the land only have the right of using 
their land based on their contract with the state. Soaring real estate prices across most Chinese 
cities in recent years have provided the government with the opportunity to sell its land to real 
estate developers for cash. However, the government must first get rid of the dwellers (with 
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compensation offerings) on the land first to open it for the developers. Frequently, when the 
dwellers refuse to move, the governmental branches clear them out through improper means. The 
land dispute issues have caused fatal incidents involving civilian deaths and ignited social 
protests involving hundreds to thousands of villagers and suburban dwellers. Some of the 
incidents were exposed to the media before the provincial or central government could react, 
causing roaring anger and ghastly criticisms among the Chinese people especially amongst 
Internet users. As a result, again, to ease the societal dissatisfaction and to direct people’s hatreds 
to certain targets, some regional governmental leaders would lose their jobs or get demoted for 
incompetence. By far, among the demoted and dismissed regional leaders observed in this study, 
most provincial-level governmental leader had never been punished for land dispute problems; 
however, lower-ranked officials who were involved were demoted or removed.  
                 Above all, in post-Deng Chinese politics, regional leaders who received downward 
political mobility or terminations of their political careers were always associated with certain 
reasons or explanations given by the CCP center. Their removals were primarily due to official 
misbehavior, such as corruption and other unlawful violations, administrative failures that led to 
accidents and loss of lives and property, abuse of power for personal gains, and other scandals 
are unacceptable for any governmental officials as civil servants (usually include accusations of 
having extra-marital affairs, sexual harassment, and all other morally unacceptable behavior). 
Table 5.1 shows that the most common types of accusations applied by the CCP center to 
remove or demote its regional leaders. Corruption (133 counts) or having violated other laws 
(140 counts) was found among removed regional leaders. Also, having made unforced 
administrative mistakes (114 counts) or having mishandled accidents (90 counts) were common 
reasons used by the center to fire its regional leaders. Overall, regional leaders were removed for 
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violating one or more of the listed accusations given by the center. Only a few regional leaders (7 
counts) were accused directly for political disagreements with the center that cost their careers. 
Again, compared to that of Mao’s era, being politically wrong is no longer the main reason a 
regional leader got fired, at least not the publicly acknowledged reason.  
Table 5.1 Types of Accusations Causing Regional Leaders’ Demotions or Dismissals 
Type of Accusation Frequency 
Corruption 133 
Other Violation 140 
Accident 90 
Duty Mistakes 114 
Movements 24 
Land Disputes 83 
Stability 73 
Scandal 65 
Political Reason 7 
Source: Author’s Database 
2. The Possibility and the Degrees of Punishments: What’s Hard to Gauge? 
 
                 Among studies of political elites under authoritarian regimes, the factors influencing 
elites’ political mobility are difficult to measure due to limited information released by state-
monitored sources. Information beyond the brief statements must be gauged through contextual 
meaning and relevant sociopolitical events. The situation is the same for scholars and China 
watchers who study Chinese political elites if no reliable insiders provide reliable news of what 
is going on in the decision-making black box.  However, certain information about demoted or 
dismissed Chinese regional leaders can be generally categorized based on the descriptions and 
accusations given by the state-owned media. As is shown in Table 5.1, most demoted or 
dismissed Chinese regional political elites in recent decades were removed because of their 
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illegal violations, especially corruption-related crimes. But we have little knowledge about how 
these officials got caught by the center. Furthermore, how (and when) would the center 
determine to take actions toward a corrupt cadre due to serious violations? As we have discussed 
in chapter three, many of the post-Deng regional leader share very similar professional 
background and political career paths. They have also been working in the same regions prior to 
receiving different further political mobility. Why then, were some of them under investigation 
for corruption, while some others were not? Since most of the outsiders will not know at all until 
the information is released by the center, previous studies have not provided convincing analysis 
on the issue.  
                 Some other questions remain to be answered at this stage before we discuss any 
further aspects of the removal of Chinese regional leaders. First, to what degree would the CCP 
center tolerate corruption and bribery among its regional political elites? And when does the 
center being silent? This study has revealed that different governmental branches occupy 
different political status in the political system of China. Meanwhile, we have also found 
evidence that some regions in China are politically more important than others, not only because 
they are located in the coastal regions of the country, but because they also generate greater 
revenue contributions to the center. Do these factors give more political protection to the 
regional leaders who work in these regions? Are more executive posts exposed to the CCP 
center’s scrutiny because the executives deal with more complicated situations in carrying out 
the policies, while the non-executives are less vulnerable due to fewer opportunities for 
wrongdoing? For instance, the head of a cultural department or a local People’s Political 
Consultative Committee would be much less involved in a mining accident or a local people’s 
social protest against the government’s tax hikes.  
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             Second, has the center always been reasonable in removing its regional leaders with 
corruption as the prime cause? Or are of corruption so prevalent because such charges gain the 
center increased authority and cater to the wants of the people in China? In other words, if it is 
known to the center that the bureaucracy is corrupt frequently and collectively, it is only a matter 
of timing to weed out a regional official who seems to be disloyal and disputative to the center 
over certain issues?  
Table 5.2 Distribution of Posts of Demoted and Dismissed Regional Leaders 
Post Count % 
Provincial Secretary 8 2.6 
Prov. Vice Sec. 33 10.8 
Governor 7 2.3 
Vice Governor 45 12.7 
Ministerial 18 5.9 
City Secretary 21 6.8 
City Vice Sec. 18 5.9 
Mayor 30 9.8 
Vice Mayor 74 24.1 
Sub-City or County 
Level 
65 19.3 
Total 319 100 
Source: Author’s Database 
              As the study itself is not fully devoted to the political phenomena of corruption in China, 
the analysis does not pretend to answer all the questions raised above. Yet, for a political system 
with extremely limited access to outsiders, these questions are surely of great benefits to anyone 
who intends to make intellectual contributions to the subject. As in our study, we have at a 
minimum observed the dismissed Chinese regional leaders with different characteristics to 
support the proposed hypotheses. As shown in Table 5.2, the 319 total dismissals involved, 8 
provincial CCP secretaries, 33 vice or deputy provincial secretaries, 7 governors, 45 vice 
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governors, and 18 ministerial officials (including regional leaders ranked as the equivalent of a 
minister). Together they constituted more than one-third of the observed cases. Provincial and 
sub-provincial leaders are considered senior governmental leaders in China; many of them are 
also CCP Central Committee members and the next move upward will be on their way to the 
Politburo.  
               Meanwhile, there were 74 vice mayors, 18 city vice or deputy secretaries, and 65 sub-
city ranked regional leaders observed by the study. Together they made 49.2 percent of the 
sample. These are the regional leaders who are considered relatively lower-ranked officials. They 
are younger and less-experienced in governmental posts, and they all have their supervisors to 
give them orders. Yet, these lower-ranked regional leaders are those who try hardest to receive 
promotions in order to have a greater future career in politics. Otherwise, they may end up where 
they are doing administrative jobs on a daily basis with official earnings much less than other 
careers. 
 
              Above all, compared to the study of upward political mobility among Chinese regional 
leaders, there are fewer unambiguous lessons we can learn from studying the dismissed Chinese 
regional leaders. It can be hypothesized here that removals of Chinese regional leaders in the 
post-Deng era are more regular, rational and legitimate with visible and explainable causes other 
than political purges and power struggles among central leaders. Compared to the removals of 
regional leaders in Mao’s and Deng’s eras, we expect to see more removals for actual unlawful 




Table 5.3 Correlations of Variables Observed in Demoted and Dismissed Regional Leaders 
          
             |      age   gender  college ccpmember     psec      gov    pvsec     vgov     csec 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         age |   1.0000 
       
      gender |   0.1977   1.0000 
      
     college |   0.3127   0.2100   1.0000 
     
   ccpmember |   0.0147  -0.0202   0.0571   1.0000 
    
        psec |   0.2946   0.0408   0.0347   0.0132   1.0000 
   
         gov |   0.1379   0.0381   0.0258   0.0124  -0.0250   1.0000 
  
       pvsec |   0.3361  -0.0029   0.0769   0.0281  -0.0568   0.1583   1.0000 
 
        vgov |   0.2805   0.0642   0.1697   0.0336  -0.0678  -0.0633  -0.0249   1.0000 
 
        csec |   0.0907   0.0676   0.1404   0.0219  -0.0443  -0.0414  -0.0524  -0.0758   1.0000 
       mayor |   0.0413   0.0354  -0.0980   0.0266  -0.0538  -0.0503  -0.0788  -0.0744  -0.0023 
       cvsec |   0.0035  -0.0557   0.0275  -0.1521  -0.0408  -0.0381  -0.0866  -0.0642  -0.0676 
      vmayor |  -0.2326  -0.0214  -0.0435   0.0456  -0.0922  -0.0861  -0.1710  -0.2336  -0.1527 
      county |  -0.4294  -0.1422  -0.2584   0.0420  -0.0848  -0.0792  -0.1799  -0.2148  -0.1404 
    minister |   0.0636   0.0623   0.1293   0.0202  -0.0408  -0.0381  -0.0866  -0.1034  -0.0676 
      league |   0.0607  -0.0662   0.1215   0.0190   0.0536   0.0624   0.0606   0.0686   0.0526 
 partyschool |   0.0608  -0.0964   0.0724   0.0276   0.0111   0.0907   0.0537  -0.0510   0.0343 
        east |   0.1194  -0.0098   0.1260   0.0481   0.0426  -0.0410   0.0815   0.0267   0.0743 
        west |  -0.0058   0.0820   0.0461   0.0473   0.0454  -0.0390  -0.0093   0.0543  -0.0692 
      middle |  -0.0521  -0.0539  -0.0970  -0.1123  -0.0317   0.1199  -0.1394  -0.0270   0.0494 
   northeast |  -0.1253  -0.0579  -0.1785   0.0266  -0.0538  -0.0503   0.1691   0.0187  -0.0457 
    poor_reg |  -0.2262  -0.0801  -0.2394  -0.0631  -0.0412  -0.0160   0.0102  -0.0569  -0.1348 
 first_media |  -0.2534  -0.0106  -0.0238  -0.0125  -0.0160   0.0016  -0.2123  -0.1501   0.0812 
    low_rank |  -0.5515  -0.1283  -0.2353   0.0756  -0.1527  -0.1426  -0.3030  -0.3685  -0.2272 
   incompete |  -0.1640   0.0236   0.0960   0.0241   0.0261   0.0343  -0.1033  -0.0560  -0.0335 
  corruption |   0.4639   0.0783   0.2761   0.0708   0.1046  -0.0014   0.2059   0.3068   0.0235 
    accident |  -0.4218  -0.0829  -0.4369  -0.0368  -0.1053  -0.0025  -0.2004  -0.2062  -0.0328 
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   (table continued) 
   stability |  -0.2437   0.0417  -0.1787  -0.0499   0.0047  -0.0341  -0.1691  -0.1882   0.0305 
   movements |  -0.0826   0.0727  -0.0273   0.0236   0.1047  -0.0445  -0.1011  -0.1207   0.0653 
   violation |   0.2484   0.0336   0.2184  -0.0071   0.0555   0.0792   0.0834   0.1568   0.0369 
  powerfight |   0.1053   0.0381   0.0792   0.0124   0.2490  -0.0233   0.0879   0.0601   0.1315 
   Mistake   |  -0.3382  -0.0665  -0.2123  -0.0216  -0.1257  -0.1174  -0.1797  -0.1660  -0.0213 
     scandal |   0.3046   0.0615   0.1710   0.0420   0.1154  -0.0258   0.1548   0.1008   0.0807 
  Land issue |  -0.1426  -0.0042  -0.0615  -0.0419  -0.0075  -0.0439  -0.1402  -0.1279   0.0094 
    demotion |  -0.2645  -0.0583  -0.1117  -0.0571  -0.1885  -0.0312  -0.0455  -0.0596  -0.0554 
     dismiss |   0.3566   0.1350   0.2439   0.1219   0.0199   0.0541   0.1621   0.1954   0.0400 
        jail |   0.3068   0.0863   0.2354   0.0649   0.0366   0.0118   0.1099   0.2342   0.0209 
     LostCCP |   0.4011   0.1032   0.2053   0.0699   0.1483   0.0006   0.1896   0.2569   0.0271 
   fin_recov |  -0.3313  -0.0933  -0.0561   0.0444  -0.0412   0.0197  -0.1155  -0.1181  -0.0262 
          
             |    mayor    cvsec   vmayor   county minister   league partys~l     east     west 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       mayor |   1.0000 
       
       cvsec |   0.0113   1.0000 
      
      vmayor |  -0.1855  -0.1082   1.0000 
     
      county |  -0.1706  -0.1293  -0.2921   1.0000 
    
    minister |  -0.0821  -0.0623  -0.1406  -0.1293   1.0000 
   
      league |  -0.0772   0.0039  -0.0294  -0.1215   0.0039   1.0000 
  
 partyschool |  -0.0046   0.0964  -0.0178  -0.0985   0.0056   0.0639   1.0000 
 
        east |  -0.0454  -0.0850   0.0818  -0.0534  -0.0534  -0.0390  -0.0082   1.0000 
 
        west |   0.0095   0.0136  -0.2239   0.3019  -0.1457  -0.0359  -0.0277  -0.3294   1.0000 
      middle |   0.1096   0.1123   0.1556  -0.2056  -0.1799  -0.0146   0.0911  -0.4280  -0.4208 
   northeast |  -0.0344  -0.0354   0.0454   0.0443  -0.0821   0.1203  -0.0764  -0.1954  -0.1921 
    poor_reg |  -0.0377   0.0515  -0.0320   0.2723  -0.3202   0.0316   0.0240  -0.6393   0.3931 
 first_media |   0.0732  -0.1297   0.0565   0.1529  -0.0175   0.0067  -0.0982  -0.0132   0.0450 
    low_rank |  -0.2853  -0.1775   0.6035   0.5550  -0.2330  -0.1308  -0.1048   0.0407   0.0400 
   incompete |  -0.0579  -0.0743   0.1107   0.0498   0.0271  -0.0162  -0.0236  -0.0411  -0.0643 
210 
 
  (table continued) 
  corruption |   0.0443   0.0616  -0.0931  -0.4048   0.0896   0.0612   0.0675   0.1998  -0.0724 
    accident |  -0.0192  -0.0998   0.0553   0.3143   0.0220  -0.0544  -0.0792  -0.1867  -0.0142 
   stability |   0.0996   0.0560  -0.0107   0.1226   0.0560  -0.0621  -0.0904  -0.1224  -0.0096 
   movements |   0.1493  -0.0210  -0.0223   0.1164  -0.0727  -0.0137  -0.0596  -0.0900   0.1366 
   violation |  -0.0370  -0.0058  -0.1031  -0.1383   0.0499  -0.0087   0.0301   0.1120  -0.0386 
  powerfight |   0.0232  -0.0381  -0.0861  -0.0792  -0.0381   0.0624  -0.0521   0.2076  -0.0390 
   duty_mstk |  -0.0486  -0.0483   0.1816   0.1958   0.0091  -0.0589  -0.1739  -0.1337  -0.0149 
     scandal |   0.0443   0.0743  -0.2175  -0.2491   0.2440  -0.0139  -0.0202   0.0738  -0.0827 
   landissue |   0.0220  -0.0270   0.1028   0.0615   0.0354   0.0552  -0.0156   0.0730  -0.0689 
    demotion |  -0.1172  -0.0889   0.1065   0.2471  -0.1183   0.0098  -0.0989   0.0091  -0.0490 
     dismiss |   0.0282   0.0755  -0.1378  -0.2093   0.0755   0.0286  -0.0509   0.0402   0.0143 
        jail |   0.0286   0.0558   0.0168  -0.3498   0.1126  -0.0076   0.0763   0.1632  -0.0842 
     ccplost |   0.0266   0.0089  -0.1013  -0.3504   0.0930  -0.0245   0.0290   0.2380  -0.0799 
   fin_recov |  -0.1025  -0.0054   0.1424   0.0939  -0.0054   0.0799   0.0404  -0.1496  -0.1072 
          
             |   middle northe~t poor_reg first_~a low_rank incomp~e corrup~n accident stabil~y 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      middle |   1.0000 
       
   northeast |  -0.2373   1.0000 
      
    poor_reg |   0.2361   0.1886   1.0000 
     
 first_media |   0.0908  -0.1710   0.0424   1.0000 
    
    low_rank |  -0.0400   0.0885   0.1890   0.1645   1.0000 
   
   incompete |   0.0113   0.1026   0.0110   0.1064   0.1279   1.0000 
  
  corruption |  -0.1453   0.0001  -0.3626  -0.4034  -0.3815  -0.1401   1.0000 
 
    accident |   0.1089   0.1013   0.2805   0.3170   0.2880   0.1745  -0.4908   1.0000 
 
   stability |   0.1457  -0.0807   0.1828   0.3885   0.0766   0.2254  -0.3957   0.4807   1.0000 
   movements |  -0.0309   0.0268   0.0518   0.2661   0.0686   0.1795  -0.2301  -0.0276   0.4359 
   violation |   0.0154  -0.1912  -0.2307  -0.0699  -0.1732  -0.2248   0.1894  -0.4891  -0.3424 
  powerfight |  -0.1101  -0.0503  -0.1960   0.0457  -0.1426   0.0343   0.1747  -0.0984  -0.0853 
   duty_mstk |   0.0854   0.0649   0.2096   0.2009   0.3095   0.2149  -0.4542   0.5121   0.4575 
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     (table continued) 
     scandal |  -0.0375  -0.0900  -0.2539  -0.1214  -0.3721  -0.0960   0.4158  -0.2812  -0.1958 
   landissue |   0.0249  -0.0768   0.0055   0.3244   0.1373   0.0065  -0.2954   0.0269   0.4352 
    demotion |   0.0566   0.0458   0.1777   0.1986   0.3121   0.0077  -0.3323   0.2416   0.1016 
     dismiss |  -0.1021   0.0282  -0.2262  -0.1887  -0.2722  -0.0864   0.4524  -0.3329  -0.2100 
        jail |  -0.0287  -0.1287  -0.2707  -0.2272  -0.2529  -0.1409   0.6064  -0.3839  -0.2906 
     ccplost |  -0.1222  -0.0843  -0.3192  -0.2595  -0.3435  -0.1606   0.6678  -0.3965  -0.2962 
   fin_recov |   0.1419   0.1577   0.1725   0.1866   0.1847   0.2604  -0.4484   0.2917   0.1654 
          
             | moveme~s violat~n powerf~t duty_m~k  scandal landis~e demotion  dismiss     jail 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   movements |   1.0000 
       
   violation |  -0.1935   1.0000 
      
  powerfight |  -0.0445   0.0792   1.0000 
     
   duty_mstk |   0.1278  -0.3518  -0.1174   1.0000 
    
     scandal |  -0.1212   0.2779   0.1879  -0.3158   1.0000 
   
   landissue |   0.2872  -0.0125  -0.0930   0.1545  -0.2257   1.0000 
  
    demotion |   0.0251  -0.0762  -0.0776   0.3131  -0.2608   0.0713   1.0000 
 
     dismiss |  -0.0698   0.2819   0.1015  -0.3085   0.2924  -0.1525  -0.4386   1.0000 
 
        jail |  -0.2333   0.2718   0.1460  -0.3532   0.4182  -0.1419  -0.3987   0.4887   1.0000 
     ccplost |  -0.2267   0.2943   0.1771  -0.3632   0.4718  -0.1693  -0.3702   0.5017   0.7666 
   fin_recov |   0.0705  -0.1920  -0.0838   0.3139  -0.2464   0.1010   0.3213  -0.4737  -0.4236 
          
             |  ccplost fin_re~v 
      
-------------+------------------ 
      
     ccplost |   1.0000 
       
   fin_recov |  -0.4576   1.0000 




3. Analysis of Chinese Regional Leaders’ Removals 
 
            Base on the accusations the CCP center utilizes to drag down regional leaders, there are 
five different main outcomes that could happen to a dismissed regional leader. These outcomes 
are listed in Table 5.4 below.  
Table 5.4 Consequences Due to The Center’s Accusation 
Consequence Count % 
Demotion 206 66.9 




Jailed 120 39.0 
Finally Recovered 72 23.4 
Source: Author’s Database 
As is shown in Table 5.4, downward political moves in the careers of regional leaders could be: 
(1) being demoted to a lower post in the government, (2) being dismissed and removed from 
current post and no longer employed in the government, (3) being dismissed from his post and 
losing CCP membership, (4) being dismissed from a governmental post, and being jailed for 
illegal wrongdoing, and (5) being removed but managing eventually to come back to 
governmental leadership post.  
                These five outcomes of regional leaders’ downward political mobility and future career 
paths are not statistically distinct outcomes. This means, for example, that losing CCP 
membership does not mean one will recover one’s post in the future. And getting dismissed by 
the center does not mean the leader must be jailed. They represent different degrees of political 
mobility. However, a certain correlation is stronger when it comes to lost CCP membership and 
jailed former regional leaders (see Table 5.3 for the correlations among variables). Regularly, 
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before a leader would be sent to jail, he would first be deprived of his CCP membership. Losing 
CCP membership is a disciplinary punishment made by the Communist party; receiving a jail 
sentence is a punishment decision made by the courthouse. And once a leader was jailed for 
wrongdoing, there would no possibility that this leader would be hired again by the government. 
Thus, for any cases of lost CCP membership and a jail sentence, the chance for a full recovery is 
zero. The Communist party does not employ anyone with criminal histories as a governmental 
official. Being dismissed, being deprived of CCP membership, and being jailed―all the three 
outcomes can happen together to the same regional leader, meaning that one’s serious unlawful 
violations had led to the center’s severe punishments.  
                 Now that we have clarified all the potential ambiguities in the present research design 
of Chinese regional leaders’ downward political mobility, it is now possible to examine 
theoretical hypotheses of the “Chinese Regional Leaders’ Downward Political Mobility Analysis” 
models: 
Model 1: The likelihood that a Chinese regional leader will receive a demotion from his 
current regional leadership post is associated with his age, higher educational level, 
Communist Youth League working experience, current working location (East, West, Middle, 
or Northeast of China), whether his current region is a poor region (or not), whether the 
leader was accused by the center of being corrupt (or not), had violated other laws (or not), 
had duty-related mistakes or incompetence (or not); whether any large scale accidents 
happened under his leadership (or not), whether any large scale people’s protests occurred (or 
not), whether the leader’s behavior had caused issues of political instability (or not). 
Furthermore, had the leader been involved in any personal scandals (or not); whether any of 
the accusations mentioned above released by the news media earlier than the authority (or not) 
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had caused greater public disruptions? Finally, what was the leader’s post? Provincial 
secretary? Governor? Vice or deputy provincial secretary? Vice governor? City secretary? 
Mayor? City vice secretary? Vice mayor? Or was it a sub-city or county leader? Was it a low 
ranking post (or not) (any post lower than the vice provincial governor or deputy secretary 
level)? All the above independent variables are dummy variables, except the leader’s age.  
Model 2: The likelihood that a Chinese regional leader will receive a dismissal from his 
current regional leadership post is associated with his age, higher educational level, 
Communist Youth League working experience, current working location (East, West, Middle, 
or Northeast of China), whether his current region is a poor region (or not), whether the 
leader was accused by the center of being corrupt (or not), had violated other laws (or not), 
had duty-related mistakes or incompetence (or not); whether any large scale accidents 
happened under his leadership (or not), whether any large scale people’s protests occurred (or 
not), whether the leader’s behavior had caused issues of political instability (or not). 
Furthermore, had the leader been involved in any personal scandals (or not); whether any of 
the accusations mentioned above released by the news media earlier than the authority (or not) 
had caused greater public disruptions? Finally, what was the leader’s post? Provincial 
secretary? Governor? Vice or deputy provincial secretary? Vice governor? City secretary? 
Mayor? City vice secretary? Vice mayor? Or was it a sub-city or county leader? Was it a low 
ranking post (or not) (any post lower than the vice provincial governor or deputy secretary 




Model 3: The likelihood that a Chinese regional leader will lose his CCP membership is 
associated with his age, higher educational level, Communist Youth League working 
experience, current working location (East, West, Middle, or Northeast of China), whether 
his current region is a poor region (or not), whether the leader was accused by the center of 
being corrupt (or not), had violated other laws (or not), had duty-related mistakes or 
incompetence (or not); whether any large scale accidents happened under his leadership (or 
not), whether any large scale people’s protests occurred (or not), whether the leader’s 
behavior had caused issues of political instability (or not). Furthermore, had the leader been 
involved in any personal scandals (or not); whether any of the accusations mentioned above 
released by the news media earlier than the authority (or not) had caused greater public 
disruptions? Finally, what was the leader’s post? Provincial secretary? Governor? Vice or 
deputy provincial secretary? Vice governor? City secretary? Mayor? City vice secretary? 
Vice mayor? Or was it a sub-city or county leader? Was it a low ranking post (or not) (any 
post lower than the vice provincial governor or deputy secretary level)? All the above 
independent variables are dummy variables, except the leader’s age.  
Model 4: The likelihood that a Chinese regional leader will be sentenced to jail for 
wrongdoing is associated with his age, higher educational level, Communist Youth League 
working experience, current working location (East, West, Middle, or Northeast of China), 
whether his current region is a poor region (or not), whether the leader was accused by the 
center of being corrupt (or not), had violated other laws (or not), had duty-related mistakes or 
incompetence (or not); whether any large scale accidents happened under his leadership (or 
not), whether any large scale people’s protests occurred (or not), whether the leader’s 
behavior had caused issues of political instability (or not). Furthermore, had the leader been 
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involved in any personal scandals (or not); whether any of the accusations mentioned above 
released by the news media earlier than the authority (or not) had caused greater public 
disruptions? Finally, what was the leader’s post? Provincial secretary? Governor? Vice or 
deputy provincial secretary? Vice governor? City secretary? Mayor? City vice secretary? 
Vice mayor? Or was it a sub-city or county leader? Was it a low ranking post (or not) (any 
post lower than the vice provincial governor or deputy secretary level)? All the above 
independent variables are dummy variables, except the leader’s age.  
Model 5: The likelihood that a Chinese regional leader will eventually recover from previous 
punishment is associated with his age, higher educational level, Communist Youth League 
working experience, current working location (East, West, Middle, or Northeast of China), 
whether his current region is a poor region (or not), whether the leader was accused by the 
center of being corrupt (or not), had violated other laws (or not), had duty-related mistakes or 
incompetence (or not); whether any large scale accidents happened under his leadership (or 
not), whether any large scale people’s protests occurred (or not), whether the leader’s 
behavior had caused issues of political instability (or not). Furthermore, had the leader been 
involved in any personal scandals (or not); whether any of the accusations mentioned above 
released by the news media earlier than the authority (or not) had caused greater public 
disruptions? Finally, what was the leader’s post? Provincial secretary? Governor? Vice or 
deputy provincial secretary? Vice governor? City secretary? Mayor? City vice secretary? 
Vice mayor? Or was it a sub-city or county leader? Was it a low ranking post (or not) (any 
post lower than the vice provincial governor or deputy secretary level)? All the above 
independent variables are dummy variables, except the leader’s age.  
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           Furthermore, the current analysis utilizes a multinomial logistics regression analysis to 
examine the regional leaders’ demotions and dismissals issued by the center. “The Multinomial 
Downward Mobility Models” are as follows: 
 
 
Model 6: The likelihood that a Chinese regional leader will experience downward political 
mobility of one administrative level is associated with his age, higher educational level, 
Communist Youth League working experience, current working location (East, West, Middle, 
or Northeast of China), whether his current region is a poor region (or not), whether the 
leader was accused by the center of being corrupt (or not), had violated other laws (or not), 
had duty-related mistakes or incompetence (or not); whether any large scale accidents 
happened under his leadership (or not), whether any large scale people’s protests occurred (or 
not), whether the leader’s behavior had caused issues of political instability (or not). 
Furthermore, had the leader been involved in any personal scandals (or not); whether any of 
the accusations mentioned above released by the news media earlier than the authority (or not) 
had caused greater public disruptions? Finally, what was the leader’s post? Provincial 
secretary? Governor? Vice or deputy provincial secretary? Vice governor? City secretary? 
Mayor? City vice secretary? Vice mayor? Or was it a sub-city or county leader? Was it a low 
ranking post (or not) (any post lower than the vice provincial governor or deputy secretary 
level)? All the above independent variables are dummy variables, except the leader’s age. Set 





Model 7: The likelihood that a Chinese regional leader will experience downward political 
mobility of at least two administrative levels is associated with his age, higher educational 
level, Communist Youth League working experience, current working location (East, West, 
Middle, or Northeast of China), whether his current region is a poor region (or not), whether 
the leader was accused by the center of being corrupt (or not), had violated other laws (or 
not), had duty-related mistakes or incompetence (or not); whether any large scale accidents 
happened under his leadership (or not), whether any large scale people’s protests occurred (or 
not), whether the leader’s behavior had caused issues of political instability (or not). 
Furthermore, had the leader been involved in any personal scandals (or not); whether any of 
the accusations mentioned above released by the news media earlier than the authority (or not) 
had caused greater public disruptions? Finally, what was the leader’s post? Provincial 
secretary? Governor? Vice or deputy provincial secretary? Vice governor? City secretary? 
Mayor? City vice secretary? Vice mayor? Or was it a sub-city or county leader? Was it a low 
ranking post (or not) (any post lower than the vice provincial governor or deputy secretary 
level)? All the above independent variables are dummy variables, except the leader’s age. Set 
the base outcome as “1”.  
 
Here, no change of post is coded as “0”, demotion is coded as “1”, and dismissal is coded as “2”. 
The purpose of utilizing the multinomial model is to examine downward mobility short of being 




Table 5.5a: Logistics Regression Models of Regional Leader’s Downward Political Mobility 
 (1) (2) (3) 




 (0.0269) (0.0318) (0.0316) 
    
college 1.167 1.627 0.573 
 (0.524) (0.698) (0.314) 
    
psec 0.166 0.261 15550853.1 
 (0.208) (0.340) (2.06534e+10) 
    
gov 0.818 3.591 0.954 
 (0.782) (5.006) (1.149) 
    
pvsec 1.667 1.862 1.545 
 (1.006) (1.738) (1.127) 
    
vgov 1.506 2.064 1.418 
 (0.869) (1.872) (0.933) 
    
csec 0.656 1.356 0.834 
 (0.436) (1.283) (0.707) 
    
cvsec 0.801 4.692 0.500 
 (0.553) (4.879) (0.418) 
    
mayor 0.646 2.318 1.040 
 (0.405) (2.056) (0.834) 
    
vmayor 0.000000272 0.0000506 2.289 
 (0.000262) (0.0318) (3.378) 
    
county 0.000000695 0.0000749 0.834 
 (0.000670) (0.0471) (1.269) 
    
league 1.622 1.392 0.364 
 (1.073) (1.174) (0.306) 
    
east 2.130 0.600 3.169 
 (1.692) (0.680) (3.145) 
    
west 0.479 3.409 1.727 
 (0.450) (4.485) (1.944) 
    
middle 1.070 1.981 1.017 
 (0.916) (2.464) (1.076) 
    
northeast 0.734 10.97 0.973 









 (1.093) (0.178) (0.850) 






 (0.228) (6.161) (7.653) 
    
accident 1.281 1.573 0.919 
 (0.726) (0.881) (0.670) 
    
stability 0.490 2.357 1.951 
 (0.302) (1.291) (1.400) 
    
movements 1.663 1.116 5.58e-08 
 (1.334) (0.772) (0.0000742) 




 (0.456) (2.267) (1.077) 
    
duty_mstk 3.580
**
 0.796 0.541 
 (1.518) (0.318) (0.247) 
    
first_media 2.006 1.066 1.485 
 (0.746) (0.435) (0.668) 
    
scandal 0.570 3.205 7.944
***
 
 (0.221) (2.371) (4.507) 
    
low_rank 4482077.9 39765.7 0.515 
 (4.31678e+09) (24991239.0) (0.720) 
    
landissue 0.716 0.845 0.945 
 (0.303) (0.362) (0.454) 
N 308 308 308 
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 




Table 5.5b: Logistic Regression Models of Regional Leaders’ Downward Political Mobility 
 (4) (5) 




 (0.0321) (0.0315) 




 (0.657) (1.559) 
   
psec 2.026 6.853 
 (2.500) (12.14) 
   
gov 2.264 1.771 
 (2.657) (2.478) 
   
pvsec 1.993 1.442 
 (1.436) (1.429) 
   
vgov 3.387 2.327 
 (2.298) (2.208) 
   
csec 1.868 1.034 
 (1.607) (1.071) 
   
cvsec 2.008 1.323 
 (1.746) (1.454) 
   
mayor 2.646 0.317 
 (2.147) (0.307) 
   
vmayor 4.609 258851.7 
 (6.901) (607466937.5) 
   
county 0.687 189322.1 
 (1.091) (444296606.6) 
   
league 0.643 2.524 
 (0.504) (2.372) 
   
east 0.491 0.130 
 (0.466) (0.180) 
   
west 0.367 0.0999 
 (0.401) (0.155) 
   
middle 0.392 0.312 
 (0.399) (0.452) 
   






   
poor_reg 1.596 0.848 
 (0.912) (0.617) 






 (5.020) (0.0199) 
   
accident 0.626 1.007 
 (0.480) (0.654) 
   
stability 1.330 0.510 
 (1.039) (0.297) 
   
movements  0.947 
  (0.731) 
   
violation 1.639 0.657 
 (0.661) (0.404) 
   
duty_mstk 0.526 1.752 
 (0.238) (0.797) 
   
first_media 0.978 1.363 
 (0.426) (0.620) 




 (2.019) (0.136) 
   
low_rank 1.046 0.00000258 
 (1.451) (0.00607) 
   
landissue 1.817 0.864 
 (0.871) (0.401) 
N 284 308 
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 




Table 5.6 Multinomial Regression Models of Regional Leader’s Downward Political Mobility 



















 (0.000252) (0.0286) (0.000269) (0.0328) 
     
college 3.23e-40 1.149 2.81e-40 0.870 
 (1.50e-35) (0.524) (1.31e-35) (0.397) 
     
psec 1.4044e+155 1.137 1.2350e+155 0.879 
 (3.2819e+160) (1.798) (2.8859e+160) (1.391) 
     
gov 2.13e-33 0.302 7.05e-33 3.309 
 (3.50e-28) (0.446) (1.16e-27) (4.886) 
     
pvsec 5.5896e+128 0.327 1.7104e+129 3.060 
 (1.3043e+134) (0.334) (3.9912e+134) (3.127) 
     
vgov 0.000256 0.653 0.000393 1.532 
 (61.20) (0.603) (93.78) (1.415) 
     
csec 2.33e-31 0.623 3.73e-31 1.604 
 (4.57e-26) (0.618) (7.33e-26) (1.591) 
     
cvsec 7.39453e+62 0.186 3.97958e+63 5.382 
 (1.06736e+68) (0.191) (5.74433e+68) (5.542) 
     
mayor 7.56e-17 0.840 9.00e-17 1.191 
 (1.81e-11) (0.760) (2.15e-11) (1.077) 
     
vmayor 3.02589e+17 1.121 2.69975e+17 0.892 
 (1.71644e+22) (0.538) (1.53143e+22) (0.428) 
     
league 3.70e-47 0.643 5.75e-47 1.556 
 (4.92e-42) (0.551) (7.66e-42) (1.334) 
     
east 1.03e-39 1.014 1.01e-39 0.986 
 (2.69e-34) (1.185) (2.65e-34) (1.153) 
     
west 1.22e-51 0.178 6.85e-51 5.619 
 (1.92e-46) (0.245) (1.08e-45) (7.739) 
     
middle 6.50e-83 0.381 1.70e-82 2.621 
 (1.04e-77) (0.494) (2.73e-77) (3.396) 
     





(1.11e-85) (0.171) (9.43e-85) (12.31) 






 (79.14) (4.479) (12.81) (0.117) 






 (1.31452e+61) (0.0443) (1.73799e+62) (7.751) 
     
accident 0.000196 0.327 0.000600 3.058 
 (17.10) (0.193) (52.30) (1.807) 
     
stability 1.44e-15 1.158 1.24e-15 0.864 
 (4.86e-11) (0.664) (4.20e-11) (0.496) 
     
movements 5.8147e+100 0.478 1.2160e+101 2.091 
 (5.1152e+105) (0.348) (1.0697e+106) (1.523) 






 (2.11e-50) (0.112) (9.62e-50) (2.338) 
     
duty_mstk 35.29 1.166 30.28 0.858 
 (3522909.3) (0.474) (3022635.4) (0.349) 
     
first_media 8.35014e+93 1.501 5.56297e+93 0.666 
 (1.14204e+98) (0.612) (7.60839e+97) (0.272) 
     
scandal 2.28e-67 0.307 7.42e-67 3.253 
 (2.19e-63) (0.234) (7.13e-63) (2.475) 
     
low_rank 8.49e-71 0.637 1.33e-70 1.571 
 (2.27e-65) (0.532) (3.57e-65) (1.313) 
     
landissue 2.70e-90 0.555 4.86e-90 1.800 
 (8.34e-86) (0.257) (1.50e-85) (0.831) 
N 308  308  
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 






            The analyses above point to the following major findings:  
            (1) Post-Deng era’s Chinese regional leaders who had received demotions were more 
likely to have received those demotions because of poor performance in their leadership duties. 
Leaders who failed to treat their jobs as seriously as the center expected, or who caused serious 
mistakes would be demoted. Also, if the leader’s mistake(s) was released to the media before the 
authorities could act and consequently caused public attention, the leader was more likely to be 
demoted. The independent variable has significant influence on the likelihood. It indicates the 
center’s effort to minimize the negative publicity caused by the leader’s wrongdoing. In addition, 
leaders from poorer regions are more likely to be demoted than leaders from richer regions. 
However, this prediction is successful only at a lower significance level (results are shown in 
Table 5.5a).  
            (2) Regression analysis shows that regional leaders who were dismissed and removed 
completely from the political system by the center were those who had corrupt activities and 
were accused of accepting bribes. This finding provides support for the hypothesis offered earlier. 
Also, leaders with other serious illegal violations (damaging the national security, leaking 
confidential intelligence, abusing power, violating human rights and privacy, brutal or violent 
behavior, crime-related activities including murder) were very likely to be removed and 
dismissed, ending their political careers. Again, results show that leaders from poorer regions 
were more likely to be dismissed than leaders of the developed regions. Meanwhile, leaders of 
older age were more likely to be dismissed once they were associated with wrongdoing. Issues 
concerning political stability (protests, people’s criticisms, or damage to the party-state’s rule 
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and legitimacy) can also cause leaders to be dismissed. But the prediction is successful at a lower 
confidence interval.  
                (3) Regression analysis shows that Chinese regional leaders who lost their CCP 
membership were more likely to have been charged with corruption or bribe-taking. Among 
observed cases, leaders who lost their CCP memberships were frequently accused of corruption. 
Also, leaders who lost CCP memberships were those who were accused of other unlawful 
violations and illegal wrongdoings. In addition, regional leaders who were involved in personal 
scandals (especially if the sandals were known to the public) as well as their other misbehaving 
were likewise highly likely to be deprived of their CCP memberships. Chinese regional leaders 
are considered party-state’s technocrats yet ones who enjoy traditionally acknowledged, 
mandarin-like, higher social status. They do not represent only the political authority of the party, 
but also carry the CCP’s legitimate and moral image. The results show that the CCP center has 
little tolerance for any damage to its reputation caused by its regional leaders’ adulteries or other 
licentious behaviors. The likelihood is statistically significant (see Table 5.5a).  
                 (4) Regression analysis shows that post-Deng regional leaders who were jailed for 
criminal charges by the government were much more likely to be those who were corrupt and 
tainted by personal scandals at the same time. The results suggest that corruption is very often 
used by the central authority as a primary accusation in jailing its fallen regional leaders. 
Meanwhile, results show that vice governors had a much higher probability of being jailed than 
any other regional leadership posts observed in the study. It shows that executives are more 
exposed to the danger of being caught by the center for their misbehaving. Also, results show 
that leaders who worked at in Northeastern China were more likely to be jailed than regional 
leaders from other parts of the country (see Table 5.5b). 
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                (5) Regression analysis shows that regional leaders who eventually recovered from 
demotions and dismissals were those who were younger and with higher education credentials. 
Also, leaders accused of being corrupt at the time of their removals (but without other types of 
accusations) were more likely to recover their governmental posts than those who were removed 
for other wrongdoings (see Table 5.5b). It seems that the center still values such leaders’ 
usefulness despite their greed. Yet, there were only a relatively small number of cases of political 
recovery, and making reappearance can be a highly complicated issue involving both personal 
capabilities and political opportunities simultaneously. Deng Xiaoping himself was a well-
known example of that during his political life. He was purged three times and returned to power 
three times. Indeed his final political reappearance in 1977 was eminently successful.
128
 Yet 
Deng was surely never accused of crime-related charges by the party leaders, including 
Chairman Mao.  
                   Furthermore, to clearly present the trajectories of downward political mobility of 
Chinese regional leaders, the multinomial regression models have suggested the following: 
regional leaders who received demotions and dismissals were those of younger ages, were 
accused of incorrectly handling accidents (i.e., mining accidents, collective food poisonings, 
public terror threats or incidents, environmental pollutions, and so on). Also, those leaders facing 
corruption charges and other unlawful violations were likely to be demoted. In addition, regional 
leaders of the poorer regions of China were more likely to be demoted, once being charged for 
their wrongdoings. All other thins held constant, regional leaders of less developed regions of 
China are more vulnerable to the center’s disciplinary actions (see Table 5.6).  
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               To summarize, the analytical models presented here have been successful in explaining 
the downward political mobility in general of Chinese regional leaders in post-Deng Chinese 
politics. It is clearer that the center downgrades or removes its regional leaders with fairly 
reasonable charges and accusations. Most regional leaders were removed in the name of justice 
and the rule of law. It is now unusual for the center to remove or purge any of its regional leaders 
without proper excuses and strong evidence of the leader’s wrongdoing. Although there could be 
political reasons and private motivations for the top leaders to reshuffle a local government and 
its leaders, they would take pains to make the whole process look normal.  
               Moreover, involvement in serious corruption and illegal activities are the most 
frequently used accusations by the center to remove or rectify its regional leaders. And these 
charges never fail to work as the entire bureaucracy has been corrupt due to the rent-seeking 
authoritarian regime-controlled market economy.  
B. Geopolitical Preferences and Chinese Regional Leaders’ Political Resilience 
               By all means, the reform initiated by Deng Xiaoping when he became the actual leader 
of China in the late 1970s has by far brought tremendous changes to Chinese society and the 
state. In fact, Deng’s original reformist plans not only included economic transformation to 
market economy, but also included a rich bundle of political reforms to the CCP. He pushed 
these reforms even though he was reportedly to have despised “Western-styled” parliamentary 
democracy as an unacceptable institutional choice for the Chinese state. However, there have 
been newer but trickier problems confronting the CCP after Deng’s retreat from public politics 
and his eventual death in 1997.  
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              The decentralized market and export-led economic growth over the last three decades 
have caused a visible decline of the CCP’s centralized authority, and an enormous developmental 
gap between the more industrialized coastal regions of China and the less developed Midwest. 
The inklings of the problem were actually foreseen by Deng himself, but he seemed to be too 
optimistic about the situation to leave the party any specific instructions for the future. Gradually, 
the disparity between China’s economic reform and its political transition has started showing its 
significant negative side. Not only is the future of Chinese people’s livelihood now hijacked by 
the rumors of a potential collapse of the state-orchestrated economic growth, but also those 
economically advanced regions of China are corrupting the regime by taking advantages of it.  
              Up to now the study has revealed many important patterns of Chinese regional leaders’ 
career movements, and it is now quite clear that different regions, due to their geographic and 
socioeconomic differences, occupy different levels of political importance to the center. 
Naturally, these regions are able to influence the center’s political moves as well by rearranging 
the settings of regional political systems and their elites. The elites’ performances and the 
center’s preferences for the regions they lead combine to determine the opportunities the elites 
receive for further political advancement.   
              Furthermore, it has been hypothesized that compared to the rest of the regional leaders 
in post-Deng’s China, regional leaders who head the economically advanced regions of China 
have more resilience facing the center’s discipline over the leaders’ corruption and other 
unlawful violations. As demonstrated in the first part of the chapter, regional leaders from the 
less developed regions of China are more likely to be demoted and dismissed when their 
wrongdoings are discovered by the center. On one hand, it could be true that in the less 
developed regions of China, their socioeconomic development is more dependent on the 
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governments’ strength and determination to modernize. In a way, the bigger role the local 
government plays in the economy, the more wrongdoing opportunities the regional leaders might 
encounter as they are given more power with less control. On the other hand, it can be more 
realistic to reason that in less developed regions of China, the relatively less political importance 
the regional leaders have exposes them to greater danger of being punished by the center for their 







                 Based on the findings in previous parts of this study, longer years in regional 
leadership services contribute to a regional leader’s upward political mobility (getting promoted); 
and constitutionally, a provincial leader in China can serve only two 5-year terms up to 10 years 
total. A city leader can also serve two terms of 5 years each, up to 10 years of services in the 
same post. The analysis of the data on Chinese regional leaders show that on average, provincial 
leaders in China serve 5 years before they receive other occupational options granted by the 
center; and city leaders serve 4.3 years in average before they move forward to other positions 




Table 5.7 Regional Leaders of the City of Shenzhen and Their Post Changes 
Year Name Post Length(Year) Previous Location After Location2 Change of Region 
1995 Li Zibin Mayor 5 Vice Minister Central Minister Central Y 
1998 Zhang Gaoli Secretary 3 Vice Gov. Guangdong Gov. Shandong Y 
2000 Yu Youjun Mayor 3 Provincial Guangdong Vice Gov. Hunan Y 
2001 Huang Liman Secretary 4 City Dep. Sec. Shenzhen Provincial NPC Guangdong N 
2005 Xu Zongheng Mayor 4 City Dep. Sec. Shenzhen Dismiss N/A N/A 
2005 Li Hongzhong Secretary 2 Vice Gov. Guangdong Gov. Hubei Y 
2007 Liu Yupu Secretary 3 Provincial Guangdong City NPC Shenzhen N 
2010 Wang Rong Secretary 1 City Sec. Suzhou N/A - - 
Mean N/A N/A 3.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Source: Author’s Database 
Table 5.8 Regional Leaders of the City of Suzhou and Their Post Changes 
Year Name Post Length(Year) Previous Location After Location2 Change of Region 
1998 Liang Baohua Secretary 2 Vice Gov. Jiangsu Gov. Jiangsu N 
2000 Chen Deming Secretary 2 City Dep. Sec. Suzhou Gov. Shaanxi Y 
2001 Yang Weize Mayor 3 Bureau Chief Jiangsu City Sec. Wuxi N 
2002 Wang Min Secretary 2 Vice Gov. Jiangsu Gov. Jilin Y 
2004 Wang Rong Secretary 5 Mayor Wuxi Mayor Shenzhen Y 
2008 Yan Li Mayor 3 City Dep. Sec. Suzhou N/A - - 
2009 Jiang Kunhong Secretary 2 Mayor Nanjing N/A - - 
Mean N/A N/A 2.7 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 






Table 5.9 Regional Leaders of the City of Wenzhou and Their Post Changes 
Year Name Post Length(Year) Previous Location After Location2 Change of Region 
1984 Yuan Fanglie Secretary 1 Mayor Zhejiang Prov. Court Hangzhou N 
1984 Lu Shengliang Mayor 4 Vice Mayor Zhejiang City NPC Wenzhou N 
1985 Dong Chaocai Secretary 5 City Sec. Zhejiang Vice Gov. Hangzhou N 
1988 Liu Xirong Mayor 2 Provincial Zhejiang Vice Gov. Hangzhou N 
1990 Chen Wenxian Mayor 6 Vice Mayor Zhejiang State Business Hangzhou N 
1990 Kong Xiangyou Secretary 2 Vice Mayor Zhejiang Prov. NPC Hangzhou N 
1992 Zhang Youyu Secretary 6 Vice Mayor Wenzhou Vice Gov. Hangzhou N 
1996 Qian Xingzhong Mayor 7 Vice Mayor Zhejiang Business - - 
1998 Jiang Jufeng Secretary 4 Provincial Zhejiang Vice Gov. Chengdu Y 
2002 Li Qiang Secretary 2 Mayor Zhejiang Prov. Dep. Sec. Zhejiang N 
2003 Liu Qi Mayor 3 City Dep. Sec. Zhejiang City Sec. Ningbo N 
2004 Wang Jianman Secretary 4 City Dep. Sec. Hangzhou Vice Gov. Hangzhou N 
2006 Shao Zhanwei Mayor 2 Vice Mayor Ningbo Mayor Hangzhou N 
2008 Zhao Yide Mayor 3 City Dep. Sec. Wenzhou City Sec. Quzhou N 
2010 Chen Derong Secretary 1 Mayor Jiaxing N/A - - 
2010 Wu Weirong Mayor 1 Mayor Jinhua N/A - - 
Mean N/A N/A 3.3 N/A N/A N/A N/A  





                It is a reasonable outcome to observe that most Chinese regional leaders can tenure 
their posts to finish their first term. Meanwhile, analysis in previous chapter shows that regional 
leaders who receive demotions and dismissals were strongly associated with short years of 
services. In other words, many demoted or dismissed regional leaders received the punishment 
before they were able to finish their first term. The 352 observations made by the study have 
shown the same pattern of downward political mobility (results are shown in Table 4.18). In 
general, the common pattern we have found is: the longer a regional leader has served, the 
greater the chance that the leader can be promoted. The shorter years a leader has served, the 
greater the chance that the leader may be demoted. It is understandable that it would take some 
time for the leaders to prove themselves to be qualified as the CCP center’s loyal servants.  
                However, it seems that Chinese regional leaders from the economically advanced 
regions might have been able to change the rule of the game. The City of Shenzhen in 
Guangdong Province, the City of Suzhou in Jiangsu Province, and the City of Wenzhou in 
Zhejiang Province, are all located in more developed coastal provinces of China. All of them are 
more industrialized cities in their own province, and all of them are considered outstanding 
revenue generators to their provinces and the CCP center. As shown in Tables 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9, 
there are two smashing features that each of their leaders shared in common that deserve to be 
noticed.  
             First, in average, city leaders in all the 3 cities had served much shorter tenures than the 
national average of the regional leaders. Leaders of Shenzhen changed only every 3.1 years in 
average (Table 5.7), leaders of Suzhou changed every 2.7 years in average (Table 5.8), and 
leaders of Wenzhou changed every 3.3 years (Table 5.9). In other words, leaders in these 3 cities 
move rapidly. Changing posts within short periods of time not only avoided demotions to the 
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leaders of these cities, but also provided the majority of them with promotion opportunities that 
many other Chinese regional leaders (especially the city leaders who are younger yet ranked 
relatively lower) have been seeking for years.  
            Second, a great number of the leaders from the 3 cities experienced upward political 
mobility from the tier of city leaders to the tier of provincial leaders. As has been pointed out in 
previous parts of the study, among thousands of city leaders in China, only a small number are 
fortunate enough to become provincial or ministerial leaders in the future of their political career. 
Failure to be promoted to the provincial tier usually would not give a city leader any chance to 
step up on the CCP’s Central Committee, the club of the senior Chinese officials, and very likely 
the city leader will end up working in the municipal government until he retires. The ranking 
barriers that haunt the lower-ranked Chinese regional leaders are considered the “bottle-neck” of 
a political elite’s career. In other words, among the city leaders with similar educational 
background, training and expertise, and career experience, some of them received promotions 
earlier and more frequently, making them ranked higher in the political system of China. The rest 
of them seem to be less mobilized and stuck with the posts and locations they have had. They 
can, however, keep the privileges associated with regional political elites and some lower-ranked 
posts can be considerably lucrative inside a regional government. Yet with less hope of getting 
promoted to the upper tier of the political system, their career future is indeed gloomier than 
those regional leaders who have broken through the bottle-neck of their career prospects. 
              It is important to remember that none of the three cities―Shenzhen, Suzhou, or 
Wenzhou―is the capital city of their provinces, and that none of them is the most populous city 
of the province in which they are located. The vital political importance they occupy on the 
CCP’s map is due to their crucial function as some of the most important economic engines of 
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industrial China. As rewards, after serving the center as its managers of regional economic 
development and revenue creation, these city leaders can receive promotion opportunities that 
are higher than the national average, elevating them into the provincial leaders’ club. Therefore, 
serving as regional leaders at specific locations in China where the state’s economic and 
financial lifelines are located can be the turning points for the regional leaders to successfully 








              To sum up, the elite sample examined in this study was randomly chosen. More typical 
cases are the supersized Chinese cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing, where their 
municipal leaders are current Politburo members. With no biased preferences regarding any 
region of China, this study argues that the impact of the locational, socioeconomic and 
geopolitical settings of Chinese regional governments on the political mobility opportunities of 





Figure 5.1 Political Mobility Patterns of Chinese Regional Leaders in the Post-Deng Xiaoping Era 
Legend: Straight arrows in orange show transfers of regional leaders among different regions and from the Communist Youth League to regional governments. 
Straight arrows in blue and red show leader’s promotions and mobility from/to the CCP center. Curvy arrows show regional or central leaders’ movements to the 
legislative branches of Chinese political system: the National People’s Congress systems and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference system.  
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C. Conclusion: The Regime’s Configuration of the Regional Leaders’ Political Mobility 
            Among the classical studies of social and political elites whose ultimate fates were 
concurrently associated with the regime, some scholars assert that there are a few important signs 
that show the declining quality of the regime’s elites. They would initially appear to be softer 
than before, showing others a more humane side. Yet they appear to be very greedy trying 
everything to increase their “unlawful appropriations and to indulge in major usurpations of the 
national patrimony.”
129
 It would be an ambiguous assertion to state that the Communist Party of 
China as the ruling force of the country is a declining elitist party. The Chinese economy is 
predictably moving forward and more and more Chinese people have improving lifestyles.   
             Meanwhile, to confront Pareto’s argument, the CCP party-state has not yet shown its 
more humanly soft side. It is a government that is highly sensitive to external political 
stimulation and to the Chinese people. It has also put up the world’s greatest Internet censorship 
system to filter potential risks brought on by recent movements in the Middle East.
130
 Also, 
prominent social activists who show resentment are considered as dissidents and are treated 




             The unyielding side the regime seems to be very determined to continue its single-party 
rule of the country such that potential competitors are not likely to set their foothold in the 
political arena. From the other side, Pareto’s assertion concludes that the systemic corruption of 
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the entire bureaucracy has become the primary force that exposes the regime to the Chinese 
people’s criticisms and discontentment.  
                 As the study has revealed in this chapter, a great number of demoted or dismissed 
Chinese regional leaders in recent decades were corrupt, accepting huge amounts of bribes. The 
market economy as an institutional design chosen by Deng Xiaoping was supposed to enhance 
competition and lawfulness in Chinese society. In fact, “the market economy with Chinese 
characteristics” has increased the opportunities for governmental officials to abuse their power 
by seeking lucrative personal gain from business and public investments.  
                  On one hand, the center’s removal of officials with corruptions, unlawful violations, 
scandals, and incompetence has shown the CCP center might be vigilant in disciplining its fallen 
cadres, even sending some senior governmental leaders to prisons and executing others. This 
shows that the center can respond to the people’s dissatisfaction toward the regime. On the other 
hand, the massive scales of power-abusing, rent-seeking corruption and violations have shown 
the great failure of the CCP’s management of its regional political elites. Given tremendous 
amounts of social and economic privileges with respect and prestige, a regular city leader in 
China should not be in desperate need of extra money as most of his proper private needs are 
being supplied by the government at the taxpayers’ expenses. On the contrary, however, regional 
leaders are turning their authority into various lucrative ways to maximize the personal gain by 
usurping state investments and blackmailing businessmen. If the CCP center should be directly 
responsible for its regional leaders’ wrongdoings, at the very least the center has failed to build 
an efficient nationwide administrative system.  
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                By comparing the patterns that have evolved over time, in this chapter has highlighted 
the transitions and changes of career patterns giving regional leaders downward political 
mobility. Unlike in Mao Zedong’s era, where regional leaders were dismissed mainly for 
political reasons even though they violated no laws, in post-Deng’s Chinese politics, the CCP 
center actually promotes and demotes its regional political elites for lawful administrative 
reasons. Primarily, a regional leader will be removed or punished for his actual illegal 
wrongdoing, not because of political accusations of being disloyal to the center. In fact, among 
the cases observed in the study, almost all of the dismissed regional leaders who were later put 
on trail pleaded guilty of their corruption and other violations. The majority of them accepted the 
sentences without further appeals. Though these cases cannot prove that the center was always 
correct with its accusations, at least it shows that the center’s accusations are somewhat 
reasonable and evidence-based.  
                Finally, the findings point out that even among the demoted or dismissed regional 
leaders, not all officials have been treated equally. The study shows that regional leaders from 
the more developed parts of China seem to have more political resilience that they are more 
likely to survive the center’s rectifications, are more likely to recover their careers after 
punishment. Regional leaders who led in the important economic centers of China received faster 
and higher upward political mobility opportunities than regional leaders from other regions of 
China. The developmental gap among Chinese regions not only creates inequality of economic 
growth, but also leads to political inequality among Chinese regional political elites.  
                Moreover, lower-ranked officials have been shown to be more likely to be exposed to 
the danger of getting rectified by the center for their unlawful violations and management 
failures. Executive posts such as vice mayors and vice governors who are in charge of operating 
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governmental policies in certain fields are especially more likely to be removed for the mistakes 
or accidents that directly involve these leaders. Therefore, another disparity of Chinese regional 
politics is that party officials (regional secretaries, deputy secretaries, et hoc genus omne) are 
ranked higher than governmental officials (governors, mayors, and their deputies) yet the party 
officials are usually less responsible for the governments’ mistakes and management failures. All 
being the employees of the CCP, it would a unilateral statement to assert that the center protects 
the party officials more; but the relatively lower-ranked executive regional leaders are more 
vulnerable for making the incorrect moves.  
                For example, the former provincial party secretary of Shanxi province, Mr. Zhang 
Baoshun, was appointed the Secretary in 2005 from his vice governor post of the same province. 
Later, from 2005 to early 2009, there came three different governors of Shanxi Province: Gov. 
Yu Youjun (2005-07) was dismissed for the province’s rural brickkiln’s labor-abusing scandal; 
Gov. Meng Xuenong (September 2007-September 2008) was forced to resign after the 
province’s mining accidents and increasing death tolls among the miners; and Minister Wang 
Jun (then Head of National Safety Inspection Division) was appointed as the Interim Governor 
(September 2008-January 2009) to deal with the aftermath. Three different governors with little 
working experiences in the province all took responsibility for the government’s mistakes, while 
party Secretary Zhang Baoshun who had been vice governor of the province since 2001, was not 
politically damaged at all by any of these unexpected events. When he finished his term as the 
CCP Secretary of Shanxi, Mr. Zhang was transferred to Anhui Province, President Hu Jintao’s 
hometown province and continued serving as the provincial party secretary.
132
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               The opacity of the regional political personnel arrangements of contemporary China not 
only makes the outsiders feel puzzled by watching it, but also makes the incumbent political 
actors face risky choices and sensitive subjects in policy-making decisions. A new term that 
describes the tricky situations and interweaved personal feelings of being a governmental official 
in China is luoguan (the Bare Officials). It refers to an official who has more or less secretive 
behaviors, especially of the unlawful kind, has sent his wife or children abroad with large 
amounts of cash. The possessions are the official gained through illegal means. Thus, once the 
official is caught by the center for his wrongdoing, the official can either flee quickly by leaving 
no worries behind, or go to prison by himself while his family members and properties remain 
safe and sound in a foreign country.
133
  
               It is undoubtedly logical that a regime’s elites are configured by the regime and become 
the agents of the regime that is greatly benefited by their effort to make the regime work. Elites 
should maintain their loyalty to the regime that provides them with privileges. By studying the 
demotions and dismissals of Chinese regional leaders in the post-Deng Xiaoping era we reach 
the conclusion that the current party-state regime of China is struggling to manage all of its 
regional elites, while the regional elites are also struggling to maintain their commitment to the 
regime.  
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“Mencius said to the king Xuan of Qi, ‘When the prince regards his ministers as his 
hands and feet, his ministers regard their prince as their belly and heart; when he regards them 
as his dogs and horses, they regard him as another man; when he regards them as the ground or 
as grass, they regard him as a robber and an enemy.’” 
――“Lilou, Book II,” Mencius (circa 4
th
 Century BC) 
 
               Chinese regional leaders have occupied a role of undeniably remarkable importance in 
the political history of China. Historically, Chinese regional political elites had traditionally 
played crucial roles in industrializing and modernizing the nation. The famous yet failed Self-
Strengthening Movement (1861-1895) of the late Qing Dynasty was initiated by some of the 
most open-minded governors of the stumbling Manchu Empire, while the center government was 
hesitant to make such moves for a very long time. 134 The direct effect of the failed effort of 
modernization through decentralized commerce and regionalized industrialization was the 
defeated Chinese naval forces in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895; the secondary effect which has 
not been forgiven by many people of China until in the 21
st
 century was the disabled regime of 
the late Qing dynasty and its great negligence that failed the entire nation. By reviewing history, 
many modern Chinese people seem to have more sympathy for the regional political leaders in 
the late Qing dynasty’s social upheavals than to the regime itself. Yet, by all means, when the 
last Chinese dynasty fell and was replaced by the Republic of China, the majority of its political 
elites lost their privileges and retreated from the forefront of Chinese politics to their mostly 
eremitic private lives.  
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                 With the findings of the study, we are certain to conclude at this stage that it is the 
particular type of regime that creates particular types of political elites (and socioeconomic elites 
as well) who in return work for the regime to make sure that the regime keeps functioning. In 
contemporary Chinese politics, Chinese regional leaders are protégés and agents of the party-
state regime who continuously get rewarded by the party in financial terms and in sociopolitical 
privileges. Overall, as in many other meritocracies found in world politics, the three most 
important parts of Chinese politics are the central government, the elites, the people; the 
interactions among them have reframed and reshaped the regimes in different time periods.  
A. The People: Judging the Regime by Its Elites 
                  Scholars and China watchers have noticed the evolving adaptions the CCP has made 
through the years since the end of the Cultural Revolution and especially the great economic 
changes brought by the post 1978 reform. In fact, the adaptions the CCP has made were not due 
solely to its internal party demand of self-improvement, but were due to the even greater changes 
taking places in Chinese society. The transition of the CCP from a highly centralized totalitarian 
Leninist party to a pro-business, post-totalitarian authoritarian political party has been pushed by 
the changing Chinese society which “has become far more plural, fluid, and dynamic, and the 
way in which it is governed needs to reflect that reality.” 135 The traditional point of view, which 
used to be held by the majority of Chinese people until the Maoist years of Chinese political 
history, that the state and the government that runs it represent the ultimate secular authority is 
gradually declining because of the rise of economic individualism and the popular demand for 
the rule of law to replace absolute obedience to the state and the government. The CCP and its 
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regional political leaders are adopting changes to their agenda in order to achieve more efficient 
governance of the people and the country.  
                   The study has revealed that the CCP center has been using highly complicated but 
carefully designed models in selecting capable cadres to operate the party-state’s nationwide 
regional governments ever since the establishment of the People’s Republic. We have found that 
in the past 60 years as the regime matures from an isolated revolutionary party to the dominant 
political force of a country of 1.4 billion, its regional leaders have also become much more 
educated, more professionalized, more open-minded (in adapting to globalization and dynamic 
changes in world economy and politics), more managerially skilled (in attracting foreign 
investments and promoting local economic growth), and more technocratic in terms of relying on 
solving problems and less on charisma in gaining popularity from the voters. In other words, 
compared to early revolutionary veterans appointed as regional leaders, contemporary Chinese 
regional leaders are more technically trained for the administrative professions as regional 
leaders. The people of China are the direct forces that push the CCP to adjust its way of 
organizing its regional political leadership. Only when the Chinese people’s livelihood is being 
improved can the people accept the regime as the legitimate authority or so-called government.  
                   Without fundamental progress in transforming the regional governments above and 
beyond reshuffling their leaders, the people of China would not view their regional leaders as 
their lawful and rightful representatives but rather as the agents of the center. As highlighted in 
the study, governing a Chinese province with tens of millions of residents brings no less 
governance-related issues and administrative challenges than governing a medium-sized country 
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of the world.136 The center relies on its provincial leaders to represent its authority while the 
provincial government relies on its municipal and county-level governmental branches and their 
principals to govern the locales. As a result, most Chinese do not encounter their mayors or 
governors in their daily lives (and many are not aware of regional governmental leadership 
reshuffles), not to mention powerful central leaders such as CC members, Politburo members or 
someone even more superior. It is the lower-ranked officials who interact with the people the 
most; and it is most often the case that a citizen would be mistreated by a local authority with 
relatively low ranking in the bureaucracy who often lacks the accomplishment or sophistication 
one may find from a higher-ranked CCP cadre. However, when people feel mistreated and 
abused by authority, they sometimes do not associate their dissatisfactions with their local 
officials who are lower-ranked or non-ranked governmental employees, but with the entire party-
state regime and its gigantic nation-wide bureaucracy. 137 Administratively, the CCP center 
controls its regional agents through party discipline, organizational means (mobility whips), and 
ideological propaganda (mind control). It is hardly true (or practically possible) that each and 
every local governmental policy comes directly from the Chinese central government. 
Nevertheless, when any of the local officials’ wrongdoings causes popular discontent, they 
forward their dissatisfaction to the upper level of the government as most people consider the 
authority of the central organs to be responsible for the aftermath. In other words, lacking of 
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transparency and openness, the CCP center’s control over its regional political leaders through its 
cadre policy does not concern most Chinese people. If the complaints do not bring better 
governance or people’s life-improvements it would be equally disappointing to the people as 
there were no change at all. The use of political mobility as the center’s powerful organizational 
weapon must be associated with realistic issues of people’s lives in order to generate more ruling 
legitimacy for the party-state regime. Otherwise, the people consider themselves as outsiders and 
in the situation of “taxation without representation” which not only increase their distrusts to 
their regional leaders but also of the CCP central authority.  
                   Fundamentally a regime must root itself into its people to survive any possible 
turbulence and crisis, and it seems to be common sense that a regime and its elites should have 
perceived. When all is said and done, the improvement of governance and the degree of the 
Chinese people’s satisfactions toward the regime must be considered seriously by the CCP center 
and its regional leaders. A complicated system of arranging regional governments may work to 
provide temporary solutions, but it is far from being a satisfactory solution to the people’s 
legitimate political demands. “The urban middle class wants national dignity, a sense of progress, 
a national purpose, and the opportunity for fulfillment through participation in the overall 
reconstruction of society.” 138 Political modernization, following the economic development 
brought on by the regime, has its own definition of a “good life.” It is the sort of change that has 
never existed before that these people want to occur; and they surely would not stop asking when 
only a few of their regional governmental heads had been demoted by the center. The task of 
maintaining the current system of rule requires the CCP to make changes: they might not be 
fundamental changes at this stage, but they must be effective changes that really work and are 
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compatible with China’s socioeconomic development and status as a rising great power in the 
world.  
B. The Elites: between the Regime and the People 
                   This study focused exclusively on Chinese regional leaders’ political mobility by 
tracking their career movements over the decades since the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China. Two of the most important findings presented in this study are: first, the CCP 
center has eventually adapted a much more normalized and institutionalized means of 
determining its regional elites’ career future; and second, while being a part of the larger political 
elite in contemporary China, regional leaders of China have been treated significantly differently 
due to the geopolitical and socioeconomic characteristics of the regions.  
                   The party-state government in China has created politically and socially privileged 
groups of Chinese regional leaders since the establishment of the People’s Republic. It is the 
regime which grants certain privileges to its political elites, and in return the elites are expected 
to maintain and defend the regime in order to keep themselves privileged. We have found that 
from Mao era to the post-Deng era, the majority of top Chinese leaders (the Central Committee 
members and its Politburo members as the ultimate decision-makers of the country) have more 
or less regional leading experience, especially those who were promoted since the economic 
reforms of the late 1970s. It indicates that some regional leaders of China are potentially going to 
be the leaders of the country someday; and being an important regional governmental head may 
be a stepping stone to the central leadership. This practice of the CCP center, as it has become a 
more institutionalized process, compels leaders in China’s regional governments to compete 
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(with each other) for the limited seats on the CC, and requires that one must be much more 
aggressive with greater strategic plans to fight for Politburo membership.  
              In consequence, under a regime where even a CC member (as they are already higher 
than being a regular provincial leader) still does not have full access to the top decision-making 
tier, and where an alternate CC member does not even have voting rights of the center’s 
decisions, the informal connections and resource-seeking communications among leaders play a 
crucial role in determining a leader’s career future and one’s use of power. In other words, when 
most leaders want to progress upward in the hierarchical system despite there being no 
formalized procedure to follow, the informal ways of getting promoted shall dominate the “high-
end” part of Chinese politics. Presumably, it will also create a tremendous amount of space and 
opportunities for factional politics and informal networks among Chinese political elites. Before 
it is released to the public, personnel decisions in Chinese politics are notably marked by rumors, 
mysteries, opacities, suspicions, and sometimes schemes, plots and distrust. There is no doubt 
that regional leaders and other political elites will be hurt by the highly unofficial ways of 
competition as they are dealing with uncertainties that even a professional politician cannot 
predict; yet eventually the efficiency and quality of the regime will be greatly weakened by its 
own imperfect mechanism of selecting leaders as its elites are afraid of the uncertain outcomes. 
By all means, being haunted by the rumors about leadership successions is no positive help for 
any government to continue its effort of making its policies work.  
               The delicate position of Chinese regional leaders, as being specially arranged by the 
party, makes them a medium between the CCP center and the Chinese people. In principle, the 
regional leaders are supposed to govern the people with the center’s institutions while expressing 
the people’s needs and sentiments to the center. Historically, the initiation of Deng Xiaoping’s 
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reformist ideas involved a series of decentralizing agricultural economy recovery plans carried 
out in a few selected provinces of China on an experimental basis.139 And those regional leaders 
who were bold in carrying out the reformist policies received central leadership posts as 
rewards.140 Yet, when the center over-emphasizes regional economic development as a 
measurement of its regional leaders it might generate unexpected problems. Because the fiscal 
and locational preferences of the CCP center factors into the promoting or demoting Chinese 
regional leaders, it actually makes those Chinese regional leaders who possess no geopolitical 
advantages or are without informal or fractional connections with top political figures of China 
almost excluded from further significant promotions. Having been treated differently, these 
regional elites’ behaviors viewed as acting against the center’s commands seem to be of some 
kind of explainable self-centeredness. If getting promoted from one’s leadership post is unlikely 
or with limited possibilities, one might think more about turning one’s post into profit by 
utilizing the governmental resources to make money in business through businessmen who are 
seeking such opportunities. As a result,  
“corruption discourse during the reform era is more diffuse and less politicized than was 
the case during these three time periods and relies more heavily on the language of the 
market than on political categories defined by the state. The images of political 
corruption that predominate in reform-era tabloids are frequently intermingled with lurid 
descriptions of criminal and deviant sexual behavior, and offer very little by way of 
political analysis as to possible causes or potential cures. As the state has receded to make 
room for market forces, corruption discourse itself has become commodified, eschewing 
the categories of class and status, and caters to a new set of manufactured popular 
desires. ” 141 
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                    Furthermore, when getting promotions becomes a mixed outcome of a regional 
leader’s performance, the center’s preference and the impact of informal connections with 
central leaders, it means that simply being a capable regional leader is not enough to ensure 
further promotion in this regional leader’s political career. Such a practical concern will make 
the regional leaders put much less weight on promoting their local people’s livelihood and 
socioeconomic development, and much more weight on getting connected with central leaders 
and having more publicity and fame. This study has found that regional leaders who work in the 
more developed regions of China get more opportunities for promotion; some of them get 
promoted much more quickly than leaders of other regions. After serving in these developed 
regions, these leaders either got promoted to the center or remained in the same region with 
higher posts: they rarely get transferred to the underdeveloped parts of the country where good 
governance can be more difficult to achieve due to the dearth of resources available. Thus, some 
Chinese regional leaders have all the advantages with outstanding career successes while some 
others have no such advantages.  
                    Moreover, this study’s finding that the higher-ranked regional leaders receive more 
protections of the center than the lower-ranked officials is a further reflection of the systemic 
bias that exposes the lower-ranked regional elites to the punishments that they may not have 
deserved. This study finds that accusations of corruption are frequently used by the CCP center 
to drag the fallen regional leaders down from their posts. Nevertheless, there are preferable 
patterns where the downgraded elites have not all been treated equally. If the elites are to be 
rewarded equally by the regime, they should be punished equally as well. Otherwise not only the 
accomplishments of the center would be reduced (or become excessively costly to achieve), its 
elites would also be turned away due to the inequality which even exists at the very nature of the 
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political mobility mechanism. Gradually, the effort to “promote administrative redesigns that 
enhance the sinews of governance and provide the foundations for a regulatory state,”142 which is 
supposed to be made by both the regime and its leaders of regional governments, would be 
achieved at much higher costs with many setbacks.  
                  The achievements of the regional governments that get little attention from the center 
may not have themselves availed properly by the party, and as the size of the bureaucracy is so 
gigantic that such cases can be unavoidable and more common than people have estimated. It 
surely is the misfortune of those regional leaders with great ambitions and a great loss to the 
regime that good governance can be achieved in more efficient ways. As has been emphasized 
multiple times in this study, the elites are viewed collectively by the outsiders yet they are 
actually very different from each other; it should be the regime that remains sensitive to the fact. 
Each and every elite of the regime should be treated equally with trust and respect that they 
deserve.  
C. The Regime: Ruling the People with the Elites 
                  By all means, the party-state system dominated by the Communist Party of China is a 
powerful regime run by professionals. The CCP has been paying close attention to the political 
arenas it is in, both domestic and international. The party and its center have been facing all sorts 
of challenges and tensions, and have understood the importance of adapting to these challenges. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union played a crucial role in making the CCP understand world 
politics better; despite the ideological constraints it carried at that time. With Deng Xiaoping’s 
insistence, the reform carried on without the disturbance from the more conservative CCP 
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leaders.143 Deng and other reformist Chinese leaders had realized that the way for the CCP to 
survive a political earthquake such as the collapse of the Soviet Union was not to halt the 
marketization but to expand it and deepen it. The conclusion they reached was that the ruling 
legitimacy of the CCP only exists in making the Chinese people happy. “To abandon the path of 
reform and opening now in favour of ideological orthodoxy would only lead the CCP, and China, 
to catastrophe of the sort befalling the CPSU and the USSR.” 144 Thus, the direction of further 
political change in China should start by reforming its regional governments and their leaders.  
                   It seems that the nature of Chinese politics has hardly changed for the past two 
centuries and that the center of political power has always strictly controlled its regional 
governmental heads, rewarding the best performers among them with opportunities of higher 
promotions and greater prestige. Regional elites have had to be both capable and intelligent in 
tackling the central government’s tasks efficiently while their ways of handling the regional 
governments must be acceptable and appropriate from the center’s point of view. However, 
much the intrinsic mechanism may have remained the same, the external world has changed 
almost fundamentally. Today’s world politics and the dynamic changes in Chinese society have 
left little time for the regime and its elites to think thoroughly before they react. As a matter of 
fact, the conventional model where the center commands and rearranges its regional political 
elites in order to achieve its notion of good governance under the center’s authority is facing 
potent challenges from both domestic and international sources. “This may help to improve the 
party’s popular legitimacy in the near term, but over the longer term more competitive dynamics 
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need to be introduced into the system.”145 The authority of the CCP center is being threatened, 
though in a gradual way, by other governments of the world, by the citizens of China with 
modernized political demands, and most important of all, by the CCP’s regional leaders as even 
the elites of the regime have started making plans for themselves.  
                   By controlling the political mobility of its regional leaders, the CCP center has 
unmistakable advantages in governing the party and the state with remarkable efficiency. 
Especially when the socialist market economy requires more decentralized and regionalized 
policies to adapt to the regional characteristics of China, by controlling the outputs (personnel 
system, GDP growth and revenues), instead of the inputs (investments and labor policies) of the 
regional political economy, it surely is a progressive way of making the regime work at lower 
costs. However, since the “economic decentralization has led to the feudalization of 
administrative power, and the power monopoly of the party has become the personal power 
monopoly of each chief administrator,” 146 one of the consequential outcomes is that the party 
uses the political mobility whip to balance the regional economic dominance and the center’s 
organizational authority. In consequence, sustained economic growth relies on the developed 
regions of China, but by controlling the regional leaders’ career movements the center can be 
assured that these regions will not challenge the center’s dominance by deepening the economic 
decentralization.  
                    Furthermore, by granting capable elites with upward mobility or transferring them to 
the more developed regions of China (as these regions are also more politically important), and 
by demoting or removing elites who failed to meet the center’s expectations, the center tries to 
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maintain its ruling authority by showing its regional leaders its “just” and “mighty” sides. 
However, with uprising people’s movements, mishandling of accidents and land disputes 
protests all pointing to China’s regional governments, it is doubtful that such a system will in 
fact increase the central government’s accountability (which actually matters the most to the 
regional leaders), and the continuity of its policies. As the lower-ranked regional leaders and 
leaders from less developed parts of the country get punished more frequently and harshly than 
those more powerful and higher-ranked leaders in the developed provinces, the accountability of 
the center’s personnel system might eventually decline in the eyes of its regional leaders. 
Moreover, when corrupt elites start to flee with all of their unlawful gains, gradually the people 
will lower their respect for the entire regime and do the same things that those corrupt officials 
have already been doing.  
                  Regional leaders are essential to the regime; the center’s effective control of the 
Chinese people comes from its effective control of regional leaders. To increase the 
accountability of the regime, the center must use more effective methods of managing its elites in 
order to achieve better governance with more credibility. Although punishments after crimes 
sounds like a solution, it might be more efficient to prevent crimes from happening in the first 
place. Since corrupt activities among Chinese regional leaders are more and more common and 
reach deeper and deeper degrees, perhaps it is the time for the center to rethink and modify its 
current system of mobility control over its regional leaders. All the arrangements of Chinese 
regional governance enacted by the center function to maintain the CCP’s ruling legitimacy; 
however, the satisfaction of the Chinese people must be treated by the center with at least as 
much importance as the center handles its regional political leaders. Otherwise the control of the 
regional leaders’ political mobility will bring only temporary peace to regional politics but no 
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help to the regime in the long run. Aside from the improvement of local governance as a long-
term goal for Chinese regional leaders to achieve, the accountability and accessibility of the 
regional governments in China can be achieved in a much shorter time with much lower costs by 
involving the regional elites. Numerable institutions have been set up to improve government 
work and to prevent possible official corruption. Furthermore, technology can also play a more 
crucial role than building up the “Great Fire Wall” by filtering politically sensitive information 
on the Internet. Some scholars argue that Chinese local governments have not been governing 
with transparency and dedication; the accessibility issue (of the governments’ websites) should 
be treated as a very important part of the continued development of e-government in China. 147 
The cost of keeping the communicating channel open is presumably much lower than making 
any systemic regime changes.  
                    Punishing its fallen corrupt regional leaders through lawful means is indeed a 
positive step taken by the CCP and when the center realizes the importance to maintain a good 
image, the rule of law will have a higher level of authority than any other institution of the 
regime. 148 When the regional leaders of China today are being demoted or dismissed for their 
wrongdoings, the center is making use of the law. It is remarkably different from the Mao and 
Deng eras of Chinese politics when the rule of law sometimes could not be applied to the central 
leaders of the CCP; yet the center must not forget that it must obey the laws itself even if it is the 
ultimate decision-maker of the regime. Political development, as important as economic 
development, must be achieved by the government in order to meet the Chinese people’s 
                                                          
147
 Yuquan Shi. “The Accessibility of Chinese Local Government Web sites: an exploratory study,” Government 
Information Quarterly, 24(2007), pp.399-400.  
148
 Francis Fukuyama. “Transition to the Rule of Law,” Journal of Democracy (2009), 21(1), p.35.  
257 
 
expectation for good governance. Among the essential elements of good governance: “a good 
legal system, clean and honest officials, high administrative efficiency, and good administrative 
services,” 
149
 it is the government that is responsible for bringing the people good livelihoods 
under the rule of law. When it comes to the rule of law, as it is most closely associated with good 
governance under many post-totalitarian authoritarian regimes, no single element of the party of 
the three (the people, the elites, and the regime) shall make itself exceptionally more powerful 
than the others.  
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